Risk of Mass Atrocities: What to Watch in Bangladesh

In August 2024, a popular uprising in Bangladesh ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her political party, the Awami League, from power. The abrupt shift has raised concerns about heightened political instability and the potential for mass atrocities. This piece addresses concerning trends to monitor regarding the risk of large-scale, systematic, group-targeted, identity-based violence against civilians in the country. 

Background

Bangladesh ranks 13th among 168 countries in the Early Warning Project’s assessment for countries’ risk of experiencing a new onset of mass killing in 2024/2025. In 2017, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide released a report assessing the risk for mass atrocities in Bangladesh, focusing on identity-based attacks that could result from political competition between the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) opposition alliance. The report suggested that a contested result following the December 2018 election posed the riskiest scenario for potential mass killing. When the AL won decisively, little violence followed. With the AL now out of power and elections due in 2025/2026, it is important to revisit the risk of identity-based mass atrocities in a time of drastic political upheaval.

Risk Factors

Bangladesh has several structural risk factors for mass atrocities. It has a long history of identity-based violence, rooted in its colonial past, the Partition of India (1947), and the Liberation War (1971). The Liberation War was marked by mass killings for which there has been little national reckoning. Bangladesh’s political landscape has historically been dominated by two political parties, the BNP and AL, with a winner-take-all approach, which has left the government highly prone to crisis. Human rights organizations have accused Prime Minister Hasina’s regime of systemic human rights violations during its 15-year rule, culminating in the use of force against protestors in 2024 that resulted in hundreds of deaths. Political and economic institutions in Bangladesh have a reputation for corruption, and systemic weaknesses in law enforcement and the judiciary present significant obstacles to confronting historical and contemporary violations. 

Following the uprising against former Prime Minister Hasina in 2024, mobs attacked groups perceived to be affiliated with the AL, especially Hindus. This aligns with previous instances in Bangladeshi history where political instability has triggered attacks on minorities, with religion serving as a fault line for broader political and social grievances. While the transitional government has the potential to play a stabilizing role, multiple local organizations have told the Simon-Skjodt Center that fear and tension are running high.

What to Watch

The interim government has expressed a willingness to implement electoral and security reforms, repudiate violence, and pursue accountability, all of which will be critical to mitigating the risk of mass atrocities. However, reports indicate police have resumed abusive practices (albeit on a smaller scale than in the summer of 2024). Rights groups have criticized the interim government for suppressing independent media and failing to protect minority groups. Misinformation and disinformation, often originating in India, pose a significant challenge for the interim government and put minority communities in both countries at risk for violence.

Vulnerable Communities

During and after the July Uprising in 2024, civilians engaged in revenge violence against those perceived to be affiliated with the AL. This mob violence primarily targeted historically vulnerable minority groups. Hindus have been disproportionately targeted, with reports of over 1,000 homes and businesses destroyed. The Ahmadiyya Muslim community has faced renewed persecution by fundamentalist groups, and indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts remain vulnerable to violent attacks, land dispossession, and sexual violence. Mob violence has diminished since 2024, and the interim government has reported over 100 arrests related to attacks on religious and indigenous communities. However, many perpetrators of retaliatory violence continue to enjoy impunity. 

The security of minorities in Bangladesh has regional implications. The relationship between India and Bangladesh is tenuous, given India’s staunch support for Hasina’s regime. During the uprising in 2024, misleading articles and videos concerning attacks on Hindus were circulating on Indian media, with some in India using unrest in Bangladesh to amplify anti-Muslim rhetoric at home. Violence in neighboring Burma has increased since 2023, and Rohingya fleeing renewed conflict in Burma’s Rakhine State into Bangladesh are at risk of being turned back to grave danger. The future of Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh has historically been politicized ahead of elections, which could potentially lead to violence between Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshis.

Upcoming elections

Bangladesh has signaled that it will hold general elections between late 2025 and mid-2026, contingent on the progress of electoral and constitutional reforms. While elections signal a positive step in political transitions, inadequate preparation and protection measures could heighten the risk of mass violence, especially given Bangladesh’s history of a winner-take-all approach and political unrest resulting in violence during power transitions. Protests and strikes (hartals) on a variety of political issues have continued since July 2024 and have the potential to turn violent during the election period. Political dynamics have shifted significantly; the AL has been banned, and a student-led National Citizens Party (NCP) has emerged. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party, a fundamentalist Islamist group, has broken with its former ally, the BNP. The growing strength of the JI could create tension between secular reformists and those who favor conservative Islamist principles. 

Resiliencies

The success of the interim government’s promised reforms and accountability efforts could increase resilience. Economic stability, once a resilience factor in Bangladesh, has been severely weakened by recent economic woes, making it a tenuous safeguard needing rebuilding. Civic space remains a critical resilience factor; for example, advocates and activists have organized to protect minorities. However, threats to freedom of expression can fuel mistrust ahead of future elections.

Conclusion

The mob violence that emerged during the initial period of unrest has diminished, and the interim government has pledged reforms. However, considerable uncertainty remains about whether the interim government will succeed in establishing political stability and safeguarding minority rights. Therefore, it will be important to monitor attacks against minorities, in particular those already targeted, namely Hindus, Ahmadiyya Muslims, and indigenous groups. Any increase in frequency and/or scale, or participation by state actors, would indicate that mass atrocity risks are increasing. It will be equally important for concerned governments, as part of their diplomatic engagement with Bangladesh, to support the interim government in implementing promised reforms, expanding civic space, preparing for free and fair elections, and protecting the rights of minority groups.

Angie Zheng is an intern with the Simon-Skjodt Center.