The Path to Vichy: Antisemitism in France in the 1930s

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Vichy’s two Jewish statutes of October 3, 1940, and June 2, 1941, defined Jews in racial terms as anyone having three or more grandparents “of the Jewish race” (irrespective of whether that person had converted) or two Jewish grandparents if married to a Jew. They barred Jews from all civil and military service posts, as well as all professions linked to the media or banking. The statutes furthermore authorized the Council of State to impose strict quotas of 2 and 3 percent respectively on Jewish participation in the liberal professions and in institutions of higher learning. Although exemptions were to be granted individuals who had fought for France or who had performed exceptional services to the state, these were allocated only sparingly.\(^1\) According to Susan Zuccotti, of 125 Jewish university professors who applied for exemptions in the fall of 1940, only ten had received them by the spring of 1941.\(^2\)

The preamble to the first statute, which sought to explain these laws to the French public and the international community, declared:

In its work of national reconstruction the government from the very beginning was bound to study the problem of Jews as well as that of certain aliens, who, after abusing our hospitality, contributed to our defeat in no small measure. In all fields and especially in the public service...the influence of Jews has made itself felt, insinuating and finally decomposing.
All observers agree in noting the baneful effects of their activity in the course of recent years, during which they had a preponderant part in the direction of our affairs. The facts are there and they command the action of the government to which has fallen the pathetic task of French restoration.\textsuperscript{3}

For a nation in which Jews had been emancipated for nearly 150 years, the Vichy statutes, which effectively de-emancipated all Jews, native and foreign-born alike, were shocking. As Raymond-Raoul Lambert, one of French Jewry’s preeminent spokesmen, commented in his diary after reading the text of this statute: “Racism has become the law of the new state. What a dishonor! I cannot yet understand this negation of justice and scientific truth....all my illusions are shattered. I cried, as a man who, unexpectedly, is about to be abandoned by the woman who has been the sole love of his life....”\textsuperscript{4} After the war it was frequently argued that these laws were foisted on the French by the Germans, but today we know, thanks largely to the work of Robert Paxton and Michael Marrus, that this was not true.\textsuperscript{5} Although these laws were clearly modeled on the Nazi Nuremberg laws, there is no evidence of any direct German prompting. Indeed, Vichy officials openly conceded that this was the case. As Henri du Moulin de Labarthète, Marshal Philippe Pétain’s civilian chief of staff, admitted after the war, “Germany was not at the origin of the anti-Jewish legislation of Vichy. This legislation was, if I dare say, spontaneous, native.”\textsuperscript{6}

If that is true, we need to ask where this antisemitism was coming from. Was it an aberration—an ideology linked only to a small number of zealots at Vichy? Or did it have broader popular support? Was this antisemitism merely a search for scapegoats so that the military did not have to take responsibility for the defeat, as the preamble to the \textit{Statut des Juifs} suggests? Or was it more central to the larger enterprise of Vichy? And finally, how was it possible that so much attention became focused on a group that numbered only about 300,000, fewer than 1 percent of the total population? Is it true, as some scholars have suggested, that the real problem in the 1930s was the problem of foreigners, not Jews?\textsuperscript{7} Or was there an antisemitism that arose independently of this more generalized xenophobia, and again, how widespread was it? These important questions touch on a recent highly contentious debate regarding the degree to which the broader French public supported these anti-Jewish measures. Was the population largely indifferent to Vichy’s antisemitic laws? Were they too wrapped up in their day-to-day affairs to pay much attention to the Jews, as most recent historical literature suggests.\textsuperscript{8} Or did important sectors of the population actively support these measures,
at least until the summer of 1942 when, in response to the deportations of Jews, public opinion began to turn around. Hence, what I would like to do in this essay is to examine the sources of Vichy antisemitism in an attempt to answer these questions.

In exploring these issues, we could, of course, go back to nineteenth-century roots of antisemitism, which climaxed during the Dreyfus Affair in the late 1890s. Even here some scholars have suggested that antisemitism played a minimal role. According to Eugen Weber, “to most French during the nineteenth century and to many French in the twentieth century, [the “Jewish Question”] was a minor question, or no question at all.” Today, however, most scholars would agree with historians Pierre Birnbaum, Stephen Wilson, and Michael Burns that antisemitism during this period had become pervasive and inextricably bound up with other themes. First, those scholars who have stressed the centrality of antisemitism have highlighted how anti-Jewish sentiments became linked to anti-capitalism. This theme was, of course, common throughout Europe, although in France it took a certain twist due to the prominence of the Rothschild family, who from the 1840s on were commonly referred to as the “Kings of the Epoch.” But this theme became especially strong in the Third Republic after 1870, since the party that came to power—the Opportunists—was perceived to be a party of plutocrats. Moreover, Edouard Drumont, the leading antisemite of the late-nineteenth century, made this theme central to his hugely popular book *La France juive* (Jewish France).

Birnbaum in particular, however, has also shown how antisemitism at the end of the nineteenth century became linked to another theme: the hostility toward the republican state, and this link between antisemitism and anti-republicanism is perhaps what makes French antisemitism unique. As historian Philip Nord has shown, the Third Republic was in large measure the work of a coalition of Jews, Protestants, and Free Masons, and it was precisely this perception that led the republic’s opponents to hone in on these groups. Hence, the Dreyfus Affair was not merely the case of a Jew falsely accused. Rather, it was because a Jew, Alfred Dreyfus, had penetrated the highest echelons of the state—the Army general staff—that attacks against him swiftly escalated into a full-fledged assault against the republic itself. As a result, the Jewish question came to epitomize the very values that the republic stood for: the secular state; the equality of all citizens before the law, irrespective of religious or ethnic background; and the promise of careers open to talent. All those who opposed these values—and there were many of them—now saw the Jews as the preeminent symbol of
the state they detested. Moreover, in the 1890s—several of the antisemitic initiatives that later surfaced at Vichy were already under debate in the French parliament. In January 1898, 158 deputies voted for a bill calling for the exclusion from public employment of all Jews who could not prove three generations of forebears born in France. In February of that year, nearly one-third of the entire Chamber of Deputies supported a measure “to end the predominance of Jews in the various branches of the administration.” Although none of these measures was implemented at the time, they would nevertheless reappear a few decades later in the antisemitic program of the Vichy regime.

While this nineteenth-century background is important, it would be wrong to draw a direct line between the antisemitism of these years and what transpired in 1940. Antisemitism in France subsided significantly in the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair. Although the Action Française, the principle right-wing league led by Charles Maurras, carried on the antisemitic tradition, two important countercurrents kept antisemitism in check at least until the 1930s. First, during World War I, the government proclaimed a union sacrée, which encouraged all groups to put aside partisan differences to fight the common enemy—Germany. In 1917 the well-known writer Maurice Barrès, one of the leaders of the nationalistic and antisemitic right at the end of the nineteenth century, published his famous essay, Les diverses familles spirituelles de la France (The diverse spiritual families of France), in which he argued that Jews, because of their valor during World War I, deserved to be considered one of France’s “diverse spiritual families,” on par with Bretons, Provençals, or Alsatians. For many Jews, Barrès’s break with his antisemitic past was a sign that the union sacrée of the war years would endure into the postwar era.

The second important factor in dampening antisemitic sentiments after World War I was France’s desperate need for foreign workers to make up for the loss of 1.4 million men in combat. Hence, during the 1920s, the government invited thousands of foreigners, including many Jews, to come work in France. By the early 1930s, France’s foreign population totaled some 2.7 million, or about 7 percent of the population, and by the mid-1930s, foreign Jews constituted no fewer than one half of the total French Jewish community. To be sure, there was xenophobia and antisemitism in the 1920s. Nevertheless, as a result of the pressing need for foreign labor, the prevailing climate remained liberal, as symbolized by the 1927 Naturalization Act, which reduced residency requirements for naturalization from ten to a mere three
By the early 1930s, however, this climate of tolerance gave way to a new wave of antisemitism that equaled and perhaps even surpassed that of the Dreyfus Affair era. This upsurge of antisemitism offers the greatest insight into the ideological influences on Vichy’s anti-Jewish legislative program. What factors in the 1930s led to this antisemitic resurgence? First, of course, was the impact of the Great Depression. Although the Depression hit France late (in 1931), it nevertheless hit hard, and by 1934 nearly one million people were unemployed. As a result, an intense competition for jobs arose. Not surprisingly, this situation generated a fierce xenophobic backlash, and the argument that one could solve the unemployment problem by shipping home the majority of foreign workers became immensely popular. These pressures became especially intense in the liberal professions and commerce, and here a specifically antisemitic dimension surfaced. Most foreign Jews, including tens of thousands of East Europeans as well as the more recently arrived refugees from Germany, who numbered about 25,000 in 1933, were concentrated precisely in these sectors. Within weeks of the arrival of the first wave of refugees, French business associations and local chambers of commerce, especially in Paris and in Alsace and Lorraine, began to complain bitterly of refugee competition. As the Metz Chamber of Commerce declared, these “foreign competitors, highly undesirable, have become a veritable plague for honest French merchants.” In response to these protests, which culminated in a series of street demonstrations, the prefect in Strasbourg commented: “It’s indisputable that a certain antisemitism has awakened here against which we must take guard.” He even convened a meeting with the Chief Rabbi of France to ensure that “this exodus not...bring about an antisemitic movement in Alsace.”

No less insistent in their demands to limit foreign competitors were members of the liberal professions—especially doctors and lawyers. From the late 1920s on, the medical profession had complained about the high proportion of foreign students in the nation’s medical faculties, and especially about foreign Jews—most notably Romanians who had come to France to escape the *numerus clausus* on Jews in Romanian universities. Because of a bilateral treaty between France and Romania dating back to 1857, these students were allowed to receive French university degrees, which in turn permitted them to practice in France. In 1931, in the midst of a parliamentary debate over the role of foreigners in the medical profession, Prof. Victor Balthazard, president of the French Medical Association and former dean of the Paris
Medical Faculty, decried the “veritable Romanian invasion” of the medical profession. The French government, he insisted, had never intended for these nineteenth-century treaty privileges to be used by “this legion of Jews.” He even suggested that from now on only Christian Romanian students be allowed to study in France. Moreover, to dispel any notion that these Romanians might be political refugees, who therefore deserved special privileges, he denied the existence of antisemitism in Romania: “Do specific measures to throw the Jews out of higher education really exist in Romania? Are the Jews threatened with anything like a pogrom? Not in the least,” he declared.  

In 1933, when the French government enacted liberal provisions for German refugee students to complete their university degrees in France, these tensions were further exacerbated. And in 1935, medical students, joined by their colleagues in the law faculties, staged a nationwide strike to protest “unfair competition” from foreign students. The antisemitism that accompanied these demonstrations was so strong that one liberal newspaper noted that “a pogrom-like atmosphere” prevailed, while another reported that “doctors and [medical] students of Jewish origin have been cruelly beaten and molested.”

Fearful of alienating its middle-class constituencies, the central government caved in to these protectionist demands. In 1935, the conservative government of Pierre Laval imposed quotas—generally 10 percent—on the number of foreigners allowed to practice artisanry. It also restricted refugee settlement in Alsace and Lorraine as early as the end of 1933 to prevent foreign competition with native businesses, and in 1938, the government enacted nationwide restrictions on the number of foreigners allowed to practice commerce. Although quotas were not imposed on the liberal professions, these professions nevertheless won important concessions as well. Already in 1933, the parliament passed a law that limited the practice of medicine to French citizens, and in 1934 and 1935, it passed additional laws that barred even naturalized immigrants from either of these professions for five to ten years following their naturalization. These laws were of momentous significance: for the first time in the history of the Republic they created a two-tiered system of citizenship with regard to professional rights, granting fewer rights to recently naturalized citizens, while requiring them to fulfill all the obligations of citizenship, including military service. Furthermore—and this was significant for Vichy as well—the law governing the medical profession gave the medical association the right to be consulted in naturalization decisions. To be sure, doctors did not have an outright veto, but the fact that they participated in the
naturalization process, even in an advisory capacity, marked a huge concession. It is true that these laws never specifically alluded to Jews, but there is no question, as historian Ralph Schor has remarked with regard to the legal profession, that these were laws “made by lawyers, for lawyers, against foreigners who were generally Jewish.”

These middle-class protectionist campaigns did much to inculcate popular antisemitism and to orient public policy in an increasingly antisemitic direction. Although extreme right-wing groups since the early 1930s had demanded the imposition of a Jewish statute to curb naturalizations and Jewish occupational behavior, such demands had initially garnered little popular support. But by the end of the decade such sentiments had become widespread due largely to these middle-class protectionist campaigns. In 1938, several prominent conservatives, including Louis Marin and Fernand Laurent, sponsored legislation demanding the revision of all naturalizations granted since 1933, the year the refugees began to arrive; since 1927, the year the liberal naturalization law was passed; or even 1919. Such measures were necessary, these politicians explained, since “recently naturalized citizens...in commerce in addition to certain liberal professions, and especially in medicine, engage in inadmissible competition with French citizens.”

At the same time, there were growing demands for the imposition of anti-foreign and even anti-Jewish quotas in the liberal professions. In 1938, Joseph Rossé, an influential Catholic autonomist deputy from Alsace, claimed that Jews had taken over the region’s cultural and economic life, and as proof he alleged that the proportion of Jewish lawyers in the Alsatian bar had risen from 10 to 30 percent since 1918. As a result of “this colossal increase,” Rossé argued, “many Christian lawyers have been pushed to the brink of starvation, so they revolt and antisemitism begins to take hold.” Even some liberal newspapers, such as L’Ere nouvelle, recommended the imposition of a numerus clausus on foreign Jews in the liberal professions. As the paper’s editors explained, such restrictions were essential since the editors had received a deluge of letters “from doctors from large cities or the Paris suburbs who have provided us with stupefying statistics regarding the proportion of Jewish doctors and foreign Jewish doctors in the medical corps of the large urban centers.”

The second major theme of antisemitism in the 1930s was the identification of Jews with the political left, and here we see how anti-foreign sentiment became an attack on all Jews in France. The association of Jews with left-wing movements dates back to the nineteenth century, but it reached new heights after World War I with the
creation of the Soviet Union and the growing strength of communist and socialist parties throughout Europe. By the mid-1930s, even philosemites, such as Jesuit priest Joseph Bonsirven, insisted that it was legitimate to curtail the influx into France of “Polish, Romanian, Russian, [or] German Jews, who shamelessly indulge in communist propaganda and display a clear intention to take over every available job in France.” Nevertheless, the coming to power of the Popular Front government in the spring of 1936 greatly exacerbated this trend. The accession to power of Léon Blum, the socialist prime minister of the Popular Front coalition and a Jew, was accompanied by a hate campaign of unprecedented ferocity that penetrated well beyond the radical right. Now extreme forms of antisemitism, previously limited to the far right, began to seep into conservative and even liberal and socialist circles. Nevertheless, the most violent attacks continued to come from the extreme right. Shortly after the spring-1936 election, the Action française, the league’s newspaper, advocated “that Blum be guillotined,” a statement that echoed Maurras’s attacks of the previous year, when he had branded Blum as “a man to be shot, but in the back.” And indeed, in February 1936 Blum was attacked on the streets of Paris by the camelots du roi, the street gangs of the Action Française, and he was hospitalized. Another leading exponent of extreme right-wing antisemitism, Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, who had just been elected to the Paris Municipal Council and who later became Vichy’s second Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs, declared, “If I so desire, 10,000 men would descend onto the street and kill 100,000 Jews. I could just as well kill Léon Blum. Hitler was right to kick the Jews the hell out.” Even the Chief Rabbi of France received threats regarding Blum, as if the Jewish community were somehow to blame for the recent turn of events. An anonymous group of business leaders sent a letter to the Chief Rabbi asking him to denounce Blum publicly, and they warned: “Beware that the crimes of Léon Blum and his band not redound upon your entire race.” Although the Jewish community never issued a public denunciation, they did intervene with Blum privately to try to dissuade him from taking office. According to one of Blum’s closest advisers, the Chief Rabbi even offered Blum a life-time pension equivalent to his salary as head of state if he would step down.

But for the French Jewish community, the most disquieting aspect of this hate campaign was the way it normalized antisemitism as an element of political discourse. Antisemitism now resurfaced not only in the Paris Municipal Council, which after Darquier de Pellepoix’s election became a forum for the most extreme antisemitic
views and sometimes even outright brawls, but in the parliament itself, which since the Dreyfus Affair had been relatively immune to rhetorical antisemitic outbursts. After the Popular Front victory, Xavier Vallat, a prominent conservative deputy who later became Vichy’s first Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs, excoriated Blum on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies in explicitly antisemitic terms. In June 1936 Vallat explained to his colleagues in the Chamber why he could not support Blum’s cabinet. Turning directly to Blum, Vallat declared: “There’s another reason that prevents me from voting in favor of the ministry of M. Blum: that’s M. Blum himself. Your ascendance to power is incontestably a historic date. For the first time this old Gallo-Roman country will be governed by a Jew.” When sharply reprimanded by Edouard Herriot, the president of the Chamber, and ordered to retract his statement, Vallat not only refused, but went on to declare that Jews could never be truly French:

I have no intention of forgetting the friendship that binds me to my Jewish comrades in arms. Nor have I any intention of denying to members of the Jewish race the right to acclimate here, just like everyone else who has come here to be naturalized. Nevertheless, I must say...out loud what everyone else is thinking to themselves—that in order to govern this peasant nation that is France, it is preferable to have someone whose origins, no matter how modest, disappear into the bowels of our soil, rather than a subtle talmudist.

Vallat’s views did in fact mirror those of a large sector of conservative opinion. Even conservative groups that had previously shied away from antisemitism, such as the Croix de Feu, the largest right-wing league in the 1930s, began to embrace it after the Popular Front victory. Prior to 1936, Col. François de la Rocque, the league’s leader, had tolerated antisemitism only insofar as it focused on foreign Jews. In fact, the Croix de Feu had a sizable Jewish membership, and between 1934 and 1937 the Consistory of Paris regularly invited its representatives to participate in synagogue services for the fallen war dead, an act that infuriated liberal and left-wing Jews.

Beginning in 1936, however, La Rocque’s position on the “Jewish Question” became decidedly more ambivalent. At a Croix de Feu meeting in April of that year, La Rocque firmly denounced antisemitism and declared that “if a wave of antisemitism were to break out, our Jewish comrades would unjustly become its victims. That would be fratricide, and you’d find me there trying to stop it.” But he then proceeded to blast
Léon Blum, declaring, “there are some people whose behavior suggests they want to ignite a new wave of antisemitism.”

Catholic opinion, too, became increasingly antisemitic in the aftermath of the Popular Front victory. Although many scholars have argued that Catholic attitudes toward Jews in the 1930s were overwhelmingly sympathetic (in sharp contrast to the extreme Catholic antisemitism of the Dreyfus Affair era), this view requires some modification. While a few Catholic leaders spoke out strongly against antisemitism throughout the 1930s, the vast majority expressed ambivalent views, which became more entrenched once Blum came to power. The most striking example is the explanation offered in 1937 by prominent Catholic writer and publicist François Mauriac as to why he had joined the patronage committee of the newly created philosemitic journal *La Juste Parole*, which had been founded to combat antisemitism. As Mauriac declared:

> For a Catholic, antisemitism is not only a sin against charity. We are linked to Israel, we are united with them whether we like it or not. I believe, however, that Israel is at times partly responsible for the instinct of defense it evokes among certain nations in certain historical epochs....The fight against antisemitism must begin among the Jews themselves....

> The Jews cannot perpetuate themselves, marry amongst themselves, jealously isolate themselves from Christians, without creating a state of defense and hostility.

> They cannot monopolize international finance without making others feel they are being dominated by them. They cannot sprout up wherever one of their own has been successful (Minister Blum), without evoking hatred because they themselves have indulged in [anti-Christian] reprisals. German Jews have admitted to me that there existed a Jewish problem in Germany, and that it needed to be resolved. I fear that there will ultimately be one in France as well.

> In conclusion, I associate with the fight against antisemitism, but I believe that it ultimately depends on the Jews themselves to render themselves less violent....

The third major determinant of antisemitism in the 1930s was the way in which the refugee crisis became linked to appeasement and charges of Jewish warmongering. As the Nazis began their military incursions into Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938–39, many French began to express fears that the refugees were dragging France into an undesired war, and, of course, every German military advance propelled fresh waves of
refugees to seek asylum in France. By 1939 there were at least 60,000 Jewish refugees in France, and perhaps more, since many had entered the country illegally. To stave off this influx, the government, now under the premiership of Edouard Daladier, passed in May and November of 1938 extremely harsh anti-immigrant decree laws (laws enacted directly by the administration as opposed to the parliament), which in effect put an end to the right of asylum. Despite this legislation, however, refugees continued to stream across the border, and this continued influx sparked fears that these victims of Nazism would seek to drag France into an unwanted war. As the Action française declared at the time of the Munich Crisis in September 1938, “The French do not want to fight—neither for the Jews, the Russians, nor the Freemasons of Prague.”

But even more serious was the fact that the troop mobilization associated with the Munich Crisis was accompanied by widespread anti-Jewish violence on a scale not witnessed in France since the Dreyfus Affair. Anti-Jewish attacks, targeted primarily at immigrant Jews, broke out in Paris, Rouen, Dijon, Lille, Nancy, and towns and cities throughout Alsace and Lorraine. As one Jewish self-defense organization noted: “Foreigners, Jews have been molested, despoiled, and battered on the streets of Paris, accused of sometimes having shouted ‘Vive la guerre!’ and sometimes even ‘Vive Hitler!’” The Ligue Internationale contre l’Antisémitisme (LICA) similarly reported that Jewish shops in the Montmartre district of Paris, as well as in Strasbourg and Metz, were pillaged “on the pretext that the Jews fled to the rear.” At the same time, the fact that 15,000 foreign Jews enlisted for military service also served as a pretext for attack. As the LICA again noted, “Jews were damned either way. If they enlisted, people said: ‘Naturally, the Jews desire war!’ And if they didn’t enlist, they said: ‘Naturally, the Jews are shirking their military service!’”

These sentiments were further aggravated by the event that triggered Kristallnacht in November 1938—the assassination in Paris of a German diplomat by a seventeen-year-old illegal Jewish refugee, Herschel Grynszpan, who sought to avenge the recent expulsion of his parents from Germany to Poland. Grynszpan’s crime raised charges of Jewish warmongering to hysterical levels. According to Je suis partout, the mouthpiece of the younger generation of the radical right, “That the Jews feel the need to settle their quarrels with the Germans, that’s entirely comprehensible. But that they’ve chosen Paris for this end, that’s intolerable.” But once again the extent to which these antisemitic sentiments permeated beyond the far right was new. The conservative daily Le Matin, for example, insinuated that Grynszpan worked on
behalf of the “war party,” a secret cabal directed by Moscow, which aimed to drag France into an “apocalyptic battle.” Similarly, the centrist paper *Le Temps*, generally perceived as the mouthpiece of the Quai d’Orsay, warned that if measures to bar the entry of further refugees were not adopted, then “xenophobic and antisemitic movements would become widespread.”

At the same time, growing segments of the population used these fears to press for the imposition of a *numerus clausus*. Commenting on the antisemitic violence unleashed by Kristallnacht in Germany, Léon Merklen, director of the Catholic newspaper *La Croix*, explained that since “many Jews, out of a spirit of vengeance or revenge, side with the instigators of disorder,” a *numerus clausus* might indeed be in order. “The Church,” he claimed,

accepts the fact that Christians need to adopt measures of defense against the Jews’ invasion into civil or political life. She has never condemned the *numerus clausus* in effect in East European universities, nor has she ever opposed state-sponsored projects aimed at restricting the participation of Jews in civil service positions or the liberal professions to their proportion in the population.

Here again we see how a debate that began over an influx of illegal refugees swiftly became a debate about the wider role of Jews in French political and economic life. Even the foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, blamed Jews for trying to sabotage his appeasement policies, to the shock and amazement of his British and American colleagues. As Bonnet explained immediately after Kristallnacht, his efforts to forge ahead with a bilateral non-aggression pact with the Germans had the support of more than 90 percent of the French nation; “only the Jews and the communists were crying out against it,” he claimed. When Bonnet failed to invite the two cabinet ministers of Jewish origin to the state dinner honoring the German foreign minister when this pact was signed in December 1938, the socialist newspaper *Le Populaire* wondered whether “Hitler was already dictating the law in France.”

To be sure, not everyone was swept up by this wave of antisemitism. On the left, the majority of socialists and communists, the Catholic left, and a number of liberals together with a handful of conservatives continued to denounce antisemitism and warned that it constituted “a harbinger of dictatorship in France.” According to Henri de Kérillis, the sole conservative deputy to have voted against the Munich Accord, antisemitism, by exacerbating internal divisions in France, played right into
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Nazi hands. If France were to fall into the Nazi camp as a result of its craven pursuit of appeasement, de Kérillis presciently predicted, antisemitism throughout Europe would swell to unprecedented proportions. “Tomorrow,” he prophesized, “Nazi Germany will demand that every European nation implement exceptional measures against the Jews or even their mass expulsion, their internment on some faraway continent, something akin to a colossal recommencement of the Babylonian captivity after the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple.”

These voices, however, were few and far between, and by the end of the decade antisemitism had become widespread. Already in April 1938, Britain’s ambassador in Paris noted that one of the “by-products of the long drawn out political crisis in France is a certain revival of anti-Semitism.” And in March 1940, when American Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles met with Léon Blum, the U.S. State Department reported that Welles “received more than three thousand letters from Frenchmen complaining of the honor he had bestowed on a Jew by his visit.”

Finally, this antisemitism surfaced with particular vehemence after the outbreak of war. In September 1939, when the French government ordered the internment of all German and Austrian refugees as “enemy aliens,” the refugees were branded not only as communists, but as German spies, a charge fueled by the signing of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact in August 1939. In May 1940, when German troops invaded the Low Countries, these fears reached fever pitch. As trains carried thousands of Central European refugees from the Nazi-occupied Low Countries to internment camps in southern France, crowds of onlookers threw stones and called the refugees “dirty boches.” One refugee actually expressed relief at being sent to a camp claiming, “It’s our only defense against popular indignation.” Another reported, “I’ve never seen such a fear of spies, no, not even in 1914.”

What then are the links between the antisemitism of the 1930s and the antisemitism that surfaced under Vichy? Indeed, Vichy’s Statut des Juifs attempted to scapegoat Jews for the defeat, but it was also much more. It was linked to economic concerns over immigrant competition, fears of the political left, and ultimately fears of war. Moreover, these sentiments permeated beyond the ranks of the radical right. Even today, many historians blame the antisemitism of Vichy on a small group of antisemitic zealots with ties to the Action Française. But in reality, much of Vichy’s antisemitic program had broad-based popular support. By the late 1930s, anti-foreign and anti-Jewish sentiments had become pervasive, and many supported a special statute for
foreigners, and even a special statute for Jews.\textsuperscript{59} Moreover, the notion that rollbacks of citizenship were acceptable had also become widespread. It is true that foreign Jews were the major target of these initiatives, but by the late 1930s, the lines between native and foreign Jews had become increasingly blurred. How easily anti-foreign sentiments slipped into antisemitism is especially clear when one looks at the attacks against Léon Blum. Maurras, for example, repeatedly railed against Blum as “that naturalized German Jew or son of someone naturalized,”\textsuperscript{60} and these attacks were taken so seriously that Blum personally felt compelled to deny them on the front page of the \textit{Le Populaire}, which he himself edited. There he wrote on November 19, 1938, just after the uproar following Grynszpan’s crime and Kristallnacht: “I was born in Paris, the 9th of April 1872, a Frenchman, of French parents.... My four grandparents were all born in France, on Alsatian territory. As far as it is possible to trace the outlines of a modest family’s history, my ancestry is purely French.”\textsuperscript{61} That a former prime minister felt compelled to explain his ancestry on the front page of one of the nation’s major daily newspapers speaks volumes about how serious the situation had become.

On the other hand, although there were many precedents for Vichy antisemitism in the 1930s, the transition from the 1930s to Vichy was not simply a smooth slide. The legal measures passed in the 1930s were always framed as anti-foreign as distinct from specifically anti-Jewish measures, whereas under Vichy overt antisemitism became the norm. And finally, one other factor that made antisemitism under Vichy so much more pernicious was the absence of a pro-refugee and pro-Jewish lobby. Although the size of the pro-Jewish lobby had shrunk progressively over the course of the 1930s, nevertheless there were voices who still spoke out against antisemitism in 1938 and 1939.\textsuperscript{62} However, when Vichy came to power in 1940, these voices were either silenced or forced into exile.

Vichy, in my view, does not make sense without examining how pervasive antisemitism had become in the 1930s. Antisemitism was not a peripheral issue at Vichy, but it was quite central.\textsuperscript{63} Ever since the creation of the Third Republic, Jews had become symbols of parliamentary democracy, capitalism, republicanism, and the prospect of careers open to talent. It is therefore not an accident that one of Vichy’s first acts was to de-emancipate the Jews. It may be true, as historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle has claimed, that antisemitism never found its Hitler in France, but France had plenty of homegrown antisemites, such as Xavier Vallat, and these individuals came to the fore at Vichy.\textsuperscript{64}
Still, we must not exaggerate the degree of continuity between the Third Republic and the National Revolution of Marshal Pétain. I would strongly disagree with the recent focus on the “republican origins” of Vichy. Rather, Vichy represents the forces of anti-republicanism that had always been present, but had never been able to seize power under normal circumstances. How different Vichy was from the regime that preceded it was immediately evident to most observers. As one Belgian refugee trapped in southern France lamented already in September 1940, “The democratic ideal, which seemed to be the essence of France itself, has [now] yielded to xenophobia, [and] to poorly understood totalitarianism...”
Notes

This paper is based in part on an essay that appeared in Martin S. Alexander, ed., *French History since Napoleon* (London, 1999), under the title, “The ‘Jewish Question’ from Dreyfus to Vichy,” pp. 172–202. Reprinted by permission of Edward Arnold.


23. Préfecture du Bas-Rhin, Cabinet, “Note pour M. le Secrétaire Général,” June 30, 1933, ADBR D 460 paq. 5 (36).


27. On these protectionist measures, see n. 22 above.


45. Caron, Uneasy Asylum, p. 189.


51. German ambassador von Welszeczeck, to the German Foreign Ministry, No. 366, November 30, 1938, Documents in German Foreign Policy, 1918–45 (DGFP), Series D, vol. 4, pp. 465–56. See also Welszeczeck, to the German Foreign Ministry, January 1, 1939, DGFP, Series D, vol. 4, p. 486.


59. It should be noted that the idea of a statute for immigrants was not necessarily an illiberal measure. Many liberals in France demanded such a measure to offer greater protection to immigrants. In practice, however, such measures nearly always separated recent immigrants from ones who had been in the country longer. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Lewis, “The Boundaries of the Republic.”


62. Caron, Uneasy Asylum, pp. 293–301.

63. The centrality of antisemitism to the Vichy enterprise has recently been challenged by Eric Conan and Henry Rousso, who have have complained that the study of Vichy has become too “judeocentric.” Eric Conan and Henry Rousso, Vichy: An Ever-Present Past, trans. Nathan Bracher (Hanover, NH: 1998), pp. 198–203.


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