Jewish Resistance:
Facts, Omissions, and Distortions

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The mission of the MILES LERMAN CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF JEWISH RESISTANCE—an endowed program of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum—is to educate America and the world about the scope of Jewish physical resistance during the Holocaust through ongoing Museum programs, seminars, collection of artifacts and oral histories, and related projects.
THERE ARE MANY MORE questions than answers concerning Jewish resistance during World War II. Most discussions of the subject evince myriad forms of the same queries: Why did the Jews go like sheep to their slaughter? Why did they not stand up to the Germans? Why did they refuse to fight?

Behind each of these questions are unexamined assumptions. Each claims that European Jews went to their death passively, without a struggle. Each alleges that conditions necessary for resisting existed but that the Jews failed to take advantage of these conditions. This sort of reasoning easily may lead to some predictable conclusions: If opportunities existed to thwart Nazi aims but the Jews chose not to rely on them, they must bear some responsibility for what had happened to them. These arguments amount to blaming the victims. Blaming the victims, in turn, relieves the perpetrators of some responsibility for their crimes. Such questions and their implications can be settled only by a careful examination of historical facts.

Even a cursory glance at available evidence shows that the assumptions upon which these arguments are based are false. First, favorable conditions for Jewish resistance under the German occupation were virtually non-existent. Second, despite the absence of such conditions, there was a significant amount of Jewish resistance during that period. For example, in Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe, Jewish underground organizations were set up in seven major ghettos (Bialystok, Cracow, Czestochowa, Kovno, Minsk, Vilna, and Warsaw) and in forty-five minor ghettos. Jewish armed uprisings took place in five concentration camps and in eighteen forced-labor camps.¹

An understanding of Jewish resistance will be enhanced if examined within the context of non-Jewish resistance. Before this is done, however, the meaning of resistance in general and Jewish resistance in particular calls for some preliminary clarification. Henri Michel, an
authority on European resistance movements during World War II, notes that resistance started with gestures of malicious humor and moved on to more explicit refusals to submit. With time, these refusals became organized and sometimes eventually led to actual battles. While every resistance movement developed in stages, each underground group had its special characteristics. These characteristics varied with attitudes of the occupying forces to a particular country or group, with physical and cultural attributes of a country or group, and with the kind of assistance received from Allies. An offer of assistance, in turn, depended on whether the Allies saw a country or a group as important.  

The literature about resistance to the German occupation usually refers to collective, organized forms, which are further differentiated in terms of passive/active, armed/unarmed, spiritual/non spiritual, as well as under many other characterizations. By their very nature, all underground activities are dynamic, appearing under a variety of guises. The inherent secrecy of underground activities makes the identification of participants by name and ethnic affiliation difficult. This applies particularly to Jews who joined non-Jewish underground groups. As a matter of definition then, do such individuals count as “Jewish” resisters or not? In most resistance groups, at different stages of the war, Jews were prevented from organizing into separate units. One notable exception was the French Maquis, where the Jews formed their own underground sections. In this instance it appears that even though the Jews made up less than 1% of the French population, an estimated 15–20% of the French Maquis was Jewish. Among other exceptions was the Slovakian underground.

The situation was very different for those who, for many valid and not-so-valid reasons, would not identify themselves as Jews. This applied to the main Polish resistance movement, the Armia Krajowa (AK) or Home Army. As the official military arm of the Polish government-in-exile, in London, each of its many AK subgroups was an extension of one or another of the political parties that made up this government. Some of these parties pursued antisemitic policies while others supported Jews. Depending on the political policy of an AK subgroup, a Jew who wished to join its ranks could be accepted, rejected, or murdered. Because the political ideology of most AK groups was not widely publicized, some Jews concealed their ethnic identity when seeking entrance into the AK. Those who were accepted into the Polish underground movement as Jews often were faced with discrimination. An unspecified number of Jews participated in the smaller Polish underground, the Polish Communist organization (PPR).

Some Czech Jews joined the Czech elitist underground, which operated in urban centers. Many of these Jews were assimilated and wholeheartedly identified with the Czech
nation. Others had severed their ties to Judaism long before the Nazi takeover. Most of them, however, did not deny their ethnic origin. As a rule, the operations of the Czech group were limited to the collection and distribution of illegal materials. By 1942, when the Germans stepped up the persecution of Jews, Jewish participation in that underground organization was lessened.\(^7\)

During the early stages of the development of the Russian, Belorussian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian partisan movements—1941–1943—antisemitism with its accompanied mistreatment of Jews was common. Loosely organized and poorly equipped partisan bands roamed the forests in those occupied areas. Undoubtedly, some Jews who joined these units preferred to keep their ethnic origin secret. Others, who were admitted as Jews, suffered from antisemitic consequences. By mid-1943, when the Soviet Union was in a better position to establish and exercise control over most of the partisans in these forests, the Jews were officially shielded from antisemitic excesses.\(^8\)

Also different was the fate of Jewish resisters apprehended as members of non-Jewish underground units. Primo Levi joined an Italian partisan unit. When his group was arrested and interrogated by the Fascist militia, Levi chose to identify himself as an “Italian citizen of the Jewish race.”\(^9\)

The case of Masha Bruskina, a Jewish girl from the Minsk ghetto, is both similar and different. Already at the beginning of the German occupation, in July 1941, the 17-year-old Masha had become a member of a Communist underground group outside the ghetto. Composed mostly of Belorussian non-Jews, these resisters helped hospitalized Soviet POWs recover from their war wounds. With an improvement in health, they were supplied with clothes and documents and led into the surrounding forest to organize partisan units. After a while, this Minsk underground group was denounced by one of the POWs. Members of this unit, together with Masha Bruskina, were imprisoned and tortured. Without their having revealed any secrets, on October 26, 1941, Masha Bruskina and eleven resisters were publicly hanged.

Photos taken by the Germans show her with two of her male comrades being led from the prison through the streets of Minsk; other photos show their execution. As visual documentation of the first public execution of resisters, these photographs were and continue to be widely displayed in museums and similar institutions and are included in encyclopedias and historical books. Viewers of these photos are moved by what they see as a quiet, dignified pride of the condemned. They are particularly touched by the poised yet defiant Masha Bruskina. Over the years, these photographs have captured the hearts and the
imagination of many.

Shortly after their deaths, the two Belorussian men photographed with Masha Bruskina were identified by name. Yet despite what many believe to be overwhelming evidence that supports the identity of the girl in the picture as Masha Bruskina, Soviet authorities insisted that she is unknown; more recently officials in Belarus have continued to adhere to this position.\(^\text{10}\)

Regardless of how Jews had joined a non-Jewish underground group and no matter how they felt about their Jewishness, being Jewish inevitably affected them. Jews who concealed their ethnic affiliation had to be concerned about the possibility of discovery. Those who entered a non-Jewish group as Jews were treated differently from others in their organization. As a consequence, the experiences of Jews and non-Jews in non-Jewish underground units varied considerably. Ethnic distinctions, particularly as they applied to Jews and non-Jews, so central under the German occupation, had their reflections in the underground. Whether the resisters wanted it or not, whether they identified themselves as Jews or not, whether they were assimilated or not, their Jewishness must have dominated their lives. But does it necessarily follow that Jews who participated in any underground activities were Jewish resisters? Actually, in differing degrees, the same sorts of observations and characterizations can be made about other economic or national groups. A Pole, for example, who joined the French resistance was considered a Polish resister.\(^\text{11}\) In short, as long as the community sees an ethnic or national affiliation as a significant personal attribute and acts upon it, this has an impact upon his or her experiences.

Recognizing the complexity of the concept of resistance and the need for further specification, this paper is guided by the broad definition that “acts of resistance are motivated by the intention to thwart, limit or end the exercise of power of the oppressor over the oppressed” and that “the goal of resistance must be to lessen the total quantity of oppression.”\(^\text{12}\)

To gain an understanding of Jewish resistance, the forthcoming discussion will examine communal life as forced upon the Jews by the German occupation. Concentrating mainly on Eastern Europe, the principle focus of annihilation of the Jews during WWII, I will deal with three interrelated issues. First, how did Jewish underground activities and resistance emerge and what forms did they assume? Second, what conditions promote resistance and to what extent were these conditions available to the Jews? Third, how do Jewish and non-Jewish underground efforts and resistance compare? These comparisons focus on the shared characteristics of Jewish and non-Jewish underground activities.
How Did Jewish Underground Activities Emerge and What Forms Did They Assume?

Answers to this question depend, to a large extent, on the kind of German anti-Jewish policies employed in specific instances. The German occupation of Europe was oppressive, but the degree and forms of oppression varied from country to country and from group to group. This variation was in part determined by “racial” affinities. For example, as a rule, the Nazis defined Slavs as of only slightly greater racial value than Jews. In contrast, the highest racial rank was reserved for the Germans, followed by the Scandinavians, who bore a close physical resemblance to the Aryan prototype valued by the Nazis. The other European peoples fell somewhere between these two extremes.

The Jews were defined as less than human. Officially recognized as a race, all Jews came to be targeted for total biological extinction. Nevertheless, anti-Jewish governmental policies were imposed in different countries at different times. For Jews who lived in Poland and its surrounding countries, the last quarter of 1941 signaled the beginning of the end. Only in 1943, however, did the Nazis decide to move against the Danish Jews by ordering their deportation to concentration camps. Regardless of the particular timing, mass murder of Jews was preceded by a carefully orchestrated sliding scale of destructive measures. In the first phase, laws were introduced defining and identifying who was and who was not a Jew. Thereafter the Germans confiscated Jewish property and denied gainful employment to Jews. The next important phase was signaled by the removal of Jews from their homes to specially designated areas, usually sealed-off ghettos, often out of sight of Christian populations. The later the date at which these measures were introduced, the more quickly did the destructive measures follow each other. In Lithuania and in other parts of the former Soviet Union, mass murder of Jews preceded the subsequent formation of ghettos.

The initial establishment of ghettos took place after the 1939 conquest of Poland. It was followed by a 1941 phase of ghetto-building, after the German occupation of previously Soviet-held territories. Each ghetto was designed as a temporary community, as a step leading to the final murder of the Jews, either through mass killings or transfer into concentration camps. In Western Europe, Jews were forced into special houses. From these they were transported eastward, to ghettos and to concentration camps.

All ghettos were located in the most dilapidated parts of urban centers, where overcrowding, epidemics, starvation, and death were a normal progression. The longer a ghetto lasted, the more coercive was the domination, the more extensive were starvation and
German laws and directives continuously rained upon the ghettos. Severe punishment, usually death, followed disobedience of any of them. Frequently these sanctions incorporated the principle of collective responsibility. For example, in the General Government, on October 15, 1941, a new law mandated the death sentence for any Jew who made an unauthorized move outside the Jewish quarters. A violation of this law would result in the juridical murder of not only the “guilty” party but also a similar official murder of unspecified numbers of other ghetto inhabitants who had no connection to the deed.\(^\text{14}\)

Rigid enforcement of discriminatory orders brought the Germans closer to the main goal: annihilation of the Jews. This aim was paralleled by a series of secondary objectives: humiliation and degradation of the Jews before they died. Physical, social, and psychological measures were mixed in a variety of ways. The Germans excelled in inventing the most diabolical tortures, varying in degree of subtlety.\(^\text{15}\)

Accompanying these steps were orders leading to cleavages and conflicts within the ghetto population. Among those measures was the forced transfer of Jews from surrounding communities into larger ghettos. Also forced into these confines were Gypsies and Jews who had converted to Christianity, as well as Jews transported from Austria, Germany, Holland, and Hungary. Social dissension created by their arrival inevitably led to serious economic problems.

Most of these newcomers were penniless, with no prospects for gainful employment. Many were reduced to begging, and these became an ever-growing proportion of ghetto populations. Usually these unfortunates were the early victims of starvation and disease, leading to death.\(^\text{16}\)

In addition, higher-class Jewish men often were singled out for especially debasing treatment. Rich factory owners and intellectuals were forced to clean toilets; rabbis became road workers. These assaults caused the entire system of social privilege to be inverted. The wealthy and the intelligentsia became the lowest strata.

Another consistent Nazi practice was the periodic issuing of documents that seemed to give to only a select few the right to live. From Vilna ghetto, Mark Dworzecki tells how he and his friend appealed for these life-saving passes. “Both of us sat in the dark office corridor...waiting for the judgment upon us. We talked together but at the same time we knew that a life voucher for one of us meant a death warrant for the other.... And here the life voucher was issued to me and my friend was condemned. I was ashamed to raise my eyes but nonetheless I took the document.”\(^\text{17}\)
A work assignment and appropriate documents did not, as a rule, translate into adequate food rations. Officially, in occupied Poland, ghetto inmates were entitled to fewer than 400 calories per day.\textsuperscript{18} Added to effects of hunger were the severe problems caused by cramped living conditions, with seven to fifteen people in a single room. The absence of electricity, running water, and adequate toilet facilities led to terrible hygiene and epidemics. Overcrowded hospitals lacked basic equipment and medication. The Jewish hospital staff was required to report all patients with chronic and contagious diseases. If identified, it was common for such patients to be put to death.\textsuperscript{19} Prohibitions extended to school attendance, to private instruction, and to religious observance. All these were a part of the Nazi process of humiliation and degradation.

Faced with these continuously expanding assaults on freedom, dignity, and survival, most Jewish Judenrat leaders and many other caring individuals refused to submit. Collectively and individually they organized a variety of fund-raising events: lectures, theatrical performances, and contests. The leadership imposed taxes on the few ghetto inhabitants who still had money. With these funds they established soup kitchens for the destitute and bought medications to combat the spread of epidemics. There was also a morale-building dimension to these responses: in larger ghettos special committees devoted themselves to establishing and sustaining theatrical presentations, libraries, and educational institutions. Illegal schools flourished in the ghettos of Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.\textsuperscript{20}

From Vilna ghetto, the teenager, Yitskhok Rudashevski underscored the value of these efforts.

Finally I have lived to see the day. Today we go to school. The day passed quite differently. Lessons, subjects, both [of the] sixth classes were combined. There is a happy spirit in class. Finally the club too was opened. My own life is shaping in quite a different way! We waste less time. The day is divided and flies by very quickly.... Yes, that is how it should be in the ghetto, the day should fly by, and we should not waste time.

Murdered by the Germans, the author left a diary.\textsuperscript{21}

Particularly active in the Eastern European ghettos were youths who, before the war, belonged to Zionist and non-Zionist movements that covered the entire political spectrum from left to right. At the beginning of the German occupation many of these youngsters saw the war only as a passing phase. They concentrated on their own education and that of others, hoping to diminish the demoralizing effects of the deteriorating situation. They were preparing for a better, more just future.\textsuperscript{22}

With a worsening of ghetto conditions, these group members implemented their
educational plans by devoting themselves to the teaching of children, to lecturing adult audiences, and to the advancement of cultural activities, including the production of theatrical events. From there, quite naturally their efforts expanded into the promotion of social welfare. These young activists seemed at once more daring and more realistic than many of the older generation, including the prewar leaders of the political parties.

By 1942, members of various political youth groups recognized that the Germans aimed at the total biological annihilation of the Jewish people. When this conclusion was reached, many of their leaders began to prepare for other forms of resistance. Initially the Jewish public was to be educated about their impending fate, this through the preparation and distribution of illegal publications. These efforts were accompanied by a collection of arms. While eager to fight the Germans, youthful resisters were realistic about the inevitable outcome of any armed encounters. Knowing well that they could not stop the destruction of Jewish lives, they hoped that through armed resistance, they would, at very least, salvage the honor of the Jewish people.

In large ghettos, in particular, preparations for resistance commonly led to the cooperation of various political groups on matters such as the timing and location of future confrontations. Around 1942, rumors about forest partisans began to circulate. In ghettos surrounded by forests, such news suggested an option: one might fight inside the ghetto or one might attempt to reach and join the partisans. Most of the youths of the underground were reluctant to leave the ghettos. They felt responsible for their imprisoned communities and feared that by leaving they would be abandoning their people. At times, the attitudes of the general ghetto populations toward the young resisters tipped the scale in favor of staying or leaving. Older, more traditional ghetto inmates, including some members of the Judenräte, were suspicious of the young. Many of them thought that Jewish contributions to the German war economy could save, if not all, at least the working part of the Jewish population. For them the prospect of a fight in the ghetto or of a mass escape into the forest would portend the destruction of an entire community.

To be sure, plans about the place, form, and timing of resistance changed often. Some leaders of the underground compromised and made accommodations to the vacillating Judenrat leadership. This happened in the Bialystok ghetto. After considerable soul-searching and after consultations with Ephraim Barash, the head of the Judenrat, the resistance group decided that they would attack the Germans during the final phase of the liquidation of the ghetto. They hoped that their attack would be followed by a mass escape into the forest. But the liquidation of the ghetto began unexpectedly, on August 16, 1943. A desperate,
predictably uneven battle ensued. In the end, only a few fighters reached the Aryan side and the forest.\textsuperscript{24}

As was the case with most resistance movements, the Jewish underground in Cracow consisted of a coalition of youth organizations. A strategic partner in this assemblage was Akiva, a politically moderate Zionist group initially dedicated to non-violence and to cultural pursuits. Following the previously described pattern, the Cracow Jewish underground first concentrated on member and community self-improvement, eventually manifested in involvement in the cultural and welfare activities of the ghetto. Soon they turned to the collection and dissemination of information, printing illegal newspapers; they also forged documents, including passes and train tickets.

As in other ghettos, by 1942 young underground leaders in Cracow became convinced that all Jews were destined for destruction. This led to the procurement of arms and to closer ties with the Polish underground, the more accessible Communist Polska Partia Robotnicza (PPR), who were more willing to cooperate with Jews than were most Polish nationalist organizations. Among the dedicated leaders of Akiva was the couple Szymek Draenger (whose nom de guerre was Marek) and Gusta Draenger (Justyna), as well as Aharon Liebeskind (Dolek).

The fate of the Cracow Jewish underground was dictated partly by its failure to gain widespread acceptance among the ghetto population and their desire not to endanger the very existence of the entire ghetto. Through the cooperation with the PPR, Akiva obtained the underground’s first two pistols and ammunition. They tried to establish contact with forest partisans, but failed. Out of the six men who left the ghetto for the forest, only one returned. With the failure of a forest option, this blow tipped the scale in favor of urban operations. Among their daring accomplishments was the December 22, 1942, grenade attack upon Cyganeria, a Cracow coffee shop frequented by Germans. The shop was damaged, and several Germans were killed and wounded. This attack was followed by arrests of Jewish resisters, among them Gusta and Szymek Draenger, Aharon Liebeskind, and many others. Liebeskind was executed. Gusta, Szymek, and the rest were imprisoned. During Gusta’s incarceration, she recorded on toilet tissue the history of the Cracow ghetto underground. Eventually smuggled out of the prison, that fragile document is one of the important primary sources for an understanding of these events. On April 29, 1943, husband and wife staged separate escapes that also freed other comrades.\textsuperscript{25}

After the prison escape the group published and distributed the magazine, \textit{Hehalutz Halohem} (The fighting pioneer); they also resumed urban sabotage actions. But their idealism
and courage in these clandestine operations were betrayed by their inexperience. In the fall of 1943 the Draengers were caught again. Nothing else is known about them. By November 1943 the Cracow Jewish underground ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{26} Only a few survived. Among them was the heroic courier Hela Rufeisen-Schipper, who today lives in Israel.\textsuperscript{27}

Through the establishment of ghettos, the Germans isolated Jews from the local gentile populations, and also other Jewish communities. Jewish resistance groups, particularly those in large ghettos such as in Bialystok, Cracow, Vilna, and Warsaw, set up illegal communication networks that came to include some smaller ghettos, some work camps, and some partisan groups in the forests. Through these lines of communication, the Jewish underground transferred information, money, goods, and arms.

All these clandestine transfers were accomplished by special couriers, most of whom were young women whose appearance did not betray their Jewishness. The effect of their not stereotypically Jewish looks was matched with their fluency in the Polish language. Known for their courage and daring, many couriers disappeared without a trace. Some were apprehended and sent to concentration camps; others were executed.\textsuperscript{28}

After the liquidation of numbers of ghettos, most of the surviving couriers continued clandestine efforts in the forbidden gentile world. Some of them devoted themselves to helping Jews who lived in hiding among Christians. Others continued to work as links between the remaining ghettos and work camps.\textsuperscript{29}

One of these couriers, Ania Rud, a former member of the Bialystok ghetto underground, lived in the city, passing as a Belorussian. She helped maintain contact between various couriers, the local underground, and forest partisans. A number of Jews who needed temporary lodgings stayed in Ania’s rented room.\textsuperscript{30}

Another courier was Marylka Rozycka, a Jewish girl from Lodz; a member of the communist party; she became a wartime legend. In Bialystok, Marylka, whose looks and manner were more typical of those of a Polish peasant, established contacts between the communist party and the ghetto underground. After the liquidation of the ghetto, she maintained close ties with the underground in the “Aryan” side and with the forest partisans, some of whom had been resisters in the ghetto. Modest, compassionate, and fearless, she insisted that all jobs were important and none were too dangerous. Marylka survived the war and settled in Bialystok. Ironically, in 1992 she died in a car accident.\textsuperscript{31}

Because of the tireless dedication of the Jewish couriers such as Rozycka, some ghetto underground organizations served as stepping-off points for the establishment and for the continuation of settings of armed and unarmed resistance. Illegal life on the Aryan side and
in the forests were manifestations of activities in two such newly created settings.  

Estimates of the number of Jews who participated in the Soviet partisan movement range from 20,000 to 30,000. Of the Jews who fought within those ranks, an estimated 80% perished.

Much of Western Belorussia was covered by large, thick forests, parts of which were inaccessible. This terrain made the area particularly suitable as an important center of the Soviet partisan movement. This need began on June 22, 1941, when Hitler launched an attack upon the Soviet Union; a sudden, massive onslaught that caused the collapse of several Red Army divisions. Because of the chaotic retreat of that army, many soldiers were left without secure escape routes. The majority of these were taken prisoner, with large numbers falling in mass executions while others died a slow death, often of starvation or from overwork in German camps. Yet some of the Soviet troops who were left behind had succeeded in making their way into the Belorussian forests. There they ultimately received some of their comrades who managed to escape from German captivity.

By 1942, the ranks of the former Soviet soldiers were reinforced by young Belorussian men who wanted to elude compulsory transportation for forced labor in Germany. Later on they were supplemented by some Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians.

Referring to themselves as partisans, these forest dwellers formed themselves into small groups. Undisciplined as a rule and lacking effective leaders and arms, they roamed the countryside competing for the meager resources. Sometimes competition among the groups led to conflict, violence, and even death.

In 1942, ghetto runaways also reached these forests. Most of these fugitives were former city dwellers, unused to outdoor life. Many of them were older people, women, and children. These Jewish fugitives were confronted by the early partisans who, preoccupied with their own survival, were crude; often they were also antisemitic. Many of the early non-Jewish partisans saw in the disheveled and hungry Jews a threat to their own existence. Some of them robbed the Jewish fugitives of their meager belongings. Some chased them away. Others abused and killed them. Doctors and nurses, and young Jewish men with their own guns, usually had a chance of being accepted into these non-Jewish partisan groups. Only a minority of these partisans treated the runaway Jews with compassion and offered them help.

In these jungle-like forests a jungle-like culture emerged; it placed a high value on physical strength, perseverance, and fearlessness. The early partisans did not associate any of these features with the Jewish fugitives. Only toward the end of 1943, after the arrival of special partisan organizers from the unoccupied territory of the Soviet Union, did the forest
Faced with threatening and unpredictable forest environments, Jews devised unusual strategies of survival. While some of them had successfully cooperated with non-Jewish partisans, others formed their own units. At times these newly created detachments were transformed into family camps, varying in composition, size, and ability to withstand the overpowering dangers.

One of these Jewish groups, known as the Bielski *otriad* (a Russian word for partisan detachment), took on the dual role of rescuers and fighters. With time, it grew into the largest armed rescue of Jews by Jews, numbering over 1,200 individuals. The founders of this otriad were the three Bielski brothers, Asael, Tuvia, and Zus. They belonged to a very small minority of Jewish peasants. Born in an isolated village, they were poor, with very limited schooling. Familiar with the countryside, and independent, the three brothers refused to submit to Nazi terror and escaped into the countryside in the summer of 1941.

With the help of Belorussian friends, the Bielskis acquired a few weapons. In the summer of 1942, they became convinced that the Germans were determined to murder all the Jews. With more than thirty followers they formed a partisan unit and appointed Tuvia Bielski as its commander.

A strong and charismatic leader, from the start Tuvia insisted that all Jews, regardless of age, sex, state of health, or any other condition, would be accepted into their otriad. Tuvia’s open-door policy met with internal opposition that saw in this position a threat to the existence of the group. Tuvia argued that large size meant greater safety. He never budged from this position. On the contrary, as the Germans stepped up their annihilation of the Jews Tuvia became more determined and more inventive, devising new means of Jewish rescue.

Not only did the Bielski partisans accept all Jews who reached them, but they sent guides into the ghettos to help Jews escape to join the otriad. Bielski scouts would also locate Jews who roamed the forest and bring them to their unit. Many Jewish partisans who had suffered from antisemitism as members of Soviet detachments eventually learned that they could find shelter in the Bielski otriad. In addition, the Bielski partisans punished local collaborators who were denouncing runaway Jews. After a while most anti-Jewish moves by local peasants ceased, making the forests safer for fugitive Jews.

Suspended in a hostile environment, Tuvia Bielski neutralized some of the surrounding dangers by cooperating with the Soviet partisans. This cooperation extended to food collection and to joint anti-German military ventures, and later included economic cooperation.
From 1942 till 1943, the Bielski partisans led a nomadic existence, moving from place to place. Toward the end of 1943, their number having grown to about 400 individuals, they established a more permanent home in the huge, swampy, partly inaccessible Nolibocka forest. At this stage the camp came to resemble a shtetl, a small town, with many “factories” and workshops.

The establishment of these production units transformed part of the Bielski detachment into a supplier of goods and services to the Soviet partisan movement. This change helped neutralize some of the antisemitic complaints that the Jews ate too much without contributing anything of value. In addition, the exchanges that were made possible by the workshops and factories improved the economic situation in the Bielski unit, diminishing the burden on the young men who had to go on dangerous food expeditions.  

Unlike the Bielski partisans, who focused on saving lives, some other Jewish partisans and their courageous leaders concentrated on waging war. Dr. Icheskel Atlas, Alter Dworecki, and Hirsz Kaplinski, for example, distinguished themselves as fighters. However, by the end of December 1942, each had been killed in action.

The three had operated in and around the huge Lipiczanska forest of western Belorussia. With its thick undergrowth, patches of swamp land, and its few and poorly built country roads, this forest promised relative safety to many of the persecuted. Many Jews fled to that refuge.

Atlas, Dworecki, and Kaplinski identified strongly with the Jewish plight. They knew that the survival of the fugitives depended on mutual protection and aid. Nevertheless, the three did not focus on saving Jewish lives. The help they offered to the Jewish fugitives was sporadic; it was not organized, and it was not very effective.

For these leaders their commitment to wage war took precedence over their desire to curtail Jewish destruction. Their preoccupation with fighting the enemy left virtually no room for saving Jews. It is reasonable to conclude that they believed that, in the long run, fighting would save more people. Tuvia Bielski may be compared with those who were committed primarily to armed struggle, each representing different important symbols of Jewish resistance: a Jewish fight for existence, and a Jewish fight for revenge.

More so than ghettos, Nazi concentration camps were places of degradation, coercion, economic exploitation, and murder. Some, such as Treblinka, Sobibor, and Belzec, were built with the sole purpose of putting Jews to death, while in camps such as Auschwitz slave labor was to be extracted from some before their murder.

Despite the horrendous circumstances under which they were made to live and die,
Jews did organize several armed revolts. Well-documented Jewish uprisings took place in Treblinka, Sobibor, Auschwitz, Janowska, Chelmno, and in eighteen different work-camps.\textsuperscript{42} Auschwitz, initially designed as a center to contain political opposition, was gradually transformed; its purpose became the total domination of internees, their economic exploitation, and sooner or later their destruction. The camp had an underground in which influential Polish political prisoners shared power with political prisoners from other countries. The Auschwitz underground maintained contact with the Polish AK, and with the Polish government-in-exile, in London. By 1944, the Auschwitz underground had begun to plan a revolt that was to be coordinated with an outside uprising. The internal uprising was to include Jewish Sonderkommando, a group of men whose task it was to burn the bodies coming out of the gas chambers. As a rule, such groups were allowed to live five to six months (some accounts say three months). After that, they were sent to the gas chambers and another group was selected to take their place.

The Sonderkommando in this case were aware of the ultimate fate planned for them, and were eager to participate in the coming revolt. But soon it became clear that the non-Jewish underground leaders were delaying. Their reluctance was based on several factors. Couriers with plans had been caught; new plans had to be developed. The Germans increased their vigilance. Massive deportations of Poles to other concentration camps followed. In mid-August 1944 it became clear that the Polish uprising in Warsaw was failing. Other underground failures followed, and the idea of coordinating the concentration camp uprising with outside resistance was increasingly seen as unrealistic. Finally, too, the AK and the Polish government in London urged that no revolt should take place unless the prisoners were to face immediate death. Unlike the Sonderkommando, non-Jewish prisoners were not confronted with total destruction. They waited.\textsuperscript{43}

Time was running out for the Sonderkommando. On October 7, 1944, the Jewish Sonderkommando, with some help from Soviet prisoners, staged an armed revolt in Auschwitz II (Birkenau). The rising began with the dynamiting of Crematoria IV, and continued with a fight in the nearby grove. These prisoners were massacred.\textsuperscript{44}

In no time the entire guard force of the camp was mobilized against the rebels. Bullets were flying all over the place. SS with dogs were chasing the Jewish and Soviet rebels, many of whom fell while trying to escape. Others took shelter in a nearby forest. When they realized that they had no chance of survival, they set the forest on fire. Another group did the same in another nearby forest in which they hid. As the day was coming to an end, Auschwitz was surrounded by guards and fires. The crematorium was burning against a dark sky, as were
small forests on opposite sides of the camp. The ground was covered with dead bodies of the members of the Sonderkommando.45

During the revolt 250 prisoners lost their lives. Later, as a reprisal, the SS shot another 200 Sonderkommando members. No prisoners were saved through escape. The German losses were two or three dead and at least a dozen wounded. This uprising had been made possible by male/female cooperation. Explosives for the final confrontation had been smuggled by Jewish women who worked in a nearby munitions factory. On January 6, 1945, less than three weeks before the Soviet liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau, four young Jewish women—Roza Robota, Ella Gaertner, Esther Wajcblum, and Regina Safirsztain—accused of supplying the gunpowder were publicly hanged. As the trap door opened, Robota shouted, “Revenge!”

Before the execution the women were interrogated under torture. Whatever compromising evidence they possessed died with them.46

What Conditions Promote Resistance? Which of These Conditions Were Available to East European Jewry?

Under the German occupation of Europe extensive wooded areas and mountains became settings with a variety of imports. In part the relative inaccessibility of woodlands and mountains and the mystery often associated with them identified them alternatively as sustaining ground for rebellion and as havens for some of the persecuted. These polar views were held respectively by the German authorities and by their prospective victims. Propelled by distrust and fear, the Germans warred against civilians who had sought refuge in the forests and mountains when the conduct of the war gave them cause to perceive imminent threat. By and large, Eastern Europe had much more terrain suitable for this purpose than did Western Europe.

No matter how favorable for resistance are the physical conditions, all resistance responses require time to mature. The start of the Soviet partisan movement can be traced to the summer of 1941, the outbreak of the Russian-German war, when the Germans invaded. And yet, despite continual urging from Stalin, it took the movement about two years to achieve a semblance of order. Similarly, Tito’s Yugoslav operation became a significant force only after the capitulation of Italy in September 1943.47 Both the French Maquis and the Dutch underground projected a readiness only in late 1943.48

With the passage of time, the changing fortunes of war made muscled resistance more appropriate. Thus, only in 1944, after the Germans were weakened by the Allies, would
responsible European leaders advocate open armed resistance; the French, Polish, and Slovak uprisings that year are examples. This leadership had been given ample warnings of the consequences of precipitous armed opposition. The assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, planned by the Czech underground and executed by them on June 5, 1942, was extremely costly: all the men in the village of Lidice were massacred, the elite of the Czech underground themselves were subject to a wave of arrests and murders.

In contrast one can point to a successful uprising in Paris. It happened when the Germans were on the verge of collapse. If preparation time is an important precondition to the building of an effective underground movement, it clearly is only one element of the equation, and it does not guarantee success. During the Polish Warsaw uprising, which began in August 1944, 200,000 Poles lost their lives. Afterwards 90% of Warsaw lay in ruins. Political miscalculations account for this failure, notwithstanding that it happened rather late in the war, when the Germans were in general retreat.

On the other hand, in the early days of the Polish AK, in 1939, it lacked unity and organization. At times its many constituent political parties worked at cross purposes, undermining the effectiveness of the entire underground. Only with time did the Home Army become one of the most powerful of European resistance organizations. By 1943 its registered membership had grown to 268,000.

In sharp contrast to these and other national underground groups, Jews had no time to prepare. In 1942, in Eastern Europe, the Germans stepped up the annihilation of the Jews. By the autumn of 1943, virtually all the ghettos were depopulated.

Additionally, if resistance is to emerge and function it must have a strategic base of operation. Such a base, by providing adequate space, promotes mobility. Guerrillas need to be able to vanish and blend into the local population. Making that possible, a strategic base helps compensate for the relatively small numbers of rebels and for their inadequate supply of arms. Closely connected to these conditions is the ability to count on local help for shelter and clothing, and for overall protection of the resistance network. All non-Jewish underground groups relied on such help.

Few, if any, Jewish resisters were so situated. Confinement in scattered ghettos automatically deprived them of a strategic base. Limited exchanges, even of information between these ghettos were maintained only by couriers. And neither the couriers nor other Jews could count on the supportive attitudes of local populations. Except for a handful of Christians who risked their lives to save Jews, local collaborators were busy undermining the chances of Jewish resistance and survival.
Possession of an encompassing leadership and of arms supplies are two additional preconditions for effective resistance. Several national underground organizations had direct contact with their political leaders abroad, who established governments in exile. These leaders supplied their underground with advice and arms. In some cases, arms reached a national underground through the Allies. For example, Tito received such assistance from Britain.  

Eastern European Jews suffered from lack of these resources as well. The want of leadership continued to grow. Jewish leaders who left Eastern Europe in 1939 failed to organize a unified front. Moreover, during the first stage of the German occupation many Jewish leaders had been murdered. Of the remaining prewar leaders, some were recruited by the occupation authorities into the German-mandated Jewish councils, the Judenräte. With continuously changing council membership, powerless, and often ambiguous toward resistance, only a few of these Judenrat leaders wholeheartedly supported the Jewish underground. Among those who did, however, were the leaders in Minsk, Kovno, Iwje, Pruzany, and Lachwa.  

The existing leadership gap was filled in part by the young heads of the local branches of the various youth organizations. Most of these underground commanders were idealistic, and eager to protect and fight for the Jewish people. Also, as in most periods of social upheaval, during the German occupation there appeared a few charismatic leaders such as Tuvia Bielski. All of these new leaders, though anxious to relieve the Jewish plight, were inexperienced. As we have already seen, at times their idealism coupled with inexperience curtailed their effectiveness.  

As regards resistance, in practical terms the Allies had virtually no interest in the Jews. This indifference translated into a rejection of all known Jewish pleas, including those requesting arms and ammunition. It goes without saying that the Jews experienced a chronic arms shortage.  

Additional hindrances to effective resistance were the pervasiveness of antisemitism among most of the conquered indigenous populations and the virtually continuous flow of debilitating anti-Jewish measures promulgated by the occupying power. Inevitably, because of these measures and those of the Germans, the Jews became physically and emotionally depleted. Hunger, disease, and the loss of all that was dear to them sapped their energy. Indeed, the more deprived people are, the less fit they are for resistance. The heterogeneity of the Jews was accentuated by their overcrowding and their inability to move, further curtailing their ability to organize and stand up to the enemy. However the issues are examined—
whether in terms of day-to-day life, factors promoting resistance, or specific opinions created by the Germans for the Jews—the situation was grim. Lucjan Dobroszycki captured the Jewish options in the following question: “Has anyone seen an army without arms; an army scattered over 200 isolated ghettos; an army of infants, old people, the sick; an army whose soldiers are denied the right even to surrender?”

How Do Jewish and Non-Jewish Resistance Activities and Underground Efforts Compare?

All countries in Nazi-occupied Europe engaged in a variety of resistance activities. However, beyond their shared rejection of German oppression, each country developed its own style of organized response. The characteristics of these movements varied with the attitudes of the occupying forces toward the conquered. Resistance also was influenced by physical and cultural features of the particular country or group, as well as by the amount and quality of assistance the resistance received from the Allies. The nature of this assistance depended on whether the Allies saw a country or a group as important. The diversity of the national resistance movements and their inherent secrecy blocked their integration. Each country had a distinct underground; there was no such thing as a unified European resistance. Just as across the continent, so inside each country factors bearing on political, social, and economic issues interfered with the integration of various resistance groups into a single entity. An authority on European resistance, Henri Michel, argues that “the best recruiting agents for resistance were the savagery of the S.S., the ineptitude of the occupying regime, and the severity of the economic exploitation.”

The situation in Poland provides an example. From the beginning, the Germans set out to destroy Poland’s cultural institutions. Polish universities and high schools were closed. These actions coincided with the prohibition of all forms of political expression. The Germans wanted to destroy the male Polish elite, targeting the intellectuals, professionals, clergy, and army officers. Many of them were murdered; others were sent to concentration camps. The majority of the early inmates of Auschwitz were members of the Polish elite.

Some emergent Polish underground organizations established illegal schools of higher learning; others facilitated clandestine lectures and promoted the writing of prohibited literature. The AK, the largest Polish resistance movement, concentrated on the illegal collection and dissemination of proscribed information. And the AK also accumulated weapons and ammunition against the day they might be used to confront the occupying forces.
Almost until the summer of 1944, the time of the Warsaw uprising, AK operations resembled the activities of other urban underground groups in Eastern Europe. All concentrated on the collection and dissemination of illegal materials, on forging documents, and on the accumulation of arms for future battles. Only a few armed uprisings—French, the Polish, and the Slovak—took place in 1944, when the Germans had been considerably weakened by the Allies. Most of the anticipated battles between the resistance movements and the Germans never materialized. Much of the accumulated weaponry had been collected in vain.

In contrast to the urban underground activities, various partisan groups used arms as early as 1941. Some scholars believe that early partisans in Belorussia—including former Soviet soldiers, Belorussian men, Jewish fugitives, and others—were propelled into the forests by the desire to live and not by ideological conviction or a genuine desire to fight.⁶⁸

Coordinated anti-German military moves by Soviet partisans began to take place in the latter half of 1943. That movement claimed responsibility for 3,000 acts of railway sabotage, with attendant destruction of tracks, and sixteen German battalions immobilized. Not all of these claims can be verified.⁶⁹ As the largest, most powerful body, the Soviet partisan movement underwent many changes. At the end of 1943, it was partially controlled by three power centers: the Communist Party, the NKVD, and the Red Army.⁷⁰

As the German military reverses became more serious and more sustained, participation in resistance to the Nazis became more attractive to larger numbers all over occupied Europe. Many were eager to join the illegal opposition forces. Among these latecomers some were former Nazi-sympathizers and some former collaborators. On the other hand, the Allies only occasionally relied on European underground organizations. Contrary to what often has been claimed, European resistance movements did not win the war. Moreover, much of the postwar talk about the wartime importance of the various resistance movements was exaggerated.⁷¹

As a people targeted for systematic degradation and total biological annihilation, Jews reacted uniquely to the German occupation. But as was the case with resistance by other Europeans, Jewish reactions to the Germans were influenced by changes in their situation. To recall, the definition of resistance guiding this discussion refers to efforts “to thwart, limit or end the exercise of power of the oppressors over the oppressed.” Given the German objective toward the Jews, some scholars have argued that Jewish efforts merely to stay alive and maintain their moral traditions conform to this definition of resistance.⁷² Others believe that this approach lacks appropriate precision and that it interferes with a disciplined understanding
of resistance. Through their daily ghetto activities Jews had rejected most German prohibitions. For Jews, all measures to preserve their own lives and those of others constituted forms of opposition. Such efforts undermined the achievement of Nazi goals and seem to qualify as resistance. And yet, their day-to-day survival efforts clearly are an order of activity different from derailing trains or participating in an armed uprising. Since in their daily lives the Jews were responding to extreme and unprecedented conditions, it is fair to represent Jewish reactions as a special form of resistance.

Vladka Meed, a courier in the Warsaw ghetto, who continuously risked her life to promote all forms of Jewish resistance, supports this view. Aware that a few Warsaw ghetto internees behaved in selfish and dishonorable ways, she nevertheless feels that the ghetto majority, “in the middle of hunger, epidemics and suffering...tried to retain their humanity. Under the most difficult conditions of unexpected pain, they would stick to...traditional Jewish ethic[s]. Their resistance [resided]...in the minute aspect[s] of everyday life.”

Vladka’s mother was one who lived her resistance. Despite extreme hunger that caused swelling under her eyes, each week this woman put aside two slices of her bread and hid them under her pillow. Once a week an old man came to their room to give Bar Mitzvah lessons to Vladka’s younger brother. The mother’s bread paid for the lessons. They never had the Bar Mitzvah.

A Vilna ghetto inmate, too, feels that “the resistance of the anonymous masses must be affirmed in terms of how they held on to their humanity, of their manifestation of solidarity, of mutual help and self-sacrifice, and the whole constellation subsumed under the simple heading of ‘good deeds.’”

In the ghetto, humanitarian activities on behalf of others required extraordinary moral strength. Such efforts contributed to the perpetuation of Jewish life while challenging the validity of Nazi policies of annihilation. As I have said, they seem to constitute resistance of a very special kind, without hope and without resources. Affirming traditional moral values without the “muscular” or violent connotations usually attaching to the notion of resistance, let us call this response unarmed humane resistance.

In addition to unarmed humane resistance, the ghetto underground collected and distributed illegal information, forged documents, and prepared for armed resistance by collecting and manufacturing arms. To show the presence or absence of Jewish resistance comparisons must be made in terms of shared features of the Jewish and non-Jewish underground and not in terms of the specifics that divide them.
Still, Jewish and non-Jewish undergrounds had different chronologies. When non-Jewish resistance movements became well-organized, most Eastern European Jews already were dead or in concentration camps. But Jewish and non-Jewish resistance groups did engage in a number of similar activities: the collection and dissemination of information, the forgery of a variety of documents, and the collection of arms.

Non-Jewish political inmates of concentration camps established significant resistance groups in Buchenwald, Dachau, and Auschwitz. According to Hermann Langbein, an underground political leader in Auschwitz, their illegal activities involved the collection and destruction of incriminating materials, and the transfer of prisoners to better jobs. Often, the beneficiaries of these transfers were members of the Communist Party. Occasionally the underground helped in prisoners’ escapes. Resistance of non-Jewish concentration camp prisoners resembled in many respects the sorts of resistance pursued by Jewish ghetto inmates prior to armed rebellion. There were several armed Jewish uprisings in concentration camps, but that cannot be said of the non-Jewish underground groups in the camps.

When Michel raises the issue of comparing Jewish and non-Jewish resistance, he identifies the Jews as the most handicapped in their ability to become engaged in underground operations. He then continues to search for answers by examining the following seemingly comparable groups: non-Jews who were forced into slave labor in Germany, Soviet prisoners of war, and non-Jewish concentration camp inmates. Each of these groups was exposed to environments that in terms of threats to life, at least, resembled the environments that the Nazis created for the Jews. But neither the forced laborers nor the POWs engaged in any organized armed resistance. Except for a few attempts to escape, they complied with the German orders. Acknowledging that the non-Jewish concentration camp undergrounds promoted mutual help, Michel notes that the Buchenwald underground planned an uprising toward the end of the war, but it never took place.

Michel concludes that “Jews were placed by Nazis in conditions in which it was difficult for them not to succumb and not be rent to pieces. Nevertheless, one can honestly conclude that the Jewish resistance movement played an honorable role in European resistance and that in some respects its role was exemplary.”

Historical evidence shows that open armed resistance was more frequent for Jewish than non-Jewish underground groups. As noted earlier, in concentration camps non-Jewish underground groups did not fight openly. Other, armed non-Jewish uprisings took place in 1944. While exact figures about Jewish participation in non-Jewish resistance movements are elusive, most estimates show that, proportionately, many Jews became active partisans and
others joined most urban underground groups. History tells that the Jews in these resistance movements behaved at least as bravely as their non-Jewish counterparts. Finally, too, when historical records about non-Jewish and Jewish resistance are compared, they refute any assumption that European Jews were passive. On the contrary, when comparisons take chronology and special circumstances into account, Jewish resistance to the unprecedented evil demonstrates a special kind of moral boldness.

**Conclusion**

Because of the inherent secrecy of underground operations, knowledge about resistance activities is incomplete. Specifically too, exact numbers, names, and ethnic identities of the resisters are unavailable. The paucity of evidence is compounded by the competition among various underground movements, each eager to take credit for Germany’s ultimate demise. Indeed, scholars of European resistance warn that knowledge about this subject is incomplete. They also tend to agree that both collectively and singly World War II underground movements cannot be credited with crushing the enemy. Finally, they also agree that, as an area of study, the history of World War II resistance leaves us with many more questions than answers.

Comparing Jewish and non-Jewish resistance, this paper dealt with organized opposition that aimed at the elimination of German oppression. A part of this opposition appeared as a series of steps, starting with the collection and dissemination of information and moving to the accumulation of arms and the preparation of armed resistance. However, the overwhelming power of the German occupation and its use of brutal force was largely responsible for the infrequent appearance of open armed resistance. Significantly, the evidence reviewed here shows that, although targeted for total annihilation, Jews more frequently than other oppressed groups engaged in open armed resistance.

In addition, this paper argued that resistance in general and Jewish resistance in particular are complex concepts. The present examination of some relevant historical facts consistently demonstrates the presence of diverse forms of resistance. This examination also has shown that within the context of general anti-German moves, armed resistance played a modest role. Nevertheless, those who refer to resistance, more often than not, think of fighting, of physical opposition, of the actual hurting of the enemy.

Why this concentration and seeming admiration of armed resistance to the exclusion of spiritual resistance? Why the relative disregard of resistance devoted to helping prospective victims overcome persecution and death?
Observations made by two Holocaust heroes seem relevant. In conjunction with the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, second-in-command of the revolt, replied to a question about its military lessons:

I don’t think there is any need to analyze the uprising in military terms. This was a war of less than a thousand people against a mighty army and no one doubted how it was likely to turn out.... If there is a school to study the human spirit, there it should be a major subject. The really important things were inherent in the force shown by Jewish youths, after years of degradation, to rise up against their destroyers and determine what death they would choose: Treblinka or Uprising. I don’t know if there is a standard to measure that.\(^79\)

Similarly, when two weeks before his death, in 1987, I interviewed Tuvia Bielski and asked how he explains his devotion to saving lives rather than to fighting the Germans, he answered, “It was simple.... The enemy made no distinctions. They took anyone (any Jew) and killed him or her.... It did not pay. To me it made no sense. I wanted to save and not to kill.”\(^80\) Indeed, during Bielski’s stay in the forest, as a commander of a unit that took on the dual role of rescuers and fighters, again and again Bielski urged his people, “Don’t rush to fight and die. So few of us are left, we have to save lives. To save a Jew is much more important than to kill Germans.”\(^81\)

Preoccupied with the examination of different forms of Jewish resistance, this paper has paid scant attention to the varieties of resistance among non-Jewish groups. Only in passing have I mentioned that under the German occupation the Polish underground was engaged in supporting the country’s cultural institutions, among them different schools and universities. Omitted from my discussion was the help offered by the main Polish underground, the AK, to those who were singled out for special persecution: former Polish officers, concentration camp political prisoners, and Jews. Indeed, by 1942, the Polish underground had a special section, “Zegota,” devoted to rescuing Jews.\(^82\)

I have described the humane resistance of the Jews in ghettos—a response that included cultural programs and economic support of the needy. Excluded from this discussion was my earlier research about the rescuing of Jews by Christians. Of my two most recent research projects about the rescue of Jews by Jews, one examined the actions of Oswald Rufeisen and his selfless protection of both Jewish and non-Jewish victims.\(^83\) The other dealt with a group of Jewish partisans commanded by Tuvia Bielski—the largest armed rescue of Jews by Jews during World War II. Earlier I have included a discussion of the history and implications of the Bielski partisan unit. Results of this research point to the significance of rescue as a form of resistance.\(^84\)
Selfless rescue as a form of resistance has important implications for an understanding of moral opposition to oppression and has potentially far-reaching implications for views about other resistance forms, including Jewish and non-Jewish opposition to oppression. In short, further attention to rescue as a form of Jewish and non-Jewish resistance would broaden and enlighten our views of the whole topic of resistance.

Dare we hope that soon, a more caring society would show greater support and attribute more value to the rescuing of victims rather than to the killings of enemies?
Notes

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1. Yehuda Bauer, “Forms of Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust,” in The Nazi Holocaust, ed. Michael R. Marrus (Westport, CT: Meckler, 1989), pp. 34–48, states that in at least sixty of the ghettos there were armed rebellions or attempts at rebellion. Similarly, he cites six concentration camps in which there were Jewish uprisings. Both the places and the number of uprisings differ somewhat from those presented by Yisrael Gutman and Shmuel Krakowski, Unequal Victims: Poles and Jews During World War II (New York: Holocaust Library, 1986), p. 106.


3. While most students deal with collective resistance, they disagree on several aspects when defining resistance in general. For example, Roger S. Gottlieb, “The Concept of Resistance: Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust,” Social Theory and Social Practice 9:1 (Spring 1983), pp. 31–49, thinks that the effectiveness of resistance should not be a part of a definition. In contrast, Raul Hilberg’s formulation relies heavily on this idea. This is clear when he says that “measured in German casualties Jewish armed opposition shrinks into insignificance.” See Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), p. 1031. Yehuda Bauer emphasizes the need for distinguishing between armed and spiritual Jewish resistance. He notes that the main expression of Jewish resistance could not be armed or violent for many complex reasons. See Yehuda Bauer, A History of the Holocaust (New York: Franklin Watts, 1982), pp. 246–77. Later in this paper I will discuss different forms of resistance.

5. These issues have been elaborated upon by Yehuda Bauer in *The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 32–33.


11. I wish to thank Professor Pat Cramer for giving me this example.


15. For a few examples of German brutality see Jean Améry, *At the Mind’s Limits* (New


22. Gutman, Resistance, pp. 120–32.

23. Ibid., pp. 146–76. See also a transcript from a meeting of the underground in Bialystok. It contains the documents of the arguments used for and against a break out from the ghetto. See document “Facing Death in the Bialystok Ghetto, February 1943,” in Document Reader, pp. 347–54; Oswald Rufeisen, a Jewish youth who was passing as half-Pole and half-German, and who organized the breakout at Mir ghetto, convinced the Jewish underground youths that they should give up the idea of conducting a battle within the ghetto. For an historical account of the Mir ghetto break-out see Nechama Tec, In the Lion’s Den: The Life of Oswald Rufeisen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 134–48. The Minsk Jewish ghetto underground was one of the few exceptions that did not seriously consider fighting inside the ghetto. In part this was due to the political homogeneity that prevailed in and out of the ghetto, and the close contacts that had been established between the communist party and the ghetto underground. Hersh Smolar talked to me about these events (in Tel Aviv, in 1989 and 1990), and wrote about it in his The Minsk Ghetto, op. cit.

24. Chajka Grossman, The Underground Army (New York: Holocaust Library, 1987). Chajka was an underground courier for the Bialystok ghetto underground. Her book is both a wartime memoir and a historical account of the Jewish underground in Bialystok. B. Mark, Ruch Oporu w Getcie Bialystokim (The underground in the Bialystok ghetto) (Warsaw: Zydowski Instytut Historyczny, 1952). Among the members of the underground who were caught during the liquidation of the Bialystok ghetto and who later escaped into the forest and became partisans was Eva Kracowski, personal interview, Tel Aviv, 1995.

26. Ibid. For an historical account of the Cracow underground from the perspective of a young Polish woman who cooperated with the group because of her close attachment to one of the members who perished, Hesio Bauminger, see Janina Bogaj, Testimony 14461 in Pomoc Polakow, 1–180, at the Jewish Historical Institute (ZIH), Warsaw.

27. Much of the history of the Cracow group and its relationships with other resistance groups is described in Hela Rufeisen-Schüpper, Pozegnanie Mileji 18: Wspomnienia Laczniczki Zydowskiej Organizacji Bojowej (Good-bye to Mila 18: Memoirs of a courier of the Jewish fighters organization) (Cracow: Beseder, 1996). In personal interviews conducted in Bustan Hagalil, Israel, in 1995, she also shared some of her stories.

28. Bronka Klibanski, “In the Ghetto and in the Resistance,” unpublished paper delivered at the International Workshop on Women in the Holocaust at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June 1995; see also Bronka Klibanski, Yad Vashem Testimony, No. 033/1351; Bela Chazan (Yaari), personal interview, Tel Aviv, 1995, was arrested as a Polish resister and survived the rest of the war in Nazi concentration camps.


30. Ania Rud, personal interview, Tel Aviv, 1995; Eva Karacowski benefited from her help, personal interview.

31. B. Mark, op. cit., p. 94; most of the couriers talk about Rozycka with a great deal of admiration. Among them are Rud, Karacowski, Klibanski, and others.

32. Tec, When Light Pierced the Darkness, pp. 40–84; Szwajger; Grossman.


34. Krakowski, War of the Doomed, p. 301.


39. For illustrations of the instability and precarious position of these different camps, see Yitzhak Arad, “Jewish Family Camps in the Forests: An Original Means of Rescue,” in Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust, Proceedings of the Second Yad Vashem International Historical Conference (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1977), pp. 333–53. Lea Garber Kowenska, a member of a small family group in the Lipiczanska forest, touchingly describes how great suffering and mutual caring intermingled in the lives of that group. See
Lea Garber Kowenska, “Dos Fos Hot Sich Fargidenk Of Aibik” (What is remembered forever), Jurnal Fun Sovietisher Heimland (Journal of the Soviet homeland) 4 (1971), pp. 92–102; In an unpublished Yiddish memoir made available to me by her daughter, Lea Garber Kowenska further describes her life in the forest. In her group of fifteen people there were seven children. Some of them were orphans whom she and others picked up on the way to the forest; Yehuda Merin and Jack Nusan Porter, “Three Jewish Family-Camps in the Forests of Volyn, Ukraine, During the Holocaust,” Jewish Social Science 156:1 (1984), pp. 83–92. Also see Tenenbaum, p. 404.


48. Borwicz argues that no responsible European leader would urge resistance before the Germans were weakened by the Allies, which was in 1944. See Michal Borwicz, “Debate,” in Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust, pp. 335–36.

49. Arad, “The Jewish Fighting Underground in Eastern Europe,” pp. 339–41; Bauer, The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness, p. 39; Rothkirchen, pp. 46–47, notes that from London the Czech resistance received orders not to engage in hazardous actions because they were too costly.
50. Ibid., pp. 46–47.


55. Friedman, “Jewish Resistance to Nazism,” pp. 388–89. Guerrilla fighters, because they are usually fewer in numbers than those who are a part of the conventional forces, have to have more freedom to move. In part, greater mobility and familiarity with the environment tend to counteract the disadvantages that stem from small size and inadequate military equipment. See Armstrong and De Witt, pp. 73–139; Henri Michel, “Jewish Resistance and the European Resistance Movement,” in *Jewish Resistance During The Holocaust*, pp. 365–


60. For some of the young, idealistic leaders in the Cracow ghetto, see footnotes 22–24. Commander of the Bialystok resistance Mordechai Tenenbaum may be so characterized, as may a number of other leaders, including Arye Wilner (Jurek); Mordechai Anielewicz, the commander of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising; Yitzhak Zuckerman (Antek); and Zivia Lubetkin. For a discussion of these and other youthful leaders, see Grossman, *Underground Army*; Zivia Lubetkin, *In the Days of Destruction and Revolt* (Tel Aviv: Beit Lohamei Haghettaot, 1981); Yitzhak Zuckerman, *A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).


62. Ibid., pp. 80–93.

63. Friedman, “Jewish Resistance,” pp. 387–92; Michel, “Jewish Resistance and the

64. Eitinger; Primo Levi describes movingly how starvation transforms the living into the living dead, p. 82.


66. Michel, *The Shadow War*, p. 185; Vakar echoes Michel’s statement, also adding that all early partisans in the Belorussian forests, the Russian former military men, the former Soviet POWs, the Belorussian men, and the Jewish ghetto inmates, had one thing in common, namely, they were propelled into the forest by the wish to survive and not by an ideology or desire to fight, Vakar, pp. 192–94.


68. See footnote 66.


70. Armstrong and De Witt, p. 133.


73. Raul Hilberg thinks that resistance should refer only to armed resistance. See his *The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996),

74. Vladka Meed, personal interview.

75. Ibid.


81. Ibid.


83. Tec, *In the Lion’s Den*.

84. Tec, *Defiance*. 
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