SURVIVING SURVIVAL
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MONNA AND OTTO WEINMANN ANNUAL LECTURE
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The assertions, opinions, and conclusions in this occasional paper are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
THE MONNA AND OTTO WEINMANN ANNUAL LECTURE honors Holocaust survivors and their fates, experiences, and accomplishments. Monna Steinbach Weinmann (1906–1991), born in Poland and raised in Austria, fled to England in autumn 1938. Otto Weinmann (1903–1993), born in Vienna and raised in Czechoslovakia, served in the Czechoslovak, French, and British armies; was wounded at Normandy; and received the Croix de Guerre for his valiant contributions during the war. Monna Steinbach and Otto Weinmann married in London in 1941 and emigrated to the United States in 1948.
After World War II, a bitter argument broke out concerning the fate of Jewish refugees. In the late summer of 1945, some 70,000 Jewish survivors of the Nazis’ Final Solution were living in camps run by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in occupied Germany, Austria and Italy. As the months passed, they were joined by a steady stream of Jewish refugees from the east, primarily Poland and Romania, who had been terrorized by individual acts of violence and even full-blown pogroms. Aided by an underground Zionist organization called the Bricha and the quiet cooperation of the Soviet authorities, they made their way west in small groups, sometimes at the rate of 100–500 a day. By late 1946, perhaps a quarter million Jews were in hundreds of displaced persons (DP) camps and other facilities in Germany, Austria, and Italy alone.

What to do with them became a contentious issue. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which ran the camps in Allied-occupied areas in conjunction with Allied military authorities and with the help of charitable organizations, provided repatriation services for non-Jewish DPs. But Jewish refugees did not want repatriation. They hoped to leave Europe entirely; for most, the preferred destination was Palestine. For the Jewish leaders in Palestine itself, particularly the Jewish Agency under David Ben-Gurion, there was no other solution. The Shoah confirmed all Zionist arguments concerning Jewish safety in the Diaspora and the need for a Jewish state. For millions in the United States, the Zionists had a point. Influenced by basic humanity, American Zionist arguments, and political considerations, President Harry S. Truman called publicly in September 1945, if not for a Jewish state, then for the admission into Palestine of 100,000 Jewish refugees, the number then thought to be in the DP camps. A congressional resolution in December called for unlimited immigration and a Jewish commonwealth there.

The British, who controlled Palestine, thought otherwise. In the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the British government promised to use its best efforts to establish a Jewish home in
Palestine, and in 1922 it received a League of Nations mandate to do so. Arab anger and sporadic violence resulted in redefinitions of the promise until in May 1939, with war looming in Europe, the British issued a White Paper that capped future Jewish immigration into Palestine at 75,000. Britain’s global position depended on its strategic presence in the Middle East, namely control of the Suez Canal zone, naval and air bases in Egypt and Iraq, plus railroads, oil concessions, and pipelines. In July 1945, Britain was weakened, broke, and facing a rising tide of Arab nationalism. The new Labour government and its new Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, saw that London had to convert its old imperial dominance into strategic partnerships with the Arab world. More Jews in Palestine could make this task impossible. The fundamentals of the White Paper were thus to be maintained. Jewish DPs were to return home. Britain even hoped to dissolve the Jewish Agency and the Haganah, the Jewish militia, owing to their toleration of the extremist tactics of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and to their own challenges to the government’s immigration policies.  

This paper examines the problem of Jewish refugees through the lens of a short-lived body called the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine, and also through the eyes of the man who became its most important member, James G. McDonald. The British could not afford a rupture with Washington over the growing mass of Jewish DPs or Palestine’s future. In November 1945, Bevin thus proposed a joint Anglo-American Committee to undertake a full examination of the issue of Jewish refugees and where they might go. On the White House’s insistence, Bevin included the question of Palestine in the Committee’s charge. Still, he expected favorable answers to a number of key questions. Did the great mass of Jews really want to go to Palestine, or was a militant Zionist leadership simply manipulating them? Could they just as easily return home to Poland and elsewhere? Could Palestine economically support mass immigration from Europe? What would the Arab and Muslim reaction be? The committee was to make an extensive study by hearing testimony in Washington, London, Europe, and the Middle East, and then make recommendations to both governments.

Committee studies of Palestine were nothing new. They had been happening since the Mandate began. But this committee was the first to study the Palestine issue after the Holocaust. It was the first to do so in light of Britain’s badly weakened postwar position within its empire. And it was the first to include the Americans. Thus it was believed in many quarters that this committee would be the committee that would emerge with definitive recommendations to a thirty-year-old problem. Most everyone who was anyone was heard. On the Zionist side Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meyerson, and many more testified, as did ordinary Jews throughout DP camps in Western Europe. On the Arab side, witnesses included monarchs, statesmen, scholars, and agitators. British military officers and colonial officials also testified in
closed sessions to explain the military implications as they saw them. Bevin, meanwhile, believed that including the Americans was a stroke of brilliance. They would be shown the practical realities. In this connection he also was confident that the US appointees would come from the Department of State’s Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, which included seasoned US diplomats who understood the strategic significance of the Middle East, had grown increasingly annoyed with Zionist pressure, and thus shared London’s view of the problem. The Committee’s recommendations thus would outflank the pro-Zionists in the US and even the White House. As Gordon Merriam of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs put it, the Committee was expected “to knock over a number of Zionist contentions….“5 As Bevin put it when announcing the Committee in parliament, “I will stake my political future on solving this problem.”6

James G. McDonald wanted to be a member of this committee. McDonald was a scholar transplanted from Indiana to New York. In the 1920s he had chaired the Foreign Policy Association, a study group concerned with multilateralism and that favored working with the League of Nations. After Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, McDonald became League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In this position he met leaders from Hitler to Roosevelt. After two years of failing to convey that German Jews were in lethal danger, he resigned in protest. Until 1945, he tried to help Europe’s Jews, doing so in numerous capacities: as a delegate to the Evian Conference, as a member of the President’s Advisory Commission on Refugees, and on the editorial board of the *New York Times*. He developed numerous connections with American and British Jewish leaders, and a belief in Zionism—the idea of a secular Jewish peoplehood and that this people needed a homeland. Most of his diaries and a significant part of his papers, lost for many years, now are in the archive of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.7

The Committee is not unknown. It held its hearings in public, two committee members wrote personal accounts afterwards, and most records have been available since the 1970s.8 But it has been seen as a way station on the teleological road to Israeli statehood, and has not been fully incorporated into post-Holocaust historiography on Jewish survivors.9 McDonald’s presence, as well as the interactions with refugees and Jewish leaders in Europe and elsewhere remind us, particularly in light of the recent spate of literature on Jewish DPs, that the Committee is also a post-Holocaust story in its own right. It contains official government reactions to the Holocaust and the Jewish refugee problem. It contains the personal reaction of the Committee members, and statements from an astonishing array of Jewish leaders as well as from ordinary Jews in the wake of the Holocaust. Moreover, because it obtained extensive Arab testimony, the Committee informs our understanding of how the Holocaust was understood in the Arab/Muslim world, as well as the relationship between contemporary antisemitism and anti-Zionism both there and elsewhere.10
On the announcement of the Committee in November 1945, McDonald wrote everyone he knew with White House connections; these included the Jewish comic actor Eddie Cantor and Rear Admiral Lewis Strauss of US naval intelligence. “This Committee,” he wrote Strauss, “offers—it seems to me, a possibility, though perhaps only a slight possibility—of advancing a statesmanlike solution to this grave humanitarian and political problem. Much will depend on the intelligence and not less upon the courage of its members.” There were to be six British and six US members. The Foreign Office in London chose the British members. But the White House, and not the State Department, chose the members from the United States. McDonald’s name was ninth on a list of ten from which the president ultimately decided.

Since the committee was to begin its work right away, several turned down the assignment. In November 1945, McDonald received a call from Secretary of State James Byrnes. Would he serve on the Anglo-American Committee? McDonald said yes. Loy Henderson, the head of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, was apoplectic on seeing McDonald’s name when the committee membership was announced on December 10. “Mr. McDonald,” he complained to Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, “has been extremely active in the cause of the Zionists, and we are still at a loss to account for his appointment to the Committee.” As it turned out, McDonald was joined on the Committee by a couple of sympathetic American members, Frank Buxton and Bartley Crum, and there was one British member, Richard Crossman, who was at least open-minded. But most of the Committee members were fundamentally hostile to Zionism.

The Committee’s work ran from January through April 1946. A key to its extensive meetings, hearings, and deliberations was the British government’s determination to establish an anti-Zionist narrative. This narrative portrayed the Balfour Declaration and Mandate as already fulfilled while arguing too that Jewish peoplehood was a construct of militant Zionists. Thus the Jewish DPs in Germany and elsewhere could go back to Eastern Europe. The narrative also attempted to de-legitimize Zionism, characterizing it as a destabilizing, chauvinistic, and even racist doctrine that would upset the delicate balance of forces in the Middle East. The narrative was to produce a distinct outcome, namely recommendations for the maintenance of the White Paper policy and for the dismantling of the Jewish Agency and Jewish military formations in Palestine, which the British argued were out of control. British power in Palestine would be maintained as the sole force that could protect the Jews already there from their own militancy, and ultimately, from Arab anger. Bevin was so confident that when the committee was in London in January 1946, he promised the members that if it reached unanimous recommendations, he would do all in his power to implement them.
Zionist leaders, together with American civil engineers and economists, made constructive arguments in Washington, London, and Jerusalem. Developmental models showed that Palestine could support up to a million more Jews; that the Arab life span in Palestine was higher than anywhere else in the Arab world owing to Jewish economic development; and that, though Zionists insisted on a Jewish majority in Palestine (minority status and international minorities treaties elsewhere had demonstrably failed), Palestine’s future in the Middle East was as bright as the Arab world wanted to make it. As David Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Jewish Agency, testified, the conflict with the Arabs was “a passing thing,” and as he told James McDonald privately, “only the Jews could win the confidence of the Arabs and thus … stabilize that part of the world….”

The British simply rejected this series of arguments. In questioning Jewish witnesses, the British Committee members, in particular the British chairman Sir John Singleton, were especially tough, not so much on venerated septuagenarians such as Chaim Weizmann and Rabbi Stephen Wise, but certainly with almost everyone else. It was not enough, they argued, for Jews to whine about numbers of Jews killed in World War II or the continuing violence against Jews in Eastern Europe. Nor would it do to argue about the verbiage of the Balfour Declaration or the League mandate and whether these documents promised a Jewish majority and a Jewish state. The Jewish population in Palestine had already grown from 84,000 to 554,000 between the censuses of 1922 and 1944 and accounted for thirty-one percent of all the people in Palestine. To London, there was a Jewish home, if not a state. Rather Jewish witnesses had to show how, if more Jewish immigrants were to go to Palestine, the result would not be chaos.

During the testimony of Harry Goodman, who represented the London branch of Agudat Israel, Singleton thundered: “As more Jews have gone … into Palestine, so Arab hostility has increased. Do you really think that if the British withdrew tomorrow and the Jews put large numbers in Palestine there would be peace? If so, why don’t the Jews recommend that the British withdraw altogether, if that is going to bring peace?” He behaved similarly with Sir Simon Marks, who was one of Britain’s most important businessmen and who had been knighted two years earlier. The Jews, Singleton said to Marks, were risking world peace, “and if it did result in trouble, that course having been taken at the request of the Jews, do you think that in the course of another world war the lot of the Jews would be happier than in the last?” In Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion received Singleton’s toughest cross-examination. Determined to prove that the Jewish Agency was controlling the insurgency in Palestine, he demanded: “Do you as the responsible head of the Jewish Agency, find it difficult to appeal to the Yishuv to observe the law?”

Yet what was happening in Europe was critical to the Committee’s work. The body spent the entire month of February 1947 in Europe and organized itself into smaller groups to see as
much of the Jewish condition there as possible. Richard Crossman remembered the point of the European visits, at least insofar as London was concerned: “It had been one of our objects to discover the real wishes of these displaced Jews. Did they really want to go to Palestine? Or was this idea the result of Zionist propaganda?” In a sense the British reached their conclusion before any data was collected. By order of Soviet authorities, Committee members were not allowed to visit Romania, Hungary, or Bulgaria, countries with large surviving Jewish populations. Moscow argued that these occupied nations, which had sided with Hitler, in their cessions of hostilities had signed renunciations of anti-Semitism, and that therefore there was no need for the Committee to visit. The British Foreign Office did not argue. These trips, insisted H.T. Morgan (a Foreign Office official) would be of little use anyway. “It would be more profitable,” he said, “to abandon them and use the time saved for storing up goodwill against the future, and the appearance of the final report, by visiting the Arab capitals.”

Three committee members travelled to Poland, where ninety percent of the Jewish population had been murdered. In Warsaw they met with the Polish officials, the British ambassador, and Adolf Berman, a former left-wing Zionist leader of the Warsaw ghetto, who now headed the Central Jewish Committee in Warsaw. The ambassador, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, a man hardly sympathetic to the Jews during the war, commented that ordinary Poles were “overwhelmingly anti-Semitic” and that “the [Polish] Government is powerless to enforce the laws it makes” aimed at protecting the Jews. Berman insisted that “The Jews want a home in Palestine that will be their own.” To these comments, Reginald Manningham-Buller, a British Committee member, asked, “whether friction is being caused by returning Jews asking for restitution of their property.” Wilfred Crick, the other British member who travelled to Warsaw, attributed Jewish flight to the Jews’ peculiar nature as he saw it. “[The] Jew,” Crick said, “is by centuries of practice, a migrant; he has no deep-set roots in the country of his birth as have the majority of mankind.” He suggested that Poland’s Jews be settled in Silesia, which the Poles had just received from defeated Germany. Other British members, meanwhile, were convinced that the Soviets were behind the Jewish movement westwards as a means to place agents into the Middle East.

In Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, the Committee’s guide was Judge Simon H. Rifkind, the “Jewish affairs” adviser to the US military government in Germany. Rifkind was irritated that only two committee members toured the US occupation zone in Germany, where most of the Jewish DPs were. But mostly, Rifkind was furious over the British attitude. Addressing the full committee in Vienna on February 18, he insisted that they issue an interim recommendation calling for the immediate evacuation of Jewish DPs to Palestine. In a letter to Rabbi Stephen Wise, he noted:
I confess that cynical as I was about this Commission [sic], I was nevertheless chagrined by the nature of the questions put to me by some of the British members. In substance they indicated lack of awareness that they were dealing with a matter of life and death for the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe, a preoccupation with the British rather than the Jewish problem, a phobia about Russia, and on the part of one of the members at least, that the British knew better what was good for the Jews than the Jews themselves…. I fear that unless something happens, the Committee will not, in its interim report, recommend strong affirmative remedial action. I pray that by the time you get this, the prophecy will have proved false. If no strong affirmative action looking toward the migration of the displaced persons to Palestine is promptly forthcoming, there will be cause for very grave concern about the morale of the DPs. Signs of tension, irritability, shortness of temper, recourse to violence, are already becoming evident. Hope long deferred is the cause of their malady. I think they are at the end of their emotional tether.35

The Americans, however, in consequence of their investigations in Europe, were becoming increasingly convinced that the Jewish problem had to be solved through mass migration to Palestine. They were struck by the conditions that they saw in Europe, the growing belief that the Jews no longer had a home there, and that the British, according to their own mandate, somehow had to facilitate a solution.

III

McDonald’s contribution to this realization was key. He travelled alone to France, the French zones of Germany and Austria, and Switzerland—areas that were far off the beaten path.36 With other committee members, he visited Italy and Greece. His tour guides were not military or government officials but numerous Jewish leaders who were active during the war and remained so afterwards; some of them were Zionists, but many of them had not been. These included: in France, Adam Rayski—the wartime Communist resistor in France; in Italy, Lev Garfunkel, who had served on the Kovno Jewish Council during the war and Raffael Cantoni of the Italian Jewish rescue organization DELASEM; and in Switzerland, Dragutin Rosenberg, one of the wartime heads of the Jewish community in Croatia, who had tried to rescue Jews from the Ustasha.

But it was the more ordinary Jews who had not been Jewish leaders who most impressed McDonald. In Paris, McDonald heard from Guy de Rothschild, the scion of the great banking family and a French military officer, who was hardly a Zionist before the war.37 On February 6, Rothschild gave what McDonald called “the best Zionist argument we have heard [to date]. Coming from a young French aristocrat, it was [all] the more impressive.” Rothschild argued that the Jews were a nation and that Palestine was the last hope for 20,000 Jewish refugees in France
as well as throughout East Central Europe. Anti-Zionism among Jews, Rothschild said, was misguided selfishness.\textsuperscript{38}

McDonald travelled on. In Biberach, a small town north of Lake Constance, McDonald met a group of 370 Jews from Poland and Lithuania, noting that the buildings in which they lived were in good condition but that the DPs lacked heating and warm clothing. Here McDonald met a group of halutzim, pioneers determined to reach Palestine. “All,” he wrote in his diary, “were ardently Zionist”:

They hardly had patience to listen to questions about other places to which they might go. It was evident from their reactions that because of their experiences of five or six terrible years in concentration camps, the loss of parents and brothers and sisters, they had developed for themselves a new conception of the world in which Palestine looms larger than all the rest of the world put together. The utter sincerity and the lack of knowledge of the difficulties give one a poignant sense of tragedy.\textsuperscript{39}

In Gailingen, another small town near Constance, McDonald met seventy young Jews, again from Eastern Europe. “As in the other camps,” he wrote, “they are all concentration camp victims and deeply, perhaps permanently, conditioned by their sufferings…. The young secretary, at the beginning of our talk, was suspicious and resentful because I was asking some questions which implied that there might be another solution for some of their members than Palestine.”\textsuperscript{40}

In Switzerland, near the town of Montreux, McDonald met with a group of German Jews. “They are the first group of German Jews that I have interviewed on this trip,” McDonald wrote in his diary.

They were all so German in appearance and manner that one would have thought them typical of the Reich. For example, one of the younger men in all his manners was a Prussian officer. Our conference was, to me, touching because these older people lived in the hopes of rejoining their children, either in the States or in Palestine. Most of them were neither Zionists nor anti-Zionists. They simply wanted to join their own. There was one exception to this—a younger man and his wife who said that they either had or could get visas to the United States but they would go only to Palestine.

In his report to the committee, he added, “Only on the futility of trying to build a new life in Europe were they united.”\textsuperscript{41}

In Lugano, Italy on February 17, McDonald, escorted by Dragutin Rosenberg, visited an Agudat boys’ camp:

The boys gathered around and we sat in the sun discussing various aspects of the Palestine problem. Nearly every one of them had lost all his relatives in concentration
camps and had known little but terror and death. They had built a new world for themselves of dreams and hopes and would tolerate no questioning of their realization. Their earnestness tempted one to weep. In commenting on my statement of the non-Zionist and anti-Zionist attitude of some of the rich British and American Jews, one of the boys said, “One day in Auschwitz would change their minds.”

In the Lugano area the next day, McDonald made it a point to see four separate refugee groups ranging from older German Jews to younger East European Jews, non-Zionist and Zionist alike. Virtually all of the first group he interviewed were younger Zionists. “One after another,” McDonald recorded,

They pleaded for an opportunity to work and have a life of freedom in their own country. They too were troubled by my questions, which reflected the attitude of non-Zionists, but they never showed any sign of doubting their ultimate triumph. The answers of some of them were quiet, of others impetuous and almost angry. A young woman of twenty-five who had lost her father and mother and six of her brothers and sisters, with unusual quietness, made perhaps the most moving plea. They, as the others I had seen the day before, were absolutely confident that there was no future for Jews anywhere in Central or Eastern Europe. On the question of chauvinism, they passionately explained to me that because of Jewish history and ideals, they could not be really chauvinistic, and whatever might seem to be chauvinism was the natural result of their tragic life and that of their people.

One could go on to include many more such discussions, but the larger point is this: while McDonald spoke to military officers, UNRRA administrators, and government officials, he also spoke directly to Jews, from leaders to ordinary refugees, from Germans to East Europeans, from Zionists to non-Zionists, as many as he could in the time that he had, departing from a conventional itinerary, in smaller and more remote DP camps, and with a patience lacking on the part of most Committee members. Quite on his own, he disproved the British argument that among most Jews, the desire to go to Palestine was a Soviet-manipulated militant Zionist deception. At the end of February, as the Committee prepared to leave Europe, Gideon Ruffer, the Jewish Agency’s liaison with the Anglo-American Committee in Europe was gloomy. Owing to British suspicions, he reported to his superiors in Jerusalem, the Anglo-American Committee would produce nothing good, and certainly not a recommendation for 100,000 additional immigration certificates. Yet as the committee left Europe, the US and British members were increasingly divided.

IV

Arab testimony was heard in Washington, London, Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Riyadh. That testimony attempted to walk a moral line. Overt antisemitism was to
be avoided. Racism, after all, had been discredited by the Nazis. Instead, Arab witnesses attempted to turn the tables, attacking Zionism as an imperialist and racist political doctrine, very much akin to Nazism itself. Keeping the Jews from Palestine thus was painted as a noble act of tolerance in a post-imperial world. To the British, Arab intransigence had finally become useful. It could be used to show to the Americans the futility—even stupidity—of placing more Jews into Palestine, and the degree to which the Middle East could explode simply by making the effort. But the balance between anti-Zionism and antisemitism was too delicate to accomplish in most cases. Arab representatives, as well as some of their British supporters, tripped over, and sometimes jumped over, the fine line that separated political from racial objections.

In Washington, Arab scholars from the Institute of Arab American Affairs testified on January 11, 1946. Philip Hitti of Princeton University claimed that Palestine was holy land because it had been conquered in a Jihad, and that “political Zionism is the rankest kind of imperialism.” His colleague, John Hazam of the City College of New York added that the Jews would turn Palestine into a “cross between Pittsburgh and Coney Island.” Khalil Totah, the Institute’s executive director, said that Zionism had spread “just like the plague, just like the measles, just like any other epidemic.” Even Judge Joseph Hutcheson, the American committee chairman, wondered if their objections were to Zionism or to Jews as such.

In London, Arab states delegations in town for the UN General Assembly were recruited by Major-General Edward Spears to testify before the Anglo-American Committee. Spears, who had headed the British mission in Damascus and Beirut from 1942 to 1944, himself declared on January 29 that “Zionist policy in Palestine has many similar features to the Nazi philosophy,” including “the Nazi idea of Lebensraum.” With the Arab delegations in London Spears convinced an Iraqi official that, “It would be a thousand pitie… it would be a thousand pitie,” he said, “to lose a unique opportunity.” Here Faris Bey al-Khoury, the president of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies, testified that the Committee’s real job was to “find out what is the reason why Jews all over this world are not received agreeably. They are undesirable [because] they believe they are the chosen people of God…. They keep racism.”

In Cairo, Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, the secretary-general of the Arab League compared the Jews to transmogrified grotesques. Imagining that Jews in the Middle East had been treated well over the centuries, he testified that “Our brother has gone to Europe and to the West and has come back [as] something else. He has turned [into] a Russified Jew, a Polish Jew, a German Jew, an English Jew.” Habib Bourguiba, the leader of a nationalist party in Tunisia, and later the Tunisian president, added: “… it is for the Jews … to change themselves, to change certain contentions which they hold, which make them offensive sometimes to the locality where they live…. The solution to the Jewish problem would be in obliterating the Zionist germ from the minds of the Jews so they could again become ordinary human beings.”
In Jerusalem, the highlight was the testimony of Jamal al-Husseini, the cousin of Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Amin al-Husseini was the power behind the Arab Higher Committee, which claimed, with more justification than has been acknowledged, to speak for the Palestinian Arab population. Amin had been in exile since leading the anti-British, anti-Jewish revolt in Palestine in 1936. He had been busy regardless. He had led another failed revolt in Iraq in 1941, then spent the war in Berlin where he mused with Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, and Adolf Eichmann about killing the Jews of Egypt and Palestine and where, through German short wave radio, he urged the Arabs to do just that. Now in Paris, he still controlled the Arab Higher Committee through his cousin Jamal, whom the British allowed to return and testify. Jamal was received in the streets as a hero—a surrogate for the Grand Mufti. Before the Committee he claimed that, “anti-Semitism is really our calamity … because had there been no anti-Semitism we believe the Jews would not have come to Palestine.” Jamal compared Ben-Gurion’s testimony of March 11 to “hearing Hitler from beyond the grave.”

Albert Hourani, then a young scholar in the Arab Office and later a distinguished Oxford professor, was more moderate. The Jews would not have to go, but Zionism did. When asked about the danger that the new Arab nationalism represented to the Jews, Hourani said that, as a minority in an Arab country, the Jews would have to adjust. And many Arab speakers insisted that the Jews had undue influence in the US, which kept the Arab case from being heard. As Ahmad al-Shuquayri, later the founder of the Palestine Liberation Organization put it: “We have not the gigantic financial enterprises of Wall Street in New York and the City of London to lure consciences and direct minds. We have not the press, the publishing houses, the pressure groups, and the radio systems to mobilize public opinion.” And if this were not enough, the Committee travelled to all Middle Eastern capitals. McDonald went to Beirut and Damascus with two other Committee members, where he was treated to more of the same. After meeting with Lebanese cabinet members, McDonald noted in his diary that, “The discussion was animated, the opinions expressed were strongly, sometimes almost violently anti-Zionist or even anti-Jewish. One of the ministers in particular repeated some of the most fantastic of the Hitler charges against the Jews.”

McDonald dejectedly noted in London that “On the whole, the Arabs made such an impression of unyieldingness that it would be impossible to win them by any sort of compromise.” Still, he countered most overtly antisemitic testimony. To Thomas Reid, a Member of Parliament who in 1938 had helped to thwart the Royal Commission’s partition scheme for Palestine, McDonald asked: “You have spoken about Jewish intriguers, Jewish politicians, Zionist agencies unrepresentative of Jewry. I wonder if you would conclude that the Jews have a monopoly of these qualities in this issue?” His polite answer to General Spears, who compared Zionism and Nazism, was as follows. “I was surprised and somewhat shocked at the
general’s characterization of Zionists as marked by Nazi tendencies. Having known something about the Nazis in first-hand experience and having dealt with their victims over a considerable period, I wonder if the general didn’t really mean that there are few Zionists, very few, whom one could characterize that way if at all?“\textsuperscript{55}

McDonald asked Jamal al-Husseini what would happen to the Jews in Palestine should the British withdraw. Jamal was only slightly opaque: “[In] a few months things will … be much better, and we shall return with the Jews merely to the same conditions that existed before the Great War.” In other words, all Jews who had arrived since the Balfour Declaration had to go.\textsuperscript{56}

V

In late March, with the testimony having ended, the Committee’s British members believed that their case had been made. On March 28, Lord Robert Morrison, one of their number, reported to Bevin that the Committee would retire to Lausanne to write its report, but added that he should not worry.\textsuperscript{57} The Committee would recommend no more than token immigration; there would be no recommendation for a Jewish state, and the Jewish Agency, it would be recommended, “should be abolished or radically reconstructed.” Morrison also believed the report would “find widespread support in the United States,” and that “a large body of Jews would desert the Zionist cause.”\textsuperscript{58}

It did not happen that way. The Committee agreed that a political solution would have to wait, and that Palestine would remain under British control in the meantime, neither Arab- nor Jewish-dominated. But in a month-long verbal slugfest in Lausanne, the American members insisted that 100,000 Jews be allowed to immigrate to Palestine as soon as possible, and there was no US sympathy for abolishing the Jewish Agency. Here McDonald led the way early in the meetings: “I made my first statement of more than a sentence or two by urging that we recognize the central importance of immigration and that we face up to the necessity of deciding unequivocally what is to be the basis of our recommendation on this point.”\textsuperscript{59} In a memorandum written afterwards, he insisted that “The number to be so admitted should be limited only by the resources available to transport and care for the Jewish displaced persons in Palestine. The United States, the British, and perhaps other governments should be invited to make available surplus war transportation and supplies to facilitate the shift of population.”\textsuperscript{60}

McDonald had the fundamental agreement of the US members. The British members argued and dissembled; they claimed that Jewish DPs were borderline black marketeers and criminals, and they looked for escape clauses. After two weeks of contention, Judge Hutcheson, the head of the US delegation, said that the 100,000 certificates were non-negotiable, and threatened that the American members would simply go home and write their own report, or, as Hutcheson put it to the British members: “Is you is, or is you ain’t?”\textsuperscript{61} To avert the disaster of a public break with the Americans, the British agreed.
The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry’s report was published on May 1, 1946. It had ten recommendations, numerous arguments, a wealth of data, and something about which everyone could complain. But the call for the immediate issue of 100,000 immigration certificates was the bombshell. At a single stroke, the Anglo-American Committee report abrogated the hated White Paper of 1939. The relevant clause recommended that: “100,000 certificates be authorized immediately for admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution; [and] that these certificates be awarded as far as possible in 1946 and that actual immigration be pushed forward as rapidly as conditions will permit.” It continued that, regarding Jewish DPs, “We know of no country to which the great majority can go in the immediate future other than Palestine. Furthermore, that is where almost all of them want to go. There they are sure that they will receive a welcome denied them elsewhere. There they hope to enjoy peace and rebuild their lives.”

The hysterics with which the Arab world greeted the Committee’s report indicated that this fundamental point was their main problem. Momentarily forgetting the line between anti-Zionism and antisemitism, Syrian president Shukri al-Quwatli vented to the US minister in Damascus, George Wadsworth, whose staff recently had received death threats over the report: “We fear the great influence wielded by Jews everywhere, notably [in the] United States. Can you not see that, while Moslems and Christians can work together, it is abnormal that either should make common cause with Jews? They have always been troublemakers; our Koran inveighs against them specifically.” Arab fury was matched, almost, by that of the Foreign Office, the US State Department, and virtually every Western diplomat and oil executive in the Middle East.

VI

To London’s anger, President Truman called for the implementation of the immigration recommendation before the report had even been made public. But after recovering from the initial shock, London looked for, and discovered, an out. The official British line in London, as Prime Minister Clement Attlee put it in Parliament, was that “the Report must be considered as a whole in all its implications.” Thus a new committee was needed in order to discuss the implementation, not only of the immigration of 100,000 Jews, but of the other recommendations too, which called for a shared territory under British trusteeship. This complicated process occurred over the summer of 1946. This time, the State Department took no chances. It handpicked like-minded diplomats to send to London. There the British and US delegations agreed to a provincial autonomy scheme known as the Morrison-Grady Plan. This plan called for the partition of Palestine into an Arab province and a very small Jewish province, both remaining under British military control, with the pace of immigration left to British discretion. It also called for advance agreement to the entire scheme by the Jews and the Arabs—agreement
that was not forthcoming. The plan has been characterized recently as a missed opportunity—a perfectly workable plan for a bi-national state that American Zionists forced Truman to turn down.\textsuperscript{66} In essence, however, the Morrison-Grady plan was a swindle—a way out of the recommendations made by the Anglo-American Committee.\textsuperscript{67} But Truman initially, albeit tentatively, accepted the plan, believing State Department officials who told him that this was the only practical way to get the Jewish DPs to Palestine without Palestine boiling over.

McDonald, however, understood the new plan’s nature. He made it a point to see Truman personally, even before word of the plan leaked out on July 24. He prepared a memorandum for the president, which argued that the new plan was

… a repudiation of the President’s program…. In effect, the present proposals would establish in Palestine a Jewish ghetto wholly unacceptable to the Jews throughout the world and to the conscience of mankind…. Incredible though it may seem, the present proposed settlement would leave to the Jewish people but one-thirtieth of the original Palestine envisioned under the Balfour Declaration…. The Jewish area now suggested of 1,500 square miles is already so thickly settled that it offers no opportunity for the admission of substantial numbers of Jewish immigrants and hence would be a death blow to all hopes for a Jewish National Home.\textsuperscript{68}

Getting into the White House with this memorandum was a feat. Truman did not know McDonald personally and had to be reminded who he was. The meeting of Saturday, July 27, 1946, was facilitated by Treasury Secretary John Snyder of St. Louis, whom McDonald had contacted earlier through mutual friends. Senators Robert F. Wagner and James M. Mead of New York accompanied McDonald to the White House.

It was a dramatic meeting in which McDonald and Truman did most of the talking. The president had to be told that the State Department’s Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs was pulling the wool over his eyes, and that under the Morrison-Grady Plan, the 100,000 Jews would never reach Palestine. “I told him, McDonald said afterwards, “that if we get the 100,000 at the price of this [plan], he would go down as anathema…. The President knows in his heart that he has been badly dealt with. I don’t think he would be so resentful if he didn’t [think so]…. I started out by saying that I felt he was in a [perilous] state, that despite his good intentions, he was losing everything.”\textsuperscript{69} Truman was impatient, prickly, and ultimately furious, but he knew that McDonald was right. Three days later, to London’s immense displeasure, Truman abruptly withdrew his support for the scheme.

VII

The 100,000 did not travel to Palestine, at least not yet; and indeed, by the summer of 1946, more than twice that number waited in Europe to emigrate. But the larger point was this: the Anglo-American Committee and Truman’s subsequent support of its plan represented a
significant and very open break with the British over the fundamental issue of Jews, in this case
Holocaust survivors, immigrating to Palestine with fewer restrictions. This had never happened
before. Without US support, or at least the irritated acquiescence that London needed on the
issue, Britain could not square the circle between a more violent Jewish insurgency in Palestine,
more Jews trying to arrive on Haganah-financed ships, and growing Arab anger. In February
1947 the British turned the matter over to the United Nations, the UN voted for partition in
November 1947, and the Israeli declaration of independence followed the day before the British
Mandate officially ended—on May 14, 1948. Jewish refugees who wanted to go to the new state
eventually did so, and the state of Israel doubled in population over the next ten years.

The culmination of McDonald’s career still lay ahead. For now he received accolades
from everyone who cared about the refugee issue. As he wrote Eddie Cantor on August 6, 1946:

I had a long and, I think, useful interview with President Truman on Saturday, July
27…. After the conference, at which the President and I did most of the talking,
Senators Wagner and Mead, who were my sponsors, told the [American] Zionist
Emergency Council that they had never heard a more frank and effective presentation
to the President. Well, I had nothing to lose save honor, so I let him have it straight.70

Truman, however irritated he might have become, liked it straight. The day after the new state of
Israel declared its independence, Truman infuriated the State Department again by making the
US the first country to recognize Israel. In searching for a proper ambassador, he chose
McDonald, the same man at whom he yelled almost exactly two years before. McDonald served
as the first US ambassador in Israel for two and a half years, helping to build a special
relationship that did not exist between Israel and any other country. But this is a story for another
volume, and perhaps, another lecture.

NOTES

This paper is based on Norman J.W. Goda, Barbara McDonald Stewart, Severin Hochberg, and
Richard Breitman, eds., *To the Gates of Jerusalem: The Diaries and Papers of James G.
McDonald, 1945–1947* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2014). I thank my fellow editors as well as the Jack, Joseph
and Morton Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum, particularly the center’s director Paul Shapiro and its director of academic
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Monna and Otto Weinmann Lecture at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

1 The broad literature on Jewish refugees includes Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In War’s Wake:
Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012);


3 Numerical analysis of Jewish DPs in Grossman, *Jews, Germans, and Allies*, 316–17. UNRRA in June 1947 ran 688 camps in the US and British occupation zone, plus twenty-one more in Austria and eight in Italy. This does not count other countries in Western Europe or less formal, non-camp arrangements as were found in Switzerland and elsewhere. Wyman, *DPs* and Königseder and Wetzel, *Waiting for Hope* contain partial lists of camps.


5 Gordon P. Merriam to George V. Allen and Loy Henderson, December 5, 1945, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA), record group (RG) 59, entry (E) 1434, lot file (LF) 54D403, box 9, folder Divisional Memos Oct.–Dec. 1945.

6 Quoted in Jones, *Failure in Palestine*, 73.


11 Lewis Strauss (1896–1974), Jewish businessman and philanthropist who served in US Navy intelligence and ordnance during World War II and as the first chief of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1947–1950. Truman had made him a rear admiral in November 1945. Strauss was on the executive of the then non-Zionist American Jewish Committee after 1933 and also was involved with Jewish charities, particularly the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

12 McDonald to Lewis Strauss, November 14, 1945, McDonald Papers, Columbia University, box 4, folder 18. See also Strauss to McDonald, July 17, 1946 in the same folder.

13 Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, December 20, 1945, NARA, RG 59, E 1434, LF 54D403, box 9, folder Divisional Memos Oct.–Dec. 1945.

14 Frank W. Buxton (1877–1974) was a career journalist and editor of the *Boston Herald*. An anti-imperialist, he was also sympathetic to Zionism.

15 Bartley C. Crum (1900–1959), corporate and celebrity lawyer, liberal Republican and devoted Roman Catholic. He was a friend of David Niles, Truman’s political adviser in the White House, who was himself Jewish, pro-Zionist, and a holdover from the Roosevelt administration. Loy Henderson bitterly opposed Crum’s appointment, even producing FBI information to the effect that Crum was a member of “certain Communist front groups.”


17 Importance discussed in Goda et al., eds. *To the Gates of Jerusalem*, 58–59, 80, 95, 202, 213, 228, 231–33, 238.

18 Ben-Gurion testimony in NARA, RG 43, AAC, box 11.

19 Goda et al., eds., *To the Gates of Jerusalem*, entry of February 7, 1946.


21 Population figures from the *Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry Regarding*

22 Harry Goodman (1899–1961) represented the London Executive of the Agudat Israel World Association, the world body of Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews. He tied the claim to Palestine to the Hebrew Bible. “The settlement in Palestine,” he said, “is a religious obligation and the gathering together of the dispersed of Israel is something which we believe will take place before the coming of the Messiah.” He asked the Committee “to consider the whole tragedy of Jewry,” and added that Arabs and Jews “will work out their own destinies in friendship.” Goodman testimony of January 26, 1946 in NARA, RG 43, AAC, box 10.

23 Sir Simon Marks (1888–1964), Anglo-Jewish businessman and philanthropist; aided Weizmann since the years before World War I; helped to build Marks and Spencer into one of the icons of British retail; knighted as 1st Baron Marks of Broughton, 1944; raised to peer of the realm, 1961.


25 NARA, RG 43, AAC, box 11.

26 Crossman, Palestine Mission, 77–79.

27 Relevant documents in The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, United Kingdom, FO 371/52507/E761; FO 371/52509/E1200.

28 Minute by H.T. Morgan, February 19, 1946, TNA, FO 371/52510/E1462.


31 Reginald Manningham-Buller (1905–1980), conservative member of parliament from Daventry and Northamptonshire South.

32 Wilfred F. Crick (1900–1989), economist, headed the International Conference of Banking Economists, 1937; economic adviser to Midland Bank beginning in 1944. Bevin expected, correctly, that Crick would point to the economic “impossibility” of sizable Jewish immigration
to Palestine.

33 Documents on the Poland trip are in NARA, RG 43, AAC, box 12, folder 1. More than 80,000 Jews did in fact settle in Lower Silesia after the war since it seemed relatively safe. By 1960, most had left. Michael Meng, *Shattered Spaces: Encountering Jewish Ruins in Postwar Germany and Poland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 132–33.


35 Rifkind to Wise, February 23, 1946, Stephen S. Wise Papers, American Jewish Historical Society, Center for Jewish History, New York City, microfilm reel 74–63. Rifkind’s memorandum to the Anglo-American Committee is in Papers of James G. McDonald, Columbia University, box 6, folder 12.

36 William Phillips of the US delegation was to have travelled with McDonald but became ill, leaving McDonald to travel alone. Phillips (1878–1968) was a former undersecretary of state and ambassador, cared little for Jews and later became vice chairman for the Committee for Peace and Justice in the Holy Land, a pro-Arab group that lobbied against the creation of a Jewish state.

37 Guy de Rothschild (1909–2007) represented the French Jewish banking and business aristocracy. He was an officer among the French troops evacuated at Dunkirk in 1940, and decorated for his service there. He returned to France thereafter, but his family was forced to sell its property. He left France again via Spain and joined de Gaulle’s Free French. After the liberation, the family was able to recover its pre-war businesses, but like many other acculturated Jews, he had become dubious concerning the contemporary genuineness of Jewish absorption in France.

38 Discussed in Goda et al., eds., *To the Gates of Jerusalem*, 78–79.

39 Ibid., 87.

40 Ibid., 89–90.

41 Ibid., 89–90.

42 Ibid., 100–101.

43 Ibid., 101–102.


45 Testimonies in NARA, RG 43, AAC, Box 10. On the Institute of Arab American Affairs see

46 Judge Joseph Chappell Hutcheson, Jr. (1879–1973), a Texas-born federal judge, sat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1931–1964; he was an accomplished and colorful legal writer, with two books and nearly 2,000 judicial opinions. Disgusted by German racial policies, but staunchly anti-Zionist, he worried that American Jews would develop a dual loyalty were a Jewish state to come into being.


49 The Arab testimonies of February 1 in London are in NARA, RG 43, AAC, box 10.

50 Testimony NARA, RG 43, AAC, box 10.


52 Testimony in NARA, RG 43, AAC, box 11.


54 Goda et al., eds., *To the Gates of Jerusalem*, entry of February 1, 1946.

55 Hearings of January 29, 1946, NARA, RG 43, AAC, box 10.

56 Testimony in NARA, RG 43, AAC, box 11.


Quoted in Goda et al., eds., To the Gates of Jerusalem, 200.

Quoted in ibid., 203.

Frank Buxton to Isaac B. Berkson, January 13, 1948, McDonald Papers, Columbia University, box 23, folder 7; Excerpt from a Letter from Arthur Lourie, April 21, 1946, PDJA, vol. 1, doc. 164.


Wadsworth to secretary of state, May 9, 1946, NARA, RG 84, entry 3248-A, box 12. See also memorandum for the minister [Wadsworth], June 10, 1946, NARA, RG 84, (E) 3248-A, box 12. Additional Arab reactions can be found throughout this box and NARA, RG 59, (E) 260-A, box 56, folder 800 Palestine.


Named for US delegation head Henry F. Grady and Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Morrison, who introduced the plan to Parliament.


Explained in Goda et al., eds., To the Gates of Jerusalem, 238–44.

Memorandum for President Truman from James G. McDonald, Formerly Member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, July 27, 1946, McDonald Papers, Columbia University, box 5, folder 1.


McDonald to Cantor, August 6, 1946, McDonald Papers, Columbia University, box 1, folder 24.
NORMAN J.W. GODA is the Norman and Irma Braman Professor of Holocaust Studies at the University of Florida and author of *Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path toward America; Tales from Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War; and The Holocaust, Europe, the World, and the Jews*. He is author of *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (with Richard Breitman) and *Hitler's Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War*. He also is co-editor of *To the Gates of Jerusalem: The Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald, 1945–1947* and of a forthcoming volume dealing with the period of James G. McDonald’s service in Israel, 1947–1951.
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