Session 3

The Fall of Srebrenica, July 1995

Documents List

Page No.	Date	Author	Title	Source	Notes
3-1	8-Jul-1995	UNMO HQ Sector BH-NE	UNMO HQ Sector BH-NE Daily Sitrep, Covering Period 090001B to 082000B July 95	ICTY	
3-5	8-Jul-1995	UNMO	Sitrep Update	ICTY	
3-6	9-Jul-1995	UNMO HQ Sec NE	Sit UDP #1	ICTY	
3-9	10-Jul-1995	UNMO HQ Sector BN-NE	UNMO HQ Sector BH-NE Daily Sitrep, Covering Period 100001B to 102000B July 95	ICTY	
3-12	11-Jul-1995	UNMO HQ Sector BH-NE	UNMO HQ Sector BH-NE Daily Sitrep Covering Period 110001B to 112000B July 95	ICTY	
3-16	12-Jul-1995	UNMO HQ Sector BH-NE	Srebrenica Update	ICTY	excerpt from original document (pages 4-5 of 5)
3-18	12-Jul-1995	UNMO	Sitrep Update	ICTY	
3-19	13-Jul-1995	UNMO	Sitrep Update	ICTY	
3-20	2-Jul-1995	Zivanovic	Order for Active b/d/combat activities/ Operation no. 1	ICTY	excerpt from original document (portions of pages 1, 3, 6, and 8 of 10)
3-22	7-Jul-1995	UNMO	Assessment Srebrenica	ICTY	excerpt from original document (cover page and addendum not included)
3-26	9-Jul-1995	Karremans	Deteriorating Situation in Srebrenica	ICTY	
3-28	9-Jul-1995	HQ UNPROFOR	Warning to the Bosnian Serbs	ICTY	
3-30	9-Jul-1995	Tolimir	Conduct of Combat Operations around Srebrenica	ICTY	
3-31	10-Jul-1995	Franken	BSA Ultimatum	ICTY	English translation provided

*Box around text denotes portion of document highlighted for conference discussion.

3-32	10-Jul-1995	Annan	Informal Consultations of the Security Council	French Parliamentary Report	excerpt from original document (attachments not included)
3-34	10-Jul-1995	Dornbush	Dutch Defmin on Srebrenica: No Good Options	State Department // Archive FOIA	excerpt from original document (pages 2-3 of 5)
3-36	10-Jul-1995	Janvier	[Letter from Gen. Janvier to Gen. Rasim]	ICTY	
3-37	10-Jul-1995	Tolimir / Janvier	[Intercepts: Calling for Cease of Attacks on UN Forces]	ICTY	
3-38	10-Jul-1995	Akashi	Situation in Srebrenica [Cable Z-1128]	ICTY	
3-41	11-Jul-1995	Akashi	Situation in Srebrenica [Cable Z-1130]	ICTY	
3-43	11-Jul-1995	Akashi	Situation in Srebrenica [Cable Z-1136]	ICTY	
3-45	11-Jul-1995	Akashi	Situation in Srebrenica [Cable Z-1138]	ICTY	
3-47	11-Jul-1995	Akashi	UNPF Policy, and Information for the Security Council	ICTY	
3-51	11-Jul-1995	Annan	Situation in Srebrenica [Cable Z-2280]	ICTY	
3-53	11-Jul-1995	HQ UNPROFOR	Orders for Defence of DUTCHBAT and Protection of Refugees in Srebrenica	French Parliamentary Report	
3-54	12-Jul-1995	Akashi	Military Information	ICTY	
3-56	11-Jul-1995	Karremans	Meetings with Gen. Mladic on 11 and 12 July 1995	French Parliamentary Report	excerpt from original document (cover page and attachment not included)
3-58	11-Jul-1995	Mladic	[Letter from Mladic to Gen. Smith]	ICTY	
3-59	11-Jul-1995	Mladic	[Letter from Gen. Janvier to Gen. Mladic]	French Parliamentary Report	excerpt from original document (cover page not included)
3-60	12-Jul-1995	U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Potocari: Bosnia and Herzegovina	National Security Archive FOIA	overhead surveillance photographic image

*Box around text denotes portion of document highlighted for conference discussion.

3-61	13-Jul-1995	U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Overview: Potocari, Bosnia and Herzegovina	ICTY	overhead surveillance photographic image
3-62	13-Jul-1995	U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Buses and Trucks Lined Up: Potocari, Bosnia and Herzegovina	ICTY	overhead surveillance photographic image
3-63	11-Jul-1995	Burton	PM Silajdzic: Srebrenica Doomed, "Betrayal Complete"	State Department // Archive FOIA	
3-66	13-Jul-1995	Akashi	Situation in Srebrenica [Cable Z-1154]	ICTY	
3-69	13-Jul-1995	Smith	Aftermath of Fall of Srebrenica	ICTY	fax cover sheet not included
3-72	13-Jul-1995	Bliss	Meeting Gen Smith / Prime Minister Silajdzic : 13 Jul 95	ICTY	
3-74	12-Jul-1995	Lake	Response to the Fall of Srebrenica	Clinton Library // Archive FOIA	
3-76	13-Jul-1995	Clinton / Chirac	Telcon with French President Jaques Chirac	Clinton Library // Archive FOIA	

*Box around text denotes portion of document highlighted for conference discussion.

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Attachment NR 3/M

MIO

See page 3 for DSR

IN:942 Page 1 UTC Time: 95-07-08 19:28:49

NL BURUM LES 493138570=FOJU X 8-JUL-1995 17:58:00 965812

00527540

FROM: UNMO HQ SECTOR BH-NE.
TO: UNMO HQ BH COMD.
INFO: MIO UNMO HQ ZAGREB.
DATE: 08 JULY 95.
FILE REF: 02
FAX NO: 7123
PREPARED BY: FLTLT D.A. WOODHOUSE
RELEASED BY: MAJ J. GJEVIKHAUG

SUBJECT: UNMO HQ SECTOR BH-NE DAILY SITREP
COVERING PERIOD 080001B TO 082000B JULY 95.

1. HIGHLIGHTS. AGAIN CALM IN MOST AREAS EXCEPT SREBRENICA. THE SHELLING OFFENSIVE CONTINUES.

2. SMOs ASSESSMENT. THE BSA OFFENSIVE ON THE SAFE AREA OF SREBRENICA LOOKS TO GO INTO A WORSE SITUATION AND IT IS ASSESSED THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE WITH A THREE PART OBJECTIVE: (A). GET THE AREA UNDER BSA CONTROL, (B). GET THE BSA CONTROL OF THE BLACK MARKET SYSTEM, (C) GET THE BIH TO CHANGE THEIR ACTIONS AROUND SARAJEVO. ALL OTHER REGIONS ARE CALM AND QUIET AND ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN SO.

3. MILITARY INFORMATION.

A. MILITARY ACTIVITY - REFER TO THE ANNEXES FOR A FULL SIT REP ON THE SREBRENICA OFFENSIVE.

B. UNMO OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATIONS

(2) HVO SIDE

- AT 080830B A TEAM BIJELA PTL AT CQ 008655 OBSERVED 1 HVO TRUCK WITH APPROX 25 UNARMED SLDRS MOVING TOWARDS THE DIR OF BRKA (CQ2066).
- AT 081045B THE TEAM BIJELA PTL OBSERVED APPROX 30 UNARMED SLDRS BOARDING A TRUCK WITH BAGS AT BRKA (CQ201666). THE TRUCK WAS FACING THE DIR OF RAHIC (CQ175612).
- AT 081056B THE BIJELA PTL OBSERVED APPROX 7 NEW GRAVES AT THE RAHIC CEMETERY.
- AT 081230B THE BIJELA PTL OBSERVED A BUS WITH APPROX 70 UNARMED SLDRS AT RAHIC MOVING TOWARDS MAOCA (CQ145595).

COMMENT: UNMO TEAM BELIEVE THIS TO BE PART OF ROUTINE ROTATION AND THE GRAVES ARE NOT POSSIBLE TO ASSESS AS THE AREA HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET.

(4) BIH SIDE

- AT 080615B, AT TUZLA BRIDGE (CQ 083322) A TEAM SREBRENIK PTL OBSERVED APPROX 20 SLDRS GATHERING TO BE PICKED UP BY A BUS THAT HEADED NTH.
- AT 080655B A TEAM ZIVINICE OP AT CQ 135230 OBSERVED 1 CIV BUS

Attachment NR. 9/P2

00527541

WITH APPROX 20 UNARMED BIH SLDRS HDG STH DIR TO KLADANJ (CQ 1600).
- AT 080701B TEAM ZIVINICE OBSERVED ONE ABIH AMBULANCE (WHITE WITH RED CROSS), AT GRID CQ 135230, WITH APPROX 10 UNARMED BIH SLDRS ALSO HEADING DIR OF KLADANJ.
- AT 080710B A TEAM TUZLA PTL OBSERVED 2 MED SIZE TRUCKS, 1 WITH HOME MADE ARMOUR PLATING AND ABOUT 24 SOLDIERS, IN LIPNICA BARRACKS AT GRID CQ 100377. COMMENT: THE SLDRS WERE TAKING BREAKFAST AND CONDUCTING NORM AM HRS PERSONAL ADMIN INDICATION THAT THEY ARE BASED AT LIPNICA AND MAY BE CONDUCTINGNIGHT OPS FROM THERE.
- AT 080745B THE TEAM TUZLA PTL OBSERVED APPROX 80 SLDRS STANDING IN GROUPS AROUND THE ROAD JUNCTION IN TUZLA AT GRID CQ 168339. THE UNARMED SLDRS WERE CARRYING BED ROLLS AND SMALL PACKS INDICATING THAT THEY WERE ABOUT TO BE COLLECTED, POSSIBLY AS PART OF A TROOP ROTATION.
- AT 080800B AT THE TUZLA BARRACKS GRID CQ 164332 THE TEAM TUZLA PTL OBSERVED MORE ACTIVITY THAN HAS BEEN SEEN IN RECENT DAYS. SIX MIL TRUCKS WERE PARKED AND THE CAR PARK WAS FULL. A WHEELED APC (POSSIBLY A BTR VARIANT) WAS ALSO SEEN ALONG WITH APPROX 30 SLDRS MOVING AROUND OUTSIDE. COMMENT: THE IMPRESSION WAS OF PREPARATIONS BEING MADE TO COLLECT AND DEPLOY TRPS AGAIN SUGGESTING THAT SATURDAY IS A TRP ROTATION DAY.
- AT 081105B THE TEAM TUZLA PTL OBSERVED MORE THAN 120 ABIH SLDRS (MOSTLY ARMED) BOARDING 2 CIV BUSES AT TUZLA/LIPNICA ROAD JUNCTION CQ 101332. THE BUSES HEADED EAST TOWARDS SIMIN HAN BIH CP AT GRID CQ 211333 AND MAYBE TO THE GEN AREA OF G.TUZLA CQ 2236.
- AT 081304B THE TEAM TUZLA PTL OBSERVED 1 ABIH SLDR WEARING A UN BLUE CAP WITH A UN BADGE. THE SLDR WAS SEEN ON TUZLA/TETIMA ROAD AT CQ 170380. THE PTL STOPPED TO TALK TO THE SLDR BUT HE IMMEDIATELY BOARDED INTO A SMALL CIV MINI BUS AND HEADED TOWARDS THE ABIH CP AT CQ 168391.

C. SUMMARY OF MEETINGS.

C1. AT 081000B TEAM SREBRENIK MET WITH THE LO 22 DIV, CAPT EDO, WHO INFORMED THAT THE SIT IN THE AOR WAS GENERALLY QUIET WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE 223 AOR. HE STATED THAT THE FOLLOWING SHELLING HAD OCCURRED:

2 x 82mm MORTAR SHELLS FIRED FROM MILINO SELO (BQ 9434) TO SKRESCI (BQ9535) - NO CAS, NO DAMAGES.

2 x 120mm MORTAR SHELLS FIRED FROM KRTOVA (BQ 9439) TO DEVETAK (BQ 8736) - 2 SERIOUS CIV CAS, SLIGHT DAMAGES.

1 x 122mm TOP CANNON SHELLS FIRED FROM TUMARJE (BQ 901352) TO TURIJA (BQ 9532) - NO CAS, NO DAMAGES.

D. OTHER SIGNIFICANT/RELEVANT INFORMATION.

D1. THE SIT IN SREBRENICA NECESSITATES THE REPORT TO BE KEPT WHOLE FOR BEST INTERPRETATION. THE SIT UPDATES AND DSR FROM THE TEAM ARE INCLUDED AS AN ANNEX TO THIS HQ DSR.

4. ACTS AGAINST UNMOS/OTHERS.

B. R.O.M. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, HOWEVER MOVEMENTS TO THE SECTOR FM SSW APPEAR TO BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT.

END

ANNEX A
TO BH-NE DSR
DATED 8 JUL 95

Attachment NR 9 /P3

00527542

TEAM SREBRENICA DSR COVERING THE PERIOD 080001B TO 081800B JUL 95.

1. THE SITUATION IN THE ENCLAVE IS NOTHING TO BE HAPPY ABOUT. THE SHELLING BY THE BSA WHICH STARTED SOME THREE DAYS AGO HAS BEEN AT IT'S UTMOST HEIGHT SINCE 0800HRS WITHOUT ANY SIGN OF ABATING.

2. THE ONGOING SHELLING IS LIKELY TO PERSIST UNTIL THE BSA OBJECTIVE IS ACHEIVED IF THEY ARE NOT HALTED.

3a. IN ADDITION TO OUR PREVIOUS REPORTS ABOUT THE ONGOING SITUATION OF THE DAY, THE BSA OFFENSIVE ON THE ENCLAVE CONTINUES TO INTENSIFY WITH 30 MORE SHELLS IMPACTING IN BOTH POTOCARI AND SREBRENICA. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF A BSA INFANTRY ATTACK FROM THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE ENCLAVE. DUTCHBAT ALSO REPORTED THAT OP F CP652807 CAME UNDER HEAVY SHELLING AND EVENTUALLY BEING OCCUPIED BY THE BSA AT ABOUT 081500B JUL 95. THEY HOWEVER STATED THAT NO ONE WAS HURT IN THE ATTACK AND THE BSA ORDERED THEIR SOLDIERS TO LEAVE THE OP WITH JUST THEIR FLAK JACKETS AND HELMETS TO WHICH THEY REFUSED AND MANAGED TO LEAVE THE OP WITH ALL THEIR EQUIPMENT. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE UNIT WHICH UNDERTOOK THIS OPERATION ARE FROM THE JNA. THIS HOWEVER IS UNCONFIRMED BY UNMO'S. ANOTHER UNCONFIRMED REPORT FROM THE BiH INDICATE THAT A BSA TANK T55 IS CURRENTLY POSITIONED ON THE MAIN ROAD LEADING TO SREBRENICA AT CP641819. SHELLING STILL CONTINUES.

3c. UNMO'S HELD A MEETING WITH THE COS 28 DIV MR RAMIZ AT ABOUT 081430B JUL 95 IN WHICH A NUMBER OF BSA POSITIONS AROUND THE ENCLAVE WERE DISCLOSED. THIS WOULD HOWEVER BE INCLUDED IN OUR MILIINFOSUM. AT ANOTHER MEETING WITH DUTCHBAT AND THE COS 28 DIV AT 081506B JUL 95 DUTCHBAT INFORMED THE COS OF THE CAPTURE OF THEIR OP F BY THE BSA. THEY WENT ON FURTHER TO SAY THAT WHEN THE SOLDIERS OF THE OP WERE WITHDRAWING FROM THE OCCUPIED POSITION THEY WERE CONFRONTED BY BiH SOLDIERS WHO TRIED TO PREVENT THEM FROM LEAVING THE AREA AND WHEN THE DUTCH SOLDIERS FORCED THEIR WAY THROUGH THEY WERE SHOT AT BY THE BiH SOLDIERS RESULTING IN ONE WOUNDED. (WE HAVE RECEIVED A REPORT THAT THE WOUNDED SOLDIER DIED ON REACHING THE DUTCHBAT COMPOUND). HE WENT ON TO ACCUSE THE BiH OF HINDERING THEM FROM CARRYING OUT THEIR DUTIES AS BEST KNOWN TO THEM AND THAT THE INCIDENCE WOULD BE REPORTED TO INTERNATIONAL CIRCLES. THE COS THEN APOLOGISED FOR HIS TROOPS BEHAVIOUR BUT EXPLAINED HOWEVER THAT HIS SOLDIERS MIGHT HAVE REACTED IN THAT WAY THROUGH FEAR SINCE THEY HAD NO MEANS OF FIGHTING BACK AGAINST THE BSA. DUTCHBATS DEPARTURE FROM THE OP WOULD LEAVE THEM PRONE TO THE BSA ADVANCEMENT SINCE THEY WERE RELYING ON DUTCHBAT TO PROTECT THEM. TO THIS THE LO DUTCHBAT REPLIED THAT THEIR PROBLEM WAS THAT THE SITUATION WAS GETTING WORSE AND HAVE THUS REPORTED TO HIGHER COMMAND BUT HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE YET. HE WENT ON FURTHER TO INFORM THE COS OF THE COUNTER MESSURES BEING TAKEN AT THAT MOMENT TO STOP THE BSA ADVANCE. HE CONSEQUENTLY REQUESTED THE BiH TO ALLOW THEM TO DO THE JOB THEIR OWN WAY. THE COS ASKED THE LO DUTCHBAT WHETHER THEY HAVE ANY ANTI-TANK WEAPONS TO WHICH HE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. THE COS THEN REQUESTED TO KNOW WHY DUTCHBAT DID NOT SHOT BACK AT THE BSA WHEN THEY WERE ATTACKED BY THE BSA. THE LO ANSWERED THAT THEY DID NOT SHOOT BACK BECAUSE THE BiH WERE IN THE VICINITY AND THAT FIRING ON THE BSA WOULD AFFECT ALSO THE BiH TO WHICH THE COS DISAGREED. THE COS FUTHER COMMENTED ON THE CRITICAL SITUATION STATING THAT BOTH UNPROFOR AND THE ENTIRE

3-4

..... Attachment NR 4 / P4

POPULATION OF SREBRENICA ARE AT THE MERCY OF THE BSA. HE THEN SAID THAT THE REACTION OF THE UN TO THE ONGOING SITUATION WAS VERY SHAMEFUL INDEED. AND IN AN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THE LO AS TO WHAT HE THINK THE OBJECTIVES OF THE BSA MIGHT BE,THE COS REPLIED THAT WHATEVER THE BSA OBJECTIVES ARE IT IS NOT RELEVANT AT THAT MOMENT SINCE THEY HAVE ALREADY ENTERED THE ENCLAVE AND THAT WHAT WAS MORE IMPORTANT IS TO FIND MEANS OF PREVENTING A TOTAL MASSACRE. THE LO DUTCHBAT THEREFORE ASKED THE COS WHETHER THERE WAS A POSSIBILTY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE BSA TO STOP THEIR OFFENSIVE ON THE ENCLAVE ADDING THAT DUTCHBAT ARE READY TO ARRANGE FOR SUCH A MEETING IF THE BiH CONSENTED TO IT. IN ANSWER TO THIS THE COS SAID THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY BE WILLING TO TO MEET THE BSA OVER THE ISSUE BUT WOULD NEED APPROVAL FROM HIS HIGHER COMMAND.HE HOWEVER ADDED THAT HE DOUBT IF ANY GOOD WOULD COME OUT OF SUCH A MEETING SINCE THEY HAVE MET BSA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS ON THE SAME ISSUE. HE ONCE AGAIN REITERIATED HIS OPINION ABOUT THE UN'S ATTITUDE FOR NOT RESPONDING POSITIVELY TO THE ONGOING CARNAGE ADDING THAT THE UN HAVE YEILDED TO BSA PRESSURE.

00527543

BEST REGARDS///.
WE STILL HOPE TO LIVE THROUGH THIS, GOD WILLING.
TEAM SREBRENICA.

ANNEX B
TO BH-NE DSR
DATED 8 JUL 95

SIT UPDATES - SREBRENICA ENCLAVE

UPDATE #1

1. SHELLING STARTED IN SREBRENICA VILLAGE THIS MORNING AT 0800HRS. THEY SEEM TO BE CONCENTRATING MORE ON THE DENSELY POPULATED AREAS LIKE CP640847, 635855 AND POTOCARI TOWN. UNMOS HAVE SO FAR COUNTED UP TO 31 EXPLOSIONS IN POTOCARI BUT DUE TO THE DISTANCE, THERE MAY BE MORE THAT WE HAVE NOT HEARD. IN SREBRENICA TOWN, UNMOS HAVE COUNTED 34 EXPLOSIONS WITH ONE LANDING APPROX 20M FROM UNMO ACCOM AT 1247HRS. SHRAPNEL WAS HURLED OVER THE PTT BLDG WHERE UNMOS ARE HOUSED BUT NO ONE WAS INJURED. THE BIH COS HAS INFORMED UNMOS THAT OVER 100 SHELLS HAVE LANDED IN GENERAL AREA OF BLJECEVA CP6493 AND CIZMIC CR611941 BUT THIS IS NCBU. AS WE ARE WRITING THIS, MORE SHELLING IS GOING ON IN BOTH POTOCARI AND SREBRENICA TOWN. WE ARE UNABLE TO CONFIRM MOST OF THE THINGS EVEN WITH DUTCHBAT. UNCONFIRMED INFO INDICATES THAT A HOTEL LOCATED AT CP642849 HAS BEEN HIT BY ONE SHELL WHILE TWO OTHERS LANDED NEARBY. ANY DAMAGE OR CASUALTIES NOT YET KNOWN. NOTE: USE THIS AS OUR DSR IF WE DO NOT SEND IT ON TIME,AS WE ARE NOW HEADING FOR THE BUNKER. MORE INFO TO COME,AS WE GET IT.

UPDATE #2

AT 1354HRS DUTCHBAT LO CALLED UNMOS AND INFORMED THEM OF THEIR INTENTIONS TO WITHDR... THEIR OP F CP652807 DUE TO THE HEAVY SHELLING ON THEIR PO... THEY SAID THEIR APC WILL MOVE TO A SAFER PLACE AS SOON AS SHELLING REDUCES. UNMOS HAVE COUNTED 60 EXPLOSIONS FROM 1335HRS TO 1406HRS IN SREBRENICA AND POTOCARI AND SHELLING IS STILL GOING ON. MORE INFO TO COME, AS WE GET IT.

Attachment NR 23/P1 **3-5**

TT081229.TMP Page 1 UTC Time: 95-07-13 08:12:41

Blaavand LES 493136950= FOIX X 13-JUL-1995 06:09:13 091662

TO:TX
FROM:TA
DTG:0800B JULY 95 00527595
SUBJ:SITREP UPDATE

FF 00339433

GOODMORNING TO YOU ALL.AFTER AN ALLMOST SLEEPLESS NIGHT WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING INFO.
THE MEDICAL CONVOY WAS STOPPED AT KLADANJ BECAUSE APPERENTLY THE LOCAL COMMANDER THERE WAS NOT INFORMED THAT A MEDICAL CONVOY WAS TO PASS HIS TERRITORY. THE LIGHT WOUNDED STAYED THERE AND ARE NOW PASSING THAT SPOT. THE HEAVY WOUNDED HAD TO RETURN BECAUSE THE INTENSIVE CARE COULD ONLY BE DONE IN THE NEIGBOURHOOD OF THE COMPOUND. I (TL) AM GOING TO THE MEDICAL CONVOY, THAT IS STANDING ON YELLOW BRIDGE JUST OUTSIDE THE ENCLAVE, TO PERSUADE THE LOCAL COMMANDER OVER HERE TO LET THEM START DRIVING TOWARDS KLADANJ. I TAKE MY SERB INTERPRETER WHITH ME TO HELP. I WILL RETURN IMMIDIATELY AFTER BEING SUCCESSFUL.
THE DEPARTURE OF THE REFUGEES STARTED AT 0700HRS AGAIN. RIGHT ON TIME. WE TRY TO INVESTIGATE THE RUMOUR THAT THE SERBS SHOULD HAVE KILLED SEVERAL MEN THEY TOOK OUT OF THE CROWD YESTERDAY. I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO.

WARMEST REGARDS
TA TEAM TL

TT081229.TMP

±FF00339433

3-6

Attachment NR 12/P1

IN.961 Page 1 UTC Time: 95-07-09 14:02:28

NL BURUM LES 493138570=FOJU K 9-JUL-1995 12:51:59 970933

TO: UNMO HQ BHC SARAJEVO
UNMO HQ ZAGREB
FM: UNMO HQ SEC NE
DTG: 091440B JUL 95

00527554

From: UNMO HQ
TO : UNMO LO/JOC
DTG : 091505B/JUL 95

SUBJ: SIT UPD # 1

UNDERNEATH A STRAIGHT FORWARD COPY OF THE SIT UPD FROM UNMO TEAM SREBRENICA (TA).

INFORMATION RECEIVED AT 1400HRS INDICATE THAT BSA TROOPS ARE NOW AT CP636834 WITH 4 TKS.THIS IS NCBU BUT MOST OF WHAT WE ARE GETTING IS TURNING OUT TO BE TRUE.THE TOWN MAY FALL ANYTIME FROM NOW.DUTCHBAT INFORMED US AT 1406 THAT THEY MIGHT WITHDRAW THEIR OP K CP610805.WE ARE STILL SAFE BUT INCASE IT DETERIORATES,WE MIGHT WITHDRAW TO DUTCHBAT.

THE MORNING STARTED BEAUTIFULLY AND WE THOUGHT ALL WOULD REMAIN WELL BUT THAT CHANGED AT 0800HRS WHEN SHELLING STARTED IN SREBRENICA AGAIN.AREAS OF CP641866 AND CP640874 HAVE SO FAR RECEIVED 7X SHELLS.UNMOS HAVE ALSO COUNTED UP TO ADDITIONAL 113 EXPLOSIONS IN BOTH SREBRENICA AND POTOCARI. THERE IS ALSO A REPORTED BSA INFANTRY ATTACK FROM THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE ENCLAVE FORMER OP E.THEY ARE BEING ENGAGED BY THE BiH.
ON 082240B UNMOS OBSERVED MANY PERS ENTERING SREBRENICA TOWN FROM SLAPOVIC-SWEDISH SHELTER VILLAGE AND NEIGHBOURING VILLAGES.SOME ARE SEEKING SHELTER FROM RELATIVES WHILE OTHERS ARE STAYING IN THE SCHOOL COMPOUND. THE BSA ENTERED THE SWEDISH SHELTER VILLAGE AT 091200B JUL 95.

MEETING.
THERE WERE TWO SUCCESSIVE MEETINGS THIS MORNING WITH THE LO DUTCHBAT AND COS 28 DIV MR RAMIZ ON ONE HAND AND LO DUTCHBAT,MSF AND MR OSMAN PRESIDENT OF THE OPSTINA IN SREBRENICA.
IN THE FIRST MEETING WHICH STARTED AT 090917B JUL 95,THE LO TEAM OF DUTCHBAT DEMANDED AN ANSWER TO AN EARLIER REQUEST YESTERDAY 08 JUL 95 FOR A GUARANTTEE FROM THE BiH THAT THEY WOULD NOT HINDER ANY OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL MOVEMENTS AGAIN.HE CONTINUED THAT BECAUSE THEY HAD NO ANSWER TO THE REQUEST YESTERDAY IT HAS RESULTED IN ANOTHER ONE OF THEIR OPS OP S FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE BSA TOGETHER WITH THE PERSONNEL AND ALL THEIR EQUIPMENTS INCLUDING ONE APC.
MR RAMIZ ANSWERED THAT INFO HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THEIR FRONT YESTERDAY INDICATED THAT THE PERSONNEL OF OP S WERE RELATING FAVOURABLY WITH HIS TROOPS AND THAT THEY WERE WITHDRAWING TOGETHER ALONG THE RIVER JADAR.HE SAID HE DID NOT THEREFORE FIND IT NECESSARY TO GIVE THE LO ANY ANSWER TO THEIR REQUEST.
THE LO TEAM REACTED THAT THIS HAD HAPPENED DUE TO MISINFORMATION FROM BOTH PARTIES AND EMPHASIZED THAT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT AT THAT MOMENT WAS TO GET THE COS GUARANTTEE FOR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHOUT ANY HINDERANCE FROM THE BiH ADDING THAT WITHOUT WHICH THEY WOULD BE FORCED TO REACT AGAINST THE BiH.THE COS ASSURED THE LO TEAM OF HIS FULLEST GUARANTTEE ADDING THAT HE HAD ALREADY INSTRUCTED HIS TROOPS TO ALLOW DUTCHBAT CARRY ON THEIR DUTIES WITHOUT ANY INTERFERANCE.HE HOWEVER STATED THAT SHOULD THERE BE ANY INDIVIDUALISTIC ACTIONS IN THAT RESPECT THEN DUTCHBAT SHOULD KNOW THAT IT WAS NOT FROM ANY OF THE MEN UNDER HIS CONTROL.HE ALSO ADDED THAT SHOULD SUCH AN INCIDENT

Attachment NR 12/P2 00527555

HAPPEN AGAIN HE WAS PREPARED TO PERSONALLY GO TO THE SCENE.
THE LO TEAM THEN REQUESTED THE COS TO INFORM DUTCHBAT OF ANY NEW DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE UNMO'S IN TIME IN ORDER FOR THEM TO INITIATE PREVENTIVE MEASURES BEFORE IT BECOMES UNAVOIDABLE.
THE LO FUTHER ACCUSED MR RAMIZ FOR REQUESTING AUTHORITY FROM HIS HIGH COMMAND TO REMOVE BY FORCE THEIR WEAPONS UNDER THE CUSTODY OF B COY.THE COS HOWEVER REPLIED IN THE NEGETIVE STATING THAT HIS HIGH COMMAND HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO DEMAND THE USE OF THEIR WEAPONS UNDER CUSTODY AS WELL AS THE WEAPONS OF DUTCHBAT IF THE DUTCH WERE NOT WILLING TO CONFRONT THE BSA.THE LO TEAM REPLIED THAT SUCH A DEMAND CANNOT BE ACCEPTED WHICH RAMIZ CONCERNTED TO SAYING THAT HAS BEEN HIS ANTICIPATION HENCE HIS REFUSAL TO CARRY OUT THAT INSTRUCTION.HE HOWEVER ENDED BY ACCUSING DUTCHBAT THE SUSPECTED MANNER THEIR ROTATION WAS TAKING.THIS WAS STRONGLY OBJECTED BY THE LO TEAM.

IN THE SECOND MEETING THAT FOLLOWED AT 090946 WITH THE PRESIDENT MR OSMAN,MSF AND DUTCHBAT,THE PRESIDENT STARTED BY RECOUNTING THE ONGOING SERIOUS SITUATION AND DEMANDED TO KNOW WHAT MEASURES THE UN ORGINIZATIONS TAKING TO ARREST THE SITUATION.HE ELABORATED THAT THERE WERE AT THE MOMENT OVER 4000 PEOPLE IN THE SREBRENICA TOWN STATING THAT THE SWEDISH SHELTER DWELLERS NUMBERING ABOUT 3000 PEOPLE AND OTHER INFLUX FROM THE SURROUNDING VILLAGES ARE NOW IN THE TOWN.HE THEREFORE REQUESTED TO KNOW IF THE UN AGENCIES EQUIPED ENOUGH TO RESPOND FAVOURABLY TO THEIR REQUEST FOR ASSISTING THESE PEOPLE.
THE DUTCHBAT LO TEAM IN THEIR ANSWER NARRATED THE CAPTURE OF TWO OF THEIR OPS BY THE BSA BLAMING THE BiH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THAT LOSS ADDING THAT THE ONLY WAY THEY CAN EXECUTE THEIR TASK PROPERLY IN THE ENCLAVE WAS TO HAVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT DEVOID OF ANY BiH INTREFERANCE.HE DISCLOSED HOWEVER THAT THEY AT THAT MOMENT CONSOLIDATED NEW POSITIONS SOUTH OF SREBRENICA TOWN AND HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTING THE ONGOING SITUATION TO THEIR HIGHER LEVELS.
MSF INTURN ANALYZED THE VOLUME OF WORK BEING CARRIED OUT TO HELP THE WOUNDED.BUT REGRETTED TO SAY THAT THEIR CAPABILITIES AND SUPPLIES WERE NOT ENOUGH TO MEET THE INCREASING NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE.THEY ALSO MADE AN APPEAL FOR THEIR LIASON OFFICER WHOM THE OPSTINA HAVE STOPPED FROM WORKING WITH THE MSF,TO BE ALLOWED BACK WITH MSF TO ASSIST IN RESRORING THEIR BROKEN DOWN COMMS EQUIPMENTS.IN RESPONSE, THE PRESIDENT FIRST ASSURED THE LO TEAM OF THEIR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND TOLD MSF TO EXPECT HIS ANSWER TO THEIR REQUEST AT A LATTER DATE.
THE ECONOMY ADMINISTRATOR MR DZEMAL BECIROVIC WHO ACCOMPANIED THE RESIDENT TO THE MEETING STATED THAT SOME OF THE NEW REFUGEES WHO HAD NO RELATIONS IN THE TOWN HAVE BEEN TEMPORALLY ACCOMMODATED AT THE PRIMARY SCHOOL AND REQUESTED THE UN ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDING THE UNMOS TO VISIT THE AREA.HE ALSO REQUESTED FOR SECURITY FROM DUTCHBAT FOR THE LOCAL HOSPITAL.MSF HOWEVER REFUSED SUCH A SECURITY EXPLAINING THAT ANY MILITARY PRESENCE IN AND ARROUND THE HOSPITAL WOULD ATTRACT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD RATHER BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SICK.THEY FUTHER STATED THAT THE NEUTRAL STAND OF THE HOSPITAL WOULD BE RELAYED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THEIR PROTECTION TO BE GUARANTTEED.
THE OPSTINA CALLED THE ATTENTION OF THE UN ORGANIZATIONS TO THE PANIC AND CHAOS THAT WOULD FOLLOW ANY ENTRY OF THE BSA INTO THE TOWN AND APPEALED TO THE UN TO ACT NOW TO AVERT SUCH A DISASTER.HE ALSO INFORMED THE MEETING ABOUT THE EFFORTS THEY ARE MAKING THROUGH THEIR HIGH ECHELON TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM AND ASKED DUTCHBAT TO BARE WITH THE LOCALS SHOULD THEY GO TO THEM FOR SHELTER SINCE THEY HAVE NO WHERE ELSE TO GO.

FROM THE LOOK OF THINGS,BSA MAY ENTER THE ENCLAVE FROM THE SOUTH ANYTIME NOW,BUT WILL MEET A LOT RESISTANCE FROM THE BIH INFANTRY.MAY BE THAT IS WHY THEY ARE SHELLING POTOCARI AND VILLAGES TO THE NORTH OF SREBRENICA TO ENGAGE THE BIH AND ENSURE NO BIH REINFORCEMENTS ARE

3-8

Attachment NR 12/P3

SENT TO THE SOUTH.

WE ARE SORRY FOR WRITING MAY BE TOO MUCH BUT WE FEEL YOU SHOULD KNOW WHAT IS HAPPENING HERE ASAP.

REGARDS
UNMO SREBRENICA THROUGH UNMO HQ NE

00527556

IN.961

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10 JUL 1995

UNMO HEADQUARTERS
FILE NO.
DTG RECEIVED 15Ø2B
ACTION CMO/DCMO/SCDO/MPO/DO/COJOC
RETURNED TO OPS ROOM BY

Ø8

3-9

Attachment NR. 15/ 78

00527566

IN.015 Page 1 UTC Time: 95-07-10 20:05:13

NL BURUM LES 493138570=FOJU X 10-JUL-1995 18:49:49 987671

FROM: UNMO HQ SECTOR BH-NE.
TO: UNMO HQ BH COMD.
INFO: MIO UNMO HQ ZAGREB.
DATE: 10 JULY 95.
FILE REF: 02
FAX NO: 7123
PREPARED BY: FLTLT D.A. WOODHOUSE
RELEASED BY: MAJ J. GJEVIKHAUG

SUBJECT: UNMO HQ SECTOR BH-NE DAILY SITREP
COVERING PERIOD 100001B TO 102000B JULY 95.

1. HIGHLIGHTS. VERY CALM IN MOST AREAS. THE OFFENSIVE AND SHELLING IN SREBRENICA CONTINUES TO ESCALATE.

2. SMOs ASSESSMENT. WITHIN THE MAIN AOR THE SITUATION STILL REMAINS CALM AND QUIET. IN THE SREBRENICA ENCLAVE THE SIT IS PROGRESSIVELY GETTING WORSE. IF THIS CONTINUES A MASSACRE IS POSSIBLE. DUE TO THIS SITUATION, THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION IS DETERIORATING AND THE UN IS LOSING CREDIBILITY IN BOSNIA.

3. MILITARY INFORMATION.
A. MILITARY ACTIVITY

(1) WARRING FACTION FIRING INCIDENTS

DTG DESCRIPTION

REFER TO ANNEX A FOR THE SREBRENICA REPORT.

101135B-101145B TEAM TUZLA REPORTED HEARING HMG AND CANNON FIRE IN GEN AREA OF CQ 2044.

B. UNMO OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATIONS

(2) HVO SIDE

- AT 101040B A TEAM BIJELA PTL OBSERVED AT CQ 112661 ONE HVO BUS WITH APPROX 50 UNARMED SLDRS MOVING NORTH TOWARDS CL (DONJA SKAKAVA). COMMENT: BELIEVED TO BE PART OF ROUTINE ROTATION.

(4) BIH SIDE

- BTW 100930B AND 101420B THE TEAM TUZLA PTL OBSERVED THAT THE COMPANY AT LIPNICA BARRACKS CQ 100377 WAS STILL IN RESIDENCE BUT THE TRUCK MOUNTED M55 AAG WAS NOT LOCATED WITHIN THE BARRACKS. THE PATROL ALSO OBSERVED THAT THE HQ OF 253 BDE IS STILL IN PLACE AT BRESKE GRID CQ 146430. THE PATROL OBSERVED AN M48 MOUNTAIN GUN BEING TRANSPORTED ON THE BACK OF A MIL TRUCK HDG EAST ON THE MAIN ROAD IN FRONT OF TEAM LOC GRID CQ155333. COMMENT: THE GUN IS MOST LIKELY REDEPLOYING TO 253BDE IN THE NE OF OUR AOR.
- AT 101030B JUL 95 THE TEAM BIJELA PTL OBSERVED AT CQ-088658

Document NR. 15 / P7

APPROX 30 BiH UNARMED SLDRS WAITING WITH PERS BELONGINGS.
COMMENT: BELIEVED THEY WERE WAITING FOR TPT TO BE CONVEYED TO THEIR PLACE OF WORK.
- BTW 101120B AND 101220B A TEAM SREBRENIK PTL AT BQ 9514 OBSERVED THE MOVEMENT OF 2 VANS AND 1 TRK FULL WITH SLDRS HDG EAST.
- AT 101220B A TEAM ZIVINICE PTL ON THE SKODA ROAD ARRIVED AT THE FORMER HOTEL KONJUH AT CQ 077012. THE BUILDING HAS BEEN CONVERTED INTO A HOSP BUT THE TEAM WERE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY WHETHER IT IS A MIL OR CIV HOSP.
- AT 101335 THE SREBRENIK TEAM, FM THEIR LOC AT BQ 010532 OBSERVED 2 ABiH TKS WITH AN UNK MG (POSS QUAD .50 AA MG) HDG NTH.
- AT 101519B, AT SREBRENIK BQ 010532, UNMO TEAM SREBRENIK OBSERVED 2 BUSES FULL OF SLDRS (APPROX 130) HDG STH.

C. SUMMARY OF MEETINGS.

C1. TEAM BIJELA HELD A MEETING WITH LO 21 DIV AT 100930B. FOL POINTS WERE DISCUSSED: (A). FOM-WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE FOM HE STATED IT IS IMPOSSIBLE ON HIS PART TO ALLOW EVEN ONE PTL BEYOND THAT APPROVED BY 2 CORPS. IF WE WISH FOR ANYTHING IT SHOULD BE SORTED OUT WITH 2ND CORPS. THE TEAM MENTIONED THAT ECMM HAS BEEN VISITING GRADACAC BQ-9672 AND PALANKA CQ-2063 REGULARLY. WHEN ASKED WHY THEN NOT UNMOS. ANSWER WAS THE SAME (ASK 2ND CORPS). (B). THE LO ALSO STATED THE FOL: 'QUOTE' THE SREB ENCLAVE WAS THE FIRST DEMILITARISED ZONE. PEOPLE LEFT ARMS WITH CONFIDENCE THAT UN WILL BE THEIR PROTECTOR. PEOPLE BELIEVED THAT THEY WILL BE SUPPLIED WITH MEDICINE, FOOD AND ABOVE ALL GUARANTEED SAFE HAVEN. NOW PEOPLE DIED FIRST BY STARVATION AND REST BY BULLETS. UN IS OBSERVING HOW IT LOOKS WHEN HELPLESS PEOPLE DIE, THEN STARTS COUNTING THE DEAD BODIES AND DESTROYED HOUSES AS PART OF DUTY. 'UNQUOTE'

C2. AT 101000B UNMO TEAM GUNJA MET WITH CAPT URIZA, LO 1BN 131BDE. THE LO TOOK THE TEAM TO A DESTROYED BRIDGE TO BRCKO TOWN AND TO BRICK FACTORY OP WHICH PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT VIEW OF BRCKO TOWN. NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS OBSERVED BUT THIS WAS AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LOCAL MILITARY AUTHORITY. IT IS HOPED THAT THIS WILL LEAD TO FURTHER FOM.

C3. AT 101150B A TEAM TUZLA PTL HAD AN UNSCHEDULED MEETING WITH MAJOR MIRE, THE HEAD OF SEC FOR 253 BDE AFTER THE PTL HAD BEEN STOPPED AT THE BIH MIL CP AT GRID CQ 145427. OVER COFFEE HE STATED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PTL WAS CARRYING OUT ITS TASK. HE COMMENTED ON THE SITUATION IN SREBRINICA AND REVEALED A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNPROFOR SITUATION IN THE ENCLAVE. HE SYMPATHISED WITH THE SITUATION FACED BY THE UN PERS IN THE ENCLAVE AND ACCEPTED THAT THE POLITICIANS MADE THE POLICY NOT UN SOLDIERS. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN A FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE AND THE TEAM WERE INVITED TO CALL ON HIM WHENEVER THEY ARE IN THE AREA. COMMENT: THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO CULTIVATE A SOURCE OF INFO NOT PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE.

D. OTHER SIGNIFICANT/RELEVANT INFORMATION.

D1. AT 101230B APPROX 200 CIV PERS COMMENCED BLOCKADE OF NORDBAT2, AT GRID CQ 1028. THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO THE PERCEIVED LACK OF UN ACTION IN SREBRENICA.

4. ACTS AGAINST UNMOS/OTHERS.

B. R.O.M. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.

3-11

Attachment NR 15/ P8

END

00527568

ANNEX A
TO BH-NE DSR
DATED 09 JUL 95

SREBRENICA SITUATION UPDATE DTG:101230B JUL 95

SHELLING IS STILL GOING ON IN SREBRENICA. UP TILL NOW WE UNMO'S CONFIRM FROM THE MORNING OVER 100 DETONATIONS. AT 100930B ABOUT 8 ROCKETS WERE FIRED FROM GRID CP 644928 IN THE DIRECTION OF SREBRENICA. REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM DUTCHBAT, INDICATE THAT : TWO APC'S ARE BEING RECOVERED FROM GRID CP 638845. A BSA TANK (T-84) IS ON THE POSITION FEATURE KVARAC GRID CP664855. THIS TANK IS MAKING THE RECOVERY OF THE APC'S VERY DIFFICULT. THE CREW OF OP-D, WHO WERE EARLIER SURROUNDED BY BIH, RETURNED TO THE COMPOUND OF B-COY. THE NUMBER OF CAS AND WOUNDED IS RAPIDLY INCREASING. HOWEVER WE ARE NOT ABLE TO GIVE YOU THE EXACT FIGURES NOW. WE WILL DO SO ASAP. WARMEST REGARDS.

SREBRENICA SITUATION UPDATE DTG:101255B JUL 95

TWO HEAVY SHELLS PROBABLY 155 MM ART SHELLS HIT THE DIRECT SURROUNDING OF THE HOSPITAL AT 1100 HRS. ALL THE WINDOWS ARE SMASHED AND SHRAPNEL HAS SHOWERED THE WALLS AND ROOMS OF THE HOSPITAL. THE SURGERY IS VERY DIFFICULT TO PROCEED. THE NUMBER OF CAS AND WOUNDED WE DON'T KNOW YET BUT WE WILL INFORM YOU ASAP. IT LOOKS AS IF THE BSA ARE NOW TARGETING THE HOSPITAL AND THE SURROUNDINGS. THIS MEANS ALSO OUR FORMER LOCATION, PTT BUILDING, IS NOW NOT SAFE TO RETURN TO. MORE TO FOLLOW. WARMEST REGARDS.

SREBRENICA SITUATION UPDATE DTG: 101346B JUL 95

SREBRENICA TOWNSHIP IS STILL UNDERGOING A VERY HEAVY SHELLING. SO FAR WE HAVE RECORDED FIGURES 49 SHELLS SINCE 1250HRS TO 1353HRS THIS AFTERNOON WITH FIGURE 9 ROCKETS LAUNCHED INTO THE TOWN AND EXCHANGES OF OCCASIONAL HMG AND SA FIRING. WE ESTIMATE THE CURRENT SITUATION TO BE GETTING WORSE. STILL MONITORING.

SREBRENICA SITUATION UPDATE DTG: 101645B JUL 95

1. INFO RECEIVED FROM ONE OF OUR YELLOW CARDS WHO IS IN SREBRENICA AT THE MOMENT AND WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH BY RADIO INDICATES THAT AS AT 1552HRS SREBRENICA TOWN CAME UNDER ANOTHER HEAVY SHELLING RESULTING IN 9 SERIOUS INJURIES. THE WESTERN END OF TOWN IS SAID TO BE THE MOST HEAVILY HIT WITH TWELVE SHELLS.
2. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT OUR FORMER LOCATION, THE PTT BUILDING IS PRESENTLY UNDER A BARRAGE OF SHELLING HAVING BEEN HIT 10 TIMES IN THE LAST HOUR.
3. DUTCHBAT REPORTS THEIR OP A CP 553901 LOCATED IN SLATINA BEING ATTACKED BY THE BSA FROM THREE SIDES, FROM THE NW, W AND SW. GRID REFS TO BE CONFIRMED LATER.
4. LATEST INFORMATION RECEIVED REPORTS OF THE FOLLOWING VILLAGES BEING BURNT BY THE BSA:-
A. PUSMULIC-CP635825

3-12

Attachment-WR 15 / P1

IN.046 Page 1 UTC Time: 95-07-11 19:29:54

00527569

NL BURUM LES 493138570=FOJU X 11-JUL-1995 17:47:03 001953

FROM: UNMO HQ SECTOR BH-NE.
TO: UNMO HQ BH COMD.
INFO: MIO UNMO HQ ZAGREB.
DATE: 11 JULY 95.
FILE REF: 02
FAX NO: 7123
PREPARED BY: FLTLT D.A. WOODHOUSE
RELEASED BY: MAJ J. GJEVIKHAUG

SUBJECT: UNMO HQ SECTOR BH-NE DAILY SITREP
COVERING PERIOD 110001B TO 112000B JULY 95.

1. HIGHLIGHTS. CALM IN MOST AREAS. THE SREBRENICA ENCLAVE IS FALLING TO THE SERB OFFENSIVE. AIR STRIKES LAUNCHED BY NATO, WITH ONLY MINIMAL EFFECT.

2. SMOs ASSESSMENT. THE SITUATION WITHIN THE MAIN AOR REMAINS CALM AND QUIET, AND LIKELY TO REMAIN THAT WAY FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS. IN THE SREBRENICA ENCLAVE THE SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED WITH THE BSA TAKING CONTROL OVER MOST REGIONS. THE AIR STRIKES DON'T APPEAR TO HAVE HAD THE EXPECTED OUTCOME. REFUGEES ARE MOVING TO THE NORTHERN PART OF THE ENCLAVE AND THE FOOD SIT IS BECOMING CRITICAL. MOVEMENT OUT OF THE ENCLAVE, TOWARDS TUZLA REGION, IS A POSSIBILITY IN THE COMING DAYS.

3. MILITARY INFORMATION.
A. MILITARY ACTIVITY

(1) WARRING FACTION FIRING INCIDENTS

REFER TO ANNEX A FOR THE REPORT ON THE SREBRENICA OFFENSIVE.

(2) AIR ACTIVITY REPORT

AS WIDELY REPORTED NATO A/C WERE IN ACTION OVER SREBRENICA. FULL DETAILS NOT AVAILABLE, REFER TO ANNEX A.

B. UNMO OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATIONS

(2) HVO SIDE

- AT 110835B TEAM ORASJE OBSERVED 3 TRUCKS WITH AMMUNITION BOXES ON BOARD PROCEEDING FM W TO E IN FRONT OF THE TEAM LOC AT GRID CQ 185889. TEAM COMMENT - BELIEVED TO BE HDG TO THE 4TH GARDIST BDE.

(4) BIH SIDE

- At 101743B, A TEAM TUZLA PTL OBSERVED A CIV BUS WITH APPR 50 ABIH SOLDIERS, ALL WITH PERSONAL WEAPONS, JUST ENTERING TUZLA FM THE WEST AT CQ104335. THE BUS WAS CARRYING A BIH FLAG AND ANOTHER GREEN FLAG WITH HALF-MOON MUSLIM EMBLEM. THE SOLDIERS MAY HAVE BEEN COMING FROM THE NTH (AROUND GRADACAC BQ 9773) OR NORTH WEST SIDE OF THE CL (AROUND DOBOJ).
- AT 101940B JUN 95, THE TEAM TUZLA PTL OBSERVED MORE THAN 40 ABIH SLDRS WITH THEIR PERSONAL KIT AT SIMIN HAN CQ206329. SOME OF

98

Attachment NR 16/P2

0052757O

THE SLDRS WERE ARMED AND WERE WAITING FOR TPT TO GO TO THE CL MOST LIKELY AROUND PARACI CQ293301.
- AT 110955B, TEAM SREBRENIK OBSERVED 3 BUSES FILLED WITH APPROX 150 SLDRS HDG STH FM PIRAGE (BQ 955566).
- AT 111100B JUN 95, TEAM TUZLA OBSERVED 1 CIV BUS CARRYING APPR 50 ABIH SOLDIERS AT CQ 097360 HDG STH (TUZLA TOWN) AND MAYBE TO THE CL AROUND MAJEVICA HILLS.
- AT 111105B THE TEAM TUZLA PTL ALSO OBSERVED AROUND 250 SLDRS INSIDE ABIH 250 BDE HQ LIPNICA CQ100377. ALSO SEEN INSIDE THE BARRACKS WERE 4 ABIH MIL TRUCKS, 1 CIV BUS AND 1 AMBULANCE. THE SLDRS CARRIED PERSONAL LUGGAGE AND LOOKED AS IF THEY WERE PREPARING TO MOVE OUT OF THE CAMP. HOWEVER THE PTL DID NOT SEE THE SLDRS MOVING OUT OF THE CAMP.
- AT 111215B, THE TEAM TUZLA PTL OBSERVED A CONVOY OF 6 ABIH VANS WITH APPR 35 SOLDIERS. 1 OF THE VANS WAS TOWING AN ANTI TANK GUN T-12. THE CONVOY WAS SEEN AT CQ082323, HEADING STH TOWARDS ZIVINICE AREA.
- AT 111400B, TEAM SREBRENIK OBSERVED APPROX 150 LOCALS (MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN) WITH PLACARDS, SWEDISH AND NORWEGIAN FLAGS. THEY WERE PASSING THE TEAM LOC AT CQ 009554, HDG STH TO BLOCK THE ENTRANCE OF THE 9 COY OF NORDBAT2 (CQ 013 545). THIS ACTION LASTED FOR APPROX 30 MINS.
- AT 111420B, TEAM SREBRENIK REPORTED OBSERVING 1 CAM TRUCK TOWING A 155MM HOW, HDG NTH FM ZIVINICE, CQ 1324.
- AT 111610B TEAM VARES OBSERVED ONE COVERED CANNON TOWED BY A STATIONARY TRUCK AT CQ 035975.
- AT 111650B TEAM VARES OBSERVED 12 TRUCKS HDG NTH OF BP 945995.

C. SUMMARY OF MEETINGS.

C1. AT 110930B, TEAM ZIVINICE MET WITH THE IO 24 DIV HQ, MR MUHAMED CIKARIC. DURING THE MEETING THE TEAM WERE UPDATED ON THE RELATIVELY CALM SIT THROUGHOUT THE DIV. THE IO ALSO HAD PLENTY TO SAY REGARDING THE SREBRENICA OFFENSIVE, MOSTLY PERSONAL OPINION AND NOT COMPLIMENTARY TO THE UN.
C2. AT 111020B, TEAM SREBRENIK HELD A MEETING WITH THE 22 DIV LO, CAPT EDO. HE REPORTED THAT THE ABIH OBSERVED 3 BSA HELI FLIGHTS HDG STH FM THE DOBOJ AREA IN THE LAST 24 HOURS.

4. ACTS AGAINST UNMOS/OTHERS.

B. R.O.M. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.

END

ANNEX A
TO BH-SNE DSR
DATED 11 JUL 95

UPDATE: DTG110200B JULY 95

UNMO TEAM ATTENDED A MEETING WITH THE LO-TEAM OF DUTCHBAT AND THE BIH. PRESENT AT THE MEETING: COS 28DIV(RAMIZ BECIROVIC), PRESIDENT OF THE OPSTINA (OSMAN), THE MAYOR(FAHRUDIN) AND HIS DEPUTY MAYOR(HAMDIA). THE POINT THAT WAS DISCUSSED: THE BLOCKING OF TWO APC'S BY THE BIH. THE APC'S WERE TRYING TO RECAPTURE THEIR FORMER BLOCKING POSITIONS AND WERE STOPPED WHEN MOVING BACKWARDS TO TAKE ANOTHER ROUTE. AFTER THE MEETING THE UNMO TEAM AND THE LO TEAM WENT TO THE APC'S AND SAW THAT THEY WERE FREE TO MOVE. THE CO ALSO EXPLAINED THE ULTIMATUM THAT WAS PROPOSED BY THE BSA:
1. NO REFUGEES ARE ALLOWED ON THE COMPOUND OF DUTCHBAT IN

Attachment NR 16 / P3

00527571

POTOCARI.
2. ONLY MSF, UNHCR AND REDCROSS ORGANISATIONS WERE ALLOWED ON THE COMPOUND TOGETHER WITH DUTCHBAT.
3. THE BSA WILL DEMILITARIZE THE ENCLAVE.
4. THERE WILL BE NO DANGER FOR THE PEOPLE ON THE COMPOUND DURING THE ACTION OF THE BSA ON DEMILITARISING THE ENCLAVE. CO DUTCHBAT STATED THAT HE HAD TURNED THIS ULTIMATUM DOWN. ALSO BH-CMD HAD TOLD THE CO-DUTCHBAT NOT TO ACCEPT THIS ULTIMATUM.

THEN THE BSA HAD ANOTHER ULTIMATUM: DUTCHBAT AND THE NGO'S SHOULD LEAVE THE ENCLAVE TURNING OVER THEIR WEAPONS. THE POPULATION WOULD BE GIVEN 48 HRS TIME TO LEAVE THE ENCLAVE AS WELL. THEY WERE ALSO FREE TO GO. THIS WAS ALSO TURNED DOWN BY THE CO.

THEN THE CO STATED THAT THERE WAS AN ULTIMATUM GIVEN TO THE BSA. BEFORE 0600HRS THIS MORNING STOP THE ATTACK ON THE ENCLAVE AND RETURN TO THE OLD POSITIONS OF 1993. IF THE BSA WILL NOT DO SO THERE WILL BE AN AIR STRIKE. THE AIR STRIKE WILL BE MASSIVE. THE COS 28 DIV (RAMIZ) ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE BSA WOULD WITHDRAW AND DO WHAT WAS TOLD TO THEM. THE ANSWER OF THE CO-DUTCHBAT WAS THAT DUTCHBAT WOULD RECAPTURE THEIR OLD POSITIONS AGAIN. THE MAYOR(FAHRUDIN) STATED THAT HE HAD NOT MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THE AIR STRIKE. HE DOESN'T BELIEVE THE AIR STRIKE WILL BE DONE. COS 28DIV (RAMIZ) ASKED WHAT THE PEOPLE SHOULD DO IN CASE THE AIR STRIKE WOULD TAKE PLACE. THE CO-DUTCHBAT STATED THAT THE PEOPLE SHOULD STAY AWAY AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FROM THE CL AND TRY TO TAKE COVER IN HOUSES. AFTER THE MEETING THE UNMO TEAM AND THE CO-DUTCHBAT DROVE BACK TO THE COMPOUND AND SAW THAT PEOPLE WERE RETURNING TO THE TOWN OF SREBRENICA. VERY FEW PEOPLE WERE ON THE STREET. FURTHER ON THE SIT IN THE ENCLAVE WAS VERY QUIET.

UPDATE: DTG 110755B JUL 95

SO FAR SO GOOD. THE SITUATION THIS MORNING HAS BEEN UNUSUALLY, BUT CREEPILY, CALM AND QUIET. THE USUAL HAIL OF SHELLS THAT HAVE BEEN GREETING OUR MORNINGS IS SURPRISINGLY ABSENT TODAY. WE VIEW THIS AS A POSITIVE CHANGE IN THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE COME FROM THE NATO ULTIMATUM EVEN THOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED YET. WE HOPE THINGS REMAIN AS IT IS NOW UNTIL A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM IS REACHED. WE ARE PRESENTLY DOING FINE BUT REMAINING IN OUR BUNKERS. THE AIR STRIKE IS SUPPOSED TO TAKE PLACE IN THE NEXT QUARTER OF AN HOUR.

UPDATE: DTG 111210B JUL 95.

1. THE SITUATION HERE HAS BEEN VERY QUIET ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH UNTIL ABOUT 1115HRS WHEN 4 SHELLS (COULD BE 82mm MORTARS) WERE FIRED FROM THE GEN AREA OF BUDAC CP635913 TOWARDS SREBRENICA.
2. THE BSA ARE STILL IN THE ENCLAVE SOUTH OF THE HORIZONTAL 84 WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MT KAK CP578834 WHICH IS STILL OCCUPIED BY THE BiH.
3. DUTCHBAT OP N CP613940 IS PRESENTLY UNDER BSA FIRE WHILE FORMER OP M IS NO LONGER OCCUPIED BY THE CREW WHO HAVE MOVED TO A NEW POSITION ABOUT 400M STH OF THEIR FORMER POSITION. THE ABANDONED POSITION WAS FIRED ON BY SEVERAL SHELLS ONE OF WHICH HIT THE ROOF OF THE OP.
4. THE BSA REQUESTED A MEETING WITH DUTCHBAT AND UNMO'S IN BRATUNAC. HOWEVER THIS WAS REFUSED BY UNPROFOR HQ. WE ARE FURTHER INFORMED THAT THE AIRCRAFT MAY STILL EXECUTE THE STRIKE ACTION BY 1300HRS.

Attachment NR 16/24

00527572

UPDATE: DTG111600B JULY 95

AT THIS MOMENT THE STREAM OF REFUGEES AND WOUNDED IS UNCOUNTABLE. WE FIGURE THAT A TOTAL OF 20 000 REFUGEES HAVE COME TO THE DUTCHBAT COMPOUND OF POTOCARI ALREADY AND IS GROWING STEADILY. SINCE OUR LAST REPORT THE SHELLING OF THE TOWN HAS BEEN GOING ON DESPITE THE AIR STRIKES. THE TOWN (SREBRENICA) IS IN THE HANDS OF THE BSA BY NOW AND THE LATEST ULTIMATUM GIVEN BY THE BSA IS THAT IF THE AIR STRIKES CONTINUE EVERYTHING INSIDE THE ENCLAVE WILL BE BOMBED INCLUDING UNPROFOR AND THE OTHER UN ORGANISATIONS.

B-COY HAS LEFT THEIR COMPOUND IN SREBRENICA AND IS HEADING FOR POTOCARI. BSA INFANTRY IS ALL AROUND IN THE ENCLAVE. THE NUMBERS DIFFER FROM 1 000 TO 3 000 MEN. THE AIR STRIKES ON THE NORTH PART OF THE ENCLAVE HAVE NOT YET TAKEN PLACE UP TILL NOW. THAT MEANS THAT THE COMPOUND IS A VERY EASY TARGET FOR ALL THE WEAPONS ON THE NORTH RIDGE OF THE ENCLAVE.

UPDATE: DTG 111730B JUL 95

THE STREAM OF REFUGEES IS STILL COMING INTO THE COMPOUND OF DUTCHBAT. THE FOOD SITUATION IS HOPELESS. FOR THE BATTALION WE HAVE FOOD FOR A VIEW DAYS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE ANY FOOD TO THE REFUGEES. ONLY WATER CAN BE SUPPLIED. THIS WILL MEAN THAT THESE PEOPLE WILL BE DESPERATE WITHIN 48 HRS. ACCORDING TO LOCAL RUMOURS A LARGE GROUP OF BIH SOLDIERS IS FIGHTING THEIR WAY OUT OF THE ENCLAVE IN THE DIRECTION OF TUZLA. THE NUMBER IS NOT KNOWN YET BUT WE WILL TRY TO FIND OUT ASAP. THE BSA HAS STOPPED SHELLING AND IS ONLY WATCHING WHAT IS HAPPENING. WE DON'T KNOW YET IF ALL THE OP'S ARE ABANDONED AND RETURNED TO THE COMPOUND. WE WILL INFORM YOU ASAP. THE NUMBER OF SEVERE WOUNDED IS NOW 35. THE NUMBER OF LIGHTLY WOUNDED PEOPLE IS UNCOUNTABLE. DUTCHBAT CAN'T GIVE MUCH HELP BECAUSE THEIR SUPPLIES HAVE NOT BEEN COMING IN SINCE THE END OF APRIL. THE ONLY MEDICAL HELP THAT IS AVAILABLE IS COMING FROM MSF, HOWEVER THAT IS ALSO NOT ENOUGH FOR ALL THE WOUNDED PEOPLE.

UPDATE: DTG 111910B JUL 95

1. THE NUMBER OF SEVERELY WOUNDED HAS GROWN NOW TO 50. DUTCHBAT IS TRYING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE FOOD SITUATION OF THE PEOPLE. THEY HAVE OPENED THE NORMAL RATIONS AND TRY TO MAKE SOME SOUP OF IT. BY DOING THIS THE FOOD RESERVE WILL LAST FOR ABOUT 48HRS. AFTER THAT NO MORE FOOD FOR UN PERSONNEL AND REFUGEES. THE BATTALION AND THE UNMO TEAM ARE TRYING TO MEET THE BSA TONIGHT AT 1930 HRS. THE BATTALION HAS THE INTENTION TO TRY TO CREATE A VERY SMALL SAFE AREA (THE COMPOUND?) TO PROTECT THE REFUGEES.
2. THE FOLLOWING OP'S ARE STILL ON THEIR OLD POSITIONS: A(CP553900), C(CP538850), M(NEW LOC, 570918), N(CP613940), P(CP645918), Q(CP658893), R(CP659883). THE OP'S ARE DOING THEIR WORK IN A VERY PASSIVE WAY.
3. FROM 1844HRS UNTIL 1900HRS THE BSA FIRED 22 ROCKETS/SHELLS FROM DUGO POLJE (GRID 644922) TOWARDS BUDAK (GRID 635912) AND GRADAC (CP635898). THE SOUND IS VERY CLOSE SO THE PANIC AMONGST THE REFUGEES INCREASES WITH EVERY SHELL.

END

3-16

Attachment NR 14 / 24

00527581

SREBRENICA UPDATE DTG:120746B JUL 95

1. AS YOU MAY SUPPOSE, THE HUMANITARIAN SIT IS GETTING WORSE THAN EVER. PEOPLE ARE IN GREAT NEED OF FOOD, CLOTHING AND MEDICINES. UNMOS ASSESS THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 10000 PEOPLE INSIDE AND 20000 OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND. MAJ FRANKEN, DCO OF DUTCHBAT SAYS THAT THERE IS A GROUP OF 7-8000 PEOPLE TRYING TO REACH THE COMPOUND FROM UPPER POTOCARI(4-5 KM SW OF THE COMPOUND) ESCORTED BY ONE UN APC WITHDRAWING FROM AN OP. HE ALSO SAYS THAT OP C HAS BEEN TAKEN (APC INCLUDED) YESTERDAY AND ITS CREW ARE TRYING TO REACH THE COMPOUND ON FOOT. MSF/DUTCHBAT MEDICS ARE SOMEHOW MANAGING TO TAKE CARE OF THE WOUNDED ALTHOUGH THERE IS LACK OF EVERYTHING THEY NEED TO TREAT THEM. THE DCO WILL TRY TO GET SOME MEDICINES FROM MSF STOCK IN THE TOWN OF SREBRENICA.
2. THERE IS ALSO A GREAT NEED OF MATTRESSES AND BLANKETS AT LEAST FOR THE PATIENTS WHO ARE MORE THAN 80 IN THE COMPOUND. SANITARY CONDITIONS IN THE COMPOUND ARE TERRIBLE. SEWAGE SYSTEM IS ALMOST GETTING CLOGGED UP.
3. THE DCO SAID DRINKING WATER SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN CUT YET AND IF IT IS, DUTCHBAT WOULD BE ABLE TO PURIFY 7000L PER DAY FROM A STREAM NEXT TO THE COMPOUND. FOOD SIT IS THE MOST CRITICAL AT THE MOMENT. DUTCHBAT WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE 2 MEALS PER DAY PER PERSON UP TO 13 JUL ONLY.
4. CO DUTCHBAT IS CURRENTLY IN BRATUNAC NEGOTIATING POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF PEOPLE. ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED DUTCHBAT SOURCES, BSA HAVE OFFERED TREATMENT OF THE WOUNDED IN ZVORNIC UNDER UN SUPERVISION AND POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF PEOPLE THROUGH ZVORNIC. WE WILL TRY TO CONFIRM THIS LATER.
5. THE DUTCHBAT DCO SAYS THAT IN CASE OF EVACUATION, UNPROFOR WOULD PROVIDE ABOUT 20 BUSES AND MAKE MORE TRIPS. ONE TRIP WOULD BE APPROX 1000 PEOPLE.
6. CO DUTCHBAT WAS TOLD BY BSA THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN AN ULTIMATUM FOR THE BIH SOLDERS IN THE COMPOUND TO HAND OVER ALL THEIR WPNS BY 1000HRS TODAY. THERE ARE NO ARMED BIH SOLDIERS IN THE COMPOUND. THERE HAS BEEN NO SHELLING THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT UP TO THIS TIME (0835HRS). WE WILL TRY TO KEEP YOU UPDATED.

SREBRENICA UPDATE: DTG 120950B JUL 95

1. AS THE DEADLINE FOR THE BSA ULTIMATUM FOR THE BIH SOLDIERS IN THE COMPOUND TO HAND OVER THEIR WEAPONS APPROACHES, WE ARE RELIABLY INFORMED THAT 2 BSA TANKS (OR MORE) ARE APPROACHING DUTCHBAT OP P AT YELLOW BRIDGE AND ALSO OPS Q AND R ARE SURROUNDED BY THE BSA. THIS IS HOWEVER NCBU. WE WILL KEEP YOU UPDATED.

SREBRENICA UPDATE: DTG 121240B JUL 95

1. MUCH THANKS FOR YOUR ASSURING WORDS.WE ARE SORRY FOR THE INTERRUPTION. WE HAD TO DISMANTLE THE STATION AS THE BSA TROOPED INTO THE STREETS OF POTOCARI AND FURTHER SPREADING TO TAKE POSITIONS ALL ROUND THE NEAR VICINITY OF DUTCHBAT COMPOUND. THEY ALSO WENT FURTHER TO SURROUND THE PREFAB FACTORY ABOUT 200M FROM THE COMPOUND IN THE DIRECTION OF POTOCARI WHERE THERE ARE ALSO A LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES. UNMO'S WERE ASKED TO TALK TO SOME BSA SOLDIERS WHO WERE SAID TO BE POINTING THEIR GUNS IN A THREATENING MANNER AT THE REFUGEES IN THE PREFAB FACTORY. HOWEVER THIS PROVED TO BE FALSE WHEN WE GOT THERE. CONTRARILY WE OBSERVED SOME OF THE BSA SOLDIERS GIVING

Attachment NR 11 / P5

00527582

OUT CIGARETTES AND CANDIES TO A FEW OF THE REFUGEES. HOPE THIS WOULD NOT PROVE TO BE A DECEPTIVE ACT THOUGH.

2. THE SITUATION NOW REMAINS CALM BUT TENSE. THE CO DUTCHBAT IS AGAIN HOLDING A MEETING ACCOMPANIED BY A SELECTED FEW OF THE REFUGEES AND WITH THE BSA TO NEGOTIATE FOR HUMANITARIAN AID FROM THE BSA. INFO RECEIVED INDICATES THE BSA HAVE ACCEPTED TO ASSIST WITH FOOD AND WATER. UNMO'S AND MSF ARE HOWEVER FURTHER NEGOTIATING FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AS WELL.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE FUEL SITUATION IN THE ENCLAVE MSF HAVE 800LTRS, UNHCR 6000LTRS AND THAT OF DUTCHBAT WOULD BE GIVING ASAP.

4. STATE OF ALERT IN THE COMPOUND HAS JUST BEEN LOWERED TO GREEN. HOPE TO LET YOU INTO THE OUTCOME OF THE ONGOING MEETING AS WELL AS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ASAP.

SREBRENICA UPDATE: DTG 121425B JUL 95

1. INFO FILTERING IN CONFIRMS THE MEETING BETWEEN THE CO DUTCHBAT AND THE BSA HIGH UPS WAS SHIFTED TO THE DUTCHBAT COMPOUND FROM WHICH THE FOLLOWING WERE AGREED UPON BY BSA:-

a. THE EVACUATION OF REFUGEES AS WELL AS ALL UN ORGANISATIONS,

b. THE EVACUATION STARTS IMMEDIATELY FIRST TO CONVERGE AT BRATUNAC FOOTBALL STADIUM AND THEREAFTER TO AN AGREED DESTINATION (THIS STARTED AT ABOUT 121512B JUL 95 WITH A FLEET OF BUSES AND TRUCKS NUMBERING FIGURE 30 PROVIDED BY THE BSA, BY FIRST TRANSPORTING THE REFUGEES IN THE FACTORY TO BRATUNAC). IT IS HOWEVER SAID THAT THIS ACTION WAS NOT APPROVED BY THE CO DUTCHBAT BUT GEN MLADIC WHO WAS AT THE MEETING ORDERED THE EVACUATION TO PROCEED. DUTCHBAT PROVIDED ESCORT THOUGH.

END

IN.081

3-18

Attachment NR 41 / 1

00527583

TT215100.TMP Page 1 UTC Time: 95-07-12 21:51:12

NL BURUM LES 493136950=FOIX X 12-JUL-1995 20:46:27 018095

TO:TX
FROM:TA
DTG122245B JULY 95
SUBJ:SITREP UPDATE

THE TRANSPORT OF THE REFUGEES HAS STOPPED BECAUSE OF THE DARK. TOMORROW MORNING AT 0700HRS IT WILL START AGAIN. THE REFUGEES WERE DROPPED ABOUT 4 KM FROM THE CL WHITH TUZLA. THEY WERE TREATED GOOD AND NO ONE WAS HARMED. THIS WAS STATED BY ONE OF THE DUTCHBAT SOLDIERS WHO ESCORTED THE CONVOY.
WE HAVE NO MORE NEWS THAN THAT WE FIGURE THAT ABOUT 5000 REFUGEES WERE BROUGHT OUT.

REGARDS
T(HE) A TEAM

TT215100.TMP

Attachment NR 23/P2

3-19

TT101652.TMP Page 1 UTC Time: 95-07-13 10:17:06

Blaavand LES 493136950= FOIX X 13-JUL-1995 09:11:29 094052

TO:TX
FROM:TA
DTG131100B JULY 95
SUBJ:SITREP UPDATE

00527596

1.A UNHCR CONVOY CONTAINING 20.000 COMBAT RATIONS, 15.000 L DRINKINGWATER,36.000 L DIESEL, TOILETS AND CLEANING MATERIAL IS COMING IN TODAY FOR THE REFUGEES AND DUTCHBAT. IT SHOULD BE HERE AT THE END OF THE AFTENOON.
2.GENERAL MLADIC ASSURED THAT THAT CONVOY WAS ACCEPTABLE SO THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY PROBLEM WHITH THAT CONVOY IN ZVORNIK AND YELLOW BRIDGE.
3.THE MEDICAL CONVOY,THAT WAS STOPPED YESTEDAY EVENING AT KLADANJ AND MOVED BACK TO YELLOW BRIDGE,IS MOVING NOW TO TUZLA WHITH SPECIAL ESCORT OF BSA PERSONEL WHITH PERSONAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM GENERAL MLADIC TO SECURE THAT THEY WILL HAVE NO MORE DIFFICULTIES ON THEIR WAY.
4.A. THE NUMBER OF DEPARTED REFUGEES IS ABOUT 10.000 BY NOW.
B. THERE SHOULD BE ANOTHER 20.000-25.000 TO BE TRANSPORTED MORE. THE BSA WILL PROBABLY BE ABLE TO TRANSPORT ALL THE REMAINING REFUGEES THAT ARE OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND TODAY AND THEY WILL START TO TRANSPORT THE REFUGEES THAT ARE INSIDE THE COMPOUND TOMORROW. THERE ARE ABOUT 4000-5000 REFUGEES INSIDE THE COMPOUND. AFTER THAT DUTCHBAT WILL BE TRASPORTED. ANY DETAILS ABOUT DUTCHBAT ARE NOT YET TAKEN CARE OF BECAUSE THE REFUGEES ARE TOP PRIORITY.
C. ABOUT 21 STABALISED WOUNDED ARE TO BE TRANSPORTED WHEN THE MEDICAL CONVOY COMES BACK. GENERAL MLADIC ASSURED THAT THAT MEDICAL CONVOY WILL BE NO PROBLEM EITHER. ABOUT 28 WOUDED COULD BE TRANSPORTED WHITH THE REFUGEES FROM INSIDE THE COMPOUND.

5.THE NUMBER OF BIH SOLDIERS THAT ARE TAKEN POW BY THE BSA IS NOT KNOWN YET BUT GENERAL MLADIC TOLD THE UNMOTEAM AND THE CO OF DUTCHBAT THAT THE BIH ARE HAVING SEVERAL HUNDREDS OF DEAD SOLDIERS IN THE AREA OF THE BANDEARA TRIANGLE. HE ALSO ASKED THE CO OF DUTCHBAT TO CONTACT THESE BIH SOLDIERS AND INFORM THEM THAT IT IS NOT THE GENERALS INTENSION TO KILL ANY MORE SOLDIERS OF THE BIH. THEY ONLY HAVE TO SURRENDER AND HANDOVER THEIR WEAPONS. BECAUSE WE (THE UNMO TEAM AND DUTCHBAT ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ENTER THAT AREA, BECAUSE OF OUR SAFETY, WE CAN'T INVESTIGATE THE NUMBERS. THE CO OF DUTCHBAT TOLD THE GENERAL THAT HE WILL TRY TO CONTACT THE BIH THROUGH THE HQ SECTOR NE BECAUSE THE CO HAS NO MORE CONTACT WHITH THE BIH ANYMORE.

6.YESTEDAY 50 BABIES WERE DELIVERED. ONE WOMAN DIED AND WAS BURRIED ON THE COMPOUND. ONE WOMAN AND A BABY DIED ON THE CONVOY TO TUZLA.

7.COL ACAMOVIC IS THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL MLADIC WHO IS TAKING CARE OF THE OPERATION FROM NOW ON.

REGARDS
T(HE)A TEAM

TT101652.TMP

Tab 8

Translation

00383593

COMMAND OF THE DRINA CORPS
Strictly confidential no. 04/156-2
Date: 2 July 1995

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
COPY No. 3
KRIVAJA - 95

TO THE COMMANDS OF: the 1st Zpbr /Zvornik infantry brigade/, 1st Bpbr /Birač infantry brigade/, 2nd Rmtbr /Romanija motorised brigade/, 1st Brlpbr /Bratunac light infantry brigade/ 1st Mlpbr /Milići light infantry brigade/, 5th map /mixed artillery regiment/

ORDER FOR ACTIVE b/d /combat activities/ Operation no. 1

[...]

During the last few days, Muslim forces from the enclaves of Žepa and Srebrenica have been particularly active.

They are infiltrating DTG /sabotage groups/ which are attacking and burning unprotected villages, killing civilians and small isolated units around the enclaves of Žepa and Srebrenica. They are trying especially hard to link up the enclaves and open a corridor to Kladanj.

[...]

2. The Command of the Drina Corps, pursuant to Operations Directive no. 7 and 7/1 of the GŠ VRS /Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska/, and on the basis of the situation in the Corps area of responsibility, has the task of carrying out offensive activities with free forces deep in the Drina Corps zone, as soon as possible, in order to split apart the enclaves of Žepa and Srebrenica, and to reduce them to their urban areas.

Extract from original document – Source: ICTY

[...]

8. - Antiaircraft defence:

- Organise air observations in all units.
- In case of a NATO air strike have materiel for antiaircraft operations in all units. Open fire on low-flying planes that threaten the order of battle.
- Put the emphasis on PVZ /Antiaircraft defence/ measures: loose arrangement and camouflage of units and materiel, maintenance of a direct combat contact with the enemy.

9. Anti airborne landing combat:

If NATO forces make an airborne landing in support of UNPROFOR, the units closest to the landing place and reserve forces will engage in combat with them. Artillery and armoured-mechanised units will support an anti-airborne landing combat at the given signal.

[...]

F/ Morale-psychological preparation of the men for the execution of the task:

Put the emphasis on the boosting combat morale, stressing the success of our units in crushing the enemy offensive during the last month.

Point out the significance of dividing and reducing in size the Srebrenica enclave for the safety of Serbian villages and civilians in central Podrinje. Supply the units as well as possible with military equipment for executing this task.

3-22

R0050416

SECRET

UNMO HQ
SNE
Tuzla

MIO.ASS.SREB001

ZAGREB/BH COMD (FOR COO/MIO)
Info G2, CAO, TA. 7 Jul 95

ASSESSMENT
SITUATION IN SREBRENICA ENCLAVE

Reference:

A. 'BSA FORCES IN SNE' MIO.ORBAT.BSA.001 DATED 7 Jul 95.

GENERAL

1. DRINA CORPS. Drina Corps, with an approximate strength of 11,000, is responsible for a CL of 90 Kms minimum along the main line and a probable further 100 Kms around the enclaves. It is so thinly spread that it is unable to launch an offensive in any area until it has ensured that the ABiH are unable to attack (see Ref A). As a result the BSA would like to be able to reduce its troops around the enclaves.

2. 2 (ABiH) CORPS. 2 Corps is well aware of the BSA problem and would like to exacerbate it by making 28 Div more active. It is worthy of note that the ABiH within SREBRENICA and ZEPA, although poorly armed, are probably not that much less in number than the total number of Inf in Drina Corps.

3. ZEPA ENCLAVE. BSA no longer seem to have too many troops around this enclave. This seems to be because this enclave is so involved with the 'local' economy that fighting would interfere with commerce (both being run by the same people).

RECENT EVENTS

4. Convoys. During Jun only 3 of the 12 planned UN convoys, which provide an estimated 65% of the required food, were allowed into the enclave. They were stopped in the main by BSA although towards the end the ABiH was making entrance so difficult that at least one convoy returned to BELGRADE.

5. UN Troop Rotations. DUTCHBAT have been prevented from returning 120 soldiers. At present the Battalion is meant to be carrying out a rotation with new Bn but the new troops are being prevented from entering.

6. ORIC. Brig Nasser Oric, Comd 28 Div, was reported to be in TUZLA last week and being prevented from returning to the enclave by ABiH. The following are possible reasons:

a. ORIC treats Srebrenica as his personal fief and does not follow the orders of either the government or the Army if it conflicts with his personal interests. He is reputed to have made a fortune through his control of the economy and this must involve dealings with the BSA. It is therefore in his interest to keep the enclave quiet.

b. He is an embarrassment to the BiH Government as he is suspected of being a War Criminal.

7. ABiH Offensive against VIS (CQ 2921). The ABiH attacked VIS area over a period of 2 weeks at the end of Jun. They failed in their objectives and took reportedly heavy casualties. At the same time there are reports of fighting N of SAPNA (CQ 4130) during that period. It is assessed that the ABiH is no longer likely to attack in these areas in the short-term, which means that the BSA can reduce its troops in these areas.

8. BSA Reinforcements around the Enclave. BSA Tanks, Arty and Inf were reported heading S from ZVORNIK (CQ 4916) on 4/5 Jul 95. It is assessed that these were released from the local fronts (see para 7) and this would also explain why the UN convoy was stopped at ZVORNIK as it would have used the same road. There are reports of troops coming from SERBIA but this is not confirmed.

9. BSA Attacks. The BSA are reported to have launched a 3-pronged attack on the enclave during 6 Jul 95. ABiH have reported the attacks but they were not confirmed as UN were in shelters as their positions were being shelled. It is of note that the area around the main DUTCHBAT camp at POTOCARI was shelled throughout the period with several rouns landing within the camp confines. Several of the UN OPs also came under fire with one receiving 2 direct hits. There were no UN casualties although at least one civilian was killed when a shell landed in Srebrenica. The local Mayor later stated that he did not believe that the BSA wished to take the enclave but rather were after strategic hilltops, which dominate the area.

PURPOSE OF BSA ATTACK

10. Drina Corps needs to reduce its CL to allow it to react with greater flexibility. It attempted to do this on the main CL with the annexation of SAPNA THUMB in Apr 95. This failed and now looks unlikely to succeed. Therefore attention has turned to Srebrenica enclave where there are 2 options:

a. Option 1 - Conquer Srebrenica Enclave.

(1). Adv.

(a). No further problems.

(b). Provides important S - N Comms routes.

SECRET

(c). Ensures access to Bauxite mines to S of enclave.

(2). Disadv.

(a). Operation itself requires large resources.

(b). Inevitable casualties cannot be replaced.

(c). Subsequent Position would be no better. Options:

Administration and control of Enclave would be manpower intensive
Liquidation of a registered population of this size would be impossible.

Removal of a large population like this would be logistically difficult without UN co-operation.

(d). Small ABiH guerilla parties could operate throughout the area without the latent threat against the enclave to stop them.

(e). BSA lose a useful negotiating point at local and international level.

(f). Local BSA Commanders lose a captive population for a lucrative black-market.

b. Option 2 - Neutralise Srebrenica Enclave. As stated above this is what has been done in ZEPA.

(1). Adv.

(a). Low cost in resources short and long-term.

(b). Greater integration with black-market economy.

(c). Retention of negotiating point for future discussions at all levels.

(2). Disadv.

(a). ABiH may be able to operate militarily in the future out of the enclave.

(b). The enclave provides a physical objective for future ABiH offensives in this region.

R0050419

SECRET

11. Conclusion. Option 2 would seem to be the logical choice in political, military and personal terms.

BSA PROMULGATION OF OPTION 2

12. Neutralisation of UN. DUTCHBAT prevents BSA from having control of the enclave by guarding the CL and not supporting the blackmarket. These 2 actions prevents the total assimilation of the enclave economy into that of the remainder of the area. The BSA therefore needs to reduce the UN presence in the enclave. The best long-term method available is to withold supplies and not allowing new troops to rotate. In the short-term pressure can then be exerted by military means at the time of rotation. which gives the politicians further reason to wish to withdraw without immediate replacement.

13. Neutralisation of ABiH. This policy will still not work if the Commanders of local ABiH continue to follow a militaristic line and operate under 2 Corps control. It is therefore important for BSA to have a venal ABiH Commander. If the present Commanders cannot be bought the best option is to exert military pressure on civilian population (ie shelling of civilian areas and prevention of foraging parties). In this way the civilians will exert pressure on the military to take a more conciliatory stance. If the BSA exert enough pressure the locals may well demand the return of ORIC their saviour of the past.

CONCLUSION

14. The present BSA action is part of a summer-long campaign by BSA to neutralise the enclave.

15. It is very unlikely that the BSA intend to launch a full-scale attack on the enclave.

16. UN positions are likely to continue to be shelled until the DutchBat withdraws or at least they are rotated with a much smaller number.

17. BSA may want the return of ORIC and will shell enclave along with small attacks to get locals to demand his return as their saviour.

18. ABiH will be happy for enclave to be shelled as it gives good media coverage and replaces "Sarajevo - the martyred city". To this end 28 Div can expect to be ordered to carry out patrols to provoke the BSA. However ORIC's whereabouts will continue to provide a clue to ABiH policy.

19. At some stage the ZVORNIK/OSMACI Bde reinforcements will have to return to the N especially if ABiH attempt to exert some pressure with a new Bde. To do this they will again close the road to the N, which will stop any convoy moving at that time if normality has meanwhile returned.

2/

UN CONFIDENTIAL

Commanding Officer
1(NL)UN Infbn (Dutchbat3)
Compound POTOCARI
SREBRENICA
Bosnia-Herzegovina

Commander
Bosnia-Herzegovina Command
HQ UNPROFOR
SARAJEVO

Thru:

9 July 1995

Commander
Sector North East
TUZLA

Nr: TK95113

Ref: TK95112 of 7 July 1995

Subject: Deteriorating situation in SREBRENICA

BACKGROUND

1. As of Thursday 6 July 1995 at sunrise the BSA started offensive operations by attacking several ABIH positions along the CL and by shelling OPs, batallion HQ and SREBRENICA itself. By ref, I did inform you about the deteriorating situation including an overview of civilian casualties till that very moment. I also did express my concerns about the military and humanitarian situation in and around the enclave and gave an assessment of the possibilities to be explored by the BSA.

2. During three days these operations have been executed by all means: attacking ABIH and UN positions, shelling the enclave and suppressing Dutchbat thru intimidation by using artillery, mortars and MLRS (M-63 and M-77) overhead compound POTOCARI with over 200 soldiers. Most of my OPs have been shot by mortars. BSA does exactly know what they are doing and till how far they can go. They do execute their operations according to a predominated and well-organised plan.

3. Yesterday at 1400 hrs, OP(NL)F did receive another three hits by T-55 while ABIH positions were allready left due to heavy fighting and have been disabled. The OP-crew managed to abandon the OP by APC under the threat of that T-55. During their withdrawal, local ABIH tried to stop them by blockading the road. At that moment one of the soldiers has been shot and died in the field dressing station afterwards.

4. At 1840 hrs both OP(NL)U and OP(NL)S were surrounded by BSA forces and ordered to surrender. For both crews there was no way turning back because of the resistance by the ABIH troops in positions in depth.

3/1

UN CONFIDENTIAL

SITUATION

5. Both OP-crews are now in BSA territory with their APC and most of their equipment. In my opinion, the soldiers will be treated by courtesy, however their APCs including ammo and equipment will be lost. I was able to communicate with them: they do fine till now.

6. The situation in and around the enclave is extremely tense again. At this moment Swedisch Shelter Project in the south has been shelled. All refugees and inhabitants of villages in the surroundings left their houses and entered the town of SREBRENICA, about 3 to 4 thousand persons.

COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT

7. Now the BSA has overtaken several positions in the south-eastern part of the enclave and created their 'freedom of movement' around ZELENI JADAR [the vicinity of former OP(NL)E] and the road towards JASENOVA and the mining-area, they will proceed their operations in western direction through JADAR valley up to mount KAK. I did express these concerns allready last month.

8. Proceeding their operations does mean that OP(NL)K and OP(NL)D in the south will be pushed out as well. The BSA will be able to execute these offensive actions according to their plans as mentioned in par. 2. By that time they will have full control over the southern part of the enclave.

9. If they manage to reach their objectives - which in my opinion they can in due time - then two possible goals are left. Firstly the conquest of the entire enclave, secondly the the enhancement of the occupation of the southern part.

10. Using CAS in all possible ways is in my opinion not feasable yet. It will provoke the BSA in such way that both SREBRENICA itself and OPs and compounds will be targeted by all means. Especially the MLRS M-63 north of OP(NL)P, the MLRS M-77 within BRATUNAC and all their artillery and mortars will launch their missiles and rounds at fixed targets. Unless these weaponsystems could be eliminated in once which is hardly impossible.

11. For your information.

CO-1(NL)UN Infbn
Dutchbat 3

Karremans, Th.J.P.
Lieutenant Colonel

UN CONFIDENTIAL

00441559

FROM: HQ UNPROFOR SARAJEVO
OFFICE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RUPERT SMITH

MOST IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

TC 28

DTG: 9 2220 B JUL 95	File Ref:	Stn. Serial No:		
Fm: THE OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER HQ UNPROFOR		Route:	No:	TOT
To:HQ UNPF ZAGREB ATTN: MA TO FC - COL DUREAU	Fax No: 151-4758 PTT:	FO	25	
Subject: WARNING TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS			Pages: 2 INCLUDING HEADER	
Int Dist: COS, P INFO				
Drafter: LT COL JRJ BAXTER MA TO COMD	Dept/Tel: VSAT 7201 MENTOR 0002	Signature:		
Releasing Officer: LT COL JRJ BAXTER MA TO COMD	Dept/Tel: VSAT 7201 MENTOR 0002	Signature:		

MESSAGE

Attached is the final version of the warning to the Bosnian Serbs. We have sent it as a CAPSAT to Gen Mladic and we will issue it as a Press statement

3-29

2/2

WARNING TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS

ATTACKS AGAINST THE SREBRENICA SAFE AREA

The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) resumed attacks against the Srebrenica Enclave on Friday 7 July 1995, firing indiscriminately into the Safe Area and directly targeting UN facilities, causing several civilian deaths. Following the concerted attack against the UN OP at ZELENE JADAR on Saturday 8 July, DUTCHBAT troops were forced to retire and during the withdrawal one peacekeeper was mortally wounded by the Bosnian Government Army in a deliberate attack. Two further UN OPs were overrun by the BSA that evening and 15 peacekeepers taken captive; a further 17 peacekeepers have been taken this afternoon. The BSA have continued to fire heavy weapons into the Safe Area and have advanced further north with tanks and infantry, supported by artillery and are now poised 1 km south of the town.

This attack against a UN declared Safe Area is totally unacceptable and represents a grave escalation of the conflict. UNPROFOR demands that the BSA offensive in this enclave ceases forthwith. The advance must stop where it is and UNPROFOR demands that the BSA withdraw to the perimeter of the Demilitarised Zone as delineated by the Morillon Agreement of 8 May 1993. Furthermore, all Dutch peacekeepers must be returned immediately with all their equipment.

The Dutch Battalion has been ordered to establish a blocking position to the south of the town. The SRSG and the FC have decided that if this blocking position is attacked by BSA forces, NATO Close Air Support will be employed. The BSA is reminded of the grave consequences of ignoring this warning.

3-30

Translation

00892590

MAIN STAFF OF THE ARMY
OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
STRICTLY CONF. NO. 12/46-501/95
9 July 1995

Name of the organ: /illegible/
Submitted – received /illegible/: 365
Date: 9 July 1995 at 2350 hrs
TLP, TGR, TLF ____ ŽV RV /unknown/
Processed by: /signature illegible/

VERY URGENT
To - President of Republika Srpska, for information
DRINA CORPS IKM /Forward Command Post/
- Generals GVERO and KRSTIĆ, personally

Drina Corps Command

Conduct of combat operations around Srebrenica

The President of Republika Srpska has been informed of successful combat operations around Srebrenica by units of the Drina Corps and that they have achieved results which enable them to occupy the very town of Srebrenica.

The President of the Republic is satisfied with the results of combat operations around Srebrenica and has agreed with the continuation of operations for the takeover of Srebrenica, disarming of Muslim terrorist gangs and complete demilitarisation of the Srebrenica enclave.

The President of Republika Srpska ordered that in the follow-up combat operations full protection be ensured to UNPROFOR members and the Muslim civilian population and that they be guaranteed safety in the event of their cross-over to the territory of Republika Srpska.

In accordance with the order of the President of Republika Srpska, you must issue an order to all combat units participating in combat operations around Srebrenica to offer maximum protection and safety to all UNPROFOR members and the civilian Muslim population. You must order subordinate units to refrain from destroying civilian targets unless forced to do so because of strong enemy resistance. Ban the torching of residential buildings and treat the civilian population and war prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

Assistant Commander
Major General
Zdravko TOLMIR

ZT/LJS

OTP Ex. 432 / a

EXCHANGE OF ULTIMATUMS BETWEEN BSA AND DUTCHBAT
July 10, 1995
(Source ICTY: Tolimir)

Bestand: M:\WPBEST\BHCUNPF1\LOG07-95.012 Bewerkt : 13-07-95 01.:

From: Maj Franken
To : Kap Groen

SECTIE MIL. GESCHIEDENIS
Bureau DOC-INFO
Doc/Nr: 1604/49

Betreft: ultimatum BSA
- UN ontwapent niet dus doen wij dat
- vanaf 110600 - + 48 u kunnen
  - burgers
  - sldn BIH
  - DUTCHBAT wapens afgeven en via YELLOW BRIDGE de enclave verlaten
- UNHCR e.d. kunnen onmiddellijk weg via YELLOW BRIDGE

Reactie UN:
- BSA dient terug te trekken tot lijnen MOURILLON (oude enclave als toen wij kwamen)
- Iedere av dient achterwege te blijven
- Vanaf 0600 morgenochtend dient het terugtrekken te beginnen

- Zo niet:
  - massale luchtavn op alle BSA doelen in en rond de enclave

Opdracht: vanaf 0600 u bunkeralarm vtgn buiten compounds gemarkeerd

Noot: opdracht te verd blijft

English translation

From: Maj Franken
To: Capt Groen

Subject: BSA Ultimatum
- The UN does not disarm, so we will do it
- From 110600 +48 hours
  - Citizens
  - BH soldiers
  - DUTCHBAT can hand in weapons and leave the enclave via the YELLOW BRIDGE.
- UNHCR and the like can go away immediately via the YELLOW BRIDGE.

UN reaction
- BSA should withdraw to the lines MORILLON (the old enclave, as when we arrived)
- Every av should be left behind.
- The withdrawal should begin from 0600 hours tomorrow morning
- If not:
  - Massive air strikes against all BSA targets in and around the enclave

Task: from 0600 hours on bunker alarm vehicles outside the compound marked
Note: task to defend remains

3-32

6

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

SSN-87

9.

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB Attn. SRSG\TFC

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 10 JULY 1995

NUMBER: MSC- 2271

SUBJECT: Informal Consultations of the Security Council

1. In light of developments on the ground and the attached letter by the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the better part of this mornings informal consultations of the Security Council was devoted to the situation in Srebrenica. The representative of the Secretary-General briefed the Council on developments based on paras 2 (a) - (c) of your Z-1127 and the SITREP. He, in particular, explained the sequence of events during which three Dutchbat APCs were fired at by the BiH with small arms, grenades and an anti-tank missile at a time when the BSA was payuing heed to UNPROFOR's strong warning that any further advace would be met with the use of force.

2. In response to various queries, Mr. Gharekhan explained that yesterday CAS authority had been delegated to the military chain of command of UNPF and UNPROFOR and that there had been no CAS request on Saturday and, thus, no request was turned down by Zagreb. He emphasized that no United Nations official had given any assurances to the Bosnian Serbs concerning the abolishment of air strikes. The Multinational Brigade of the RRF was expected to be operational later this months, however, the deployment of the 24 Airmobile Brigade was encountering difficulties imposed by the Government of Croatia with regard to the use of Ploce, and by the Federation with regard to deployment and freedom of movement in HVO controlled areas. While the United Nations did not consider the Federation a formal entity with an international personality, practical considerations required that consultations be held with President Zubak. It was hoped that the obstacles could be overcome shortly.

SREG/FC/D-OSRSG/DOA/HCA/DI/DFC/CCS/ICFY

3. At the suggestion of the United Kingdom, France and Argentina, the Council discussed elements to be included in remarks of the Council President to the media. All three emphasized the need for the Council to express its support for the Dutch Battalion and the civilian and military leadership of UNPF and UNPROFOR for the assertive position they have taken in regard to the BSA advance into Srebrenica. The Council could not remain silent in light of the serious developments in Srebrencia.

4. The United States emphasized that the Council should not lose sight of the serious breach of the safe area regime by the BSA and that, before blaming the BIH for firing on the Dutch APCs, the circumstances should be thoroughly investigated. According to one theory, the BiH had assumed the APCs concerned had been forcibly taken from UNPROFOR by the BSA, a theory which could not be discarded out of hand given the fact that the BSA in the past had not shied away from dressing in UN uniforms and attacking UNPROFOR positions in Sarajevo.

5. The Russian federation suggested that events in Srebrenica should be put in context, i.e. that raids had been staged by the BiH against Serb villages outside the safe area. With reference to the contention in Foreign Minister Sacirbey"s letter that UNPROFOR had disarmed the BiH on 8 May 1993, the Russian Federation wondered why the BiH was able to fire grenades and anti-tank missiles at the Dutch APCs. A proposal to include in the President's remarks to the press a reminder to all parties of the request in SCR 998 (1995) to demilitarize the safe areas did not meet the consensus of other Council members.

6. Attached please find the points the Council members agreed the President should make to the press. A transcript of his remarks will be dispatched separately by the Office of the Spokesman.

7. For tomorrow's Council meeting, we would appreciate, in addition to the regular update, your further clarifying the circumstances concerning the BiH fire on the Dutch APCs.

Best regards.

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
95 JUL 11 -1 33

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE GON IS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION IN SREBRENICA. DEFMIN VOORHOEVE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR [redacted] VOORHOEVE IS WARY OF AIRSTRIKES, WHICH HE THINKS COULD LEAD TO GREAT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND WOULD PUT THE 427 DUTCH TROOPS (INCLUDING 30 BEING HELD BY BOSNIAN SERBS) IN GREATER DANGER. THE DUTCH ARE UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE BOSNIAN SERBS WANT TO TAKE ALL OR JUST PART OF THE CITY, BUT THEY SEE THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE BOSNIA-SERB OFFENSIVE AS DISASTROUS. FIRST, THE GON BELIEVES THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE TRYING TO DERAIL THE RAPID REACTION FORCE BEFORE IT GETS ROLLING. [redacted] BOSNIAN FM SACIRBEY, WHO MET WITH VOORHOEVE AND FM VAN MIERLO THIS MORNING IN THE HAGUE, WAS NONCOMMITTAL ABOUT GOBH INTENTIONS IN SREBRENICA. END SUMMARY.

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

3. AMBASSADOR CONTACTED FM VAN MIERLO AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 THE HA 03682 01 OF 02 101410Z
DEFMIN VOORHOEVE LAST NIGHT TO CONVEY OUR CONCERN FOR THE DUTCH TROOPS BEING HELD BY BOSNIAN SERBS IN SREBRENICA. HE SAID THE U.S. HAS WILLING TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO REQUESTS BY THE DUTCH FOR ASSISTANCE, BUT THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE ANY RESPONSE TO SUCH REQUESTS IN ADVANCE. VOORHOEVE [redacted] THE DUTCH TROOPS ARE SURROUNDED, OUTNUMBERED AND FEAR FURTHER ACTIONS BY BOSNIAN SERBS.

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

[redacted]

4. VOORHOEVE AND FM VAN MIERLO MET JOINTLY WITH THEIR STAFFS THIS MORNING (JULY 10) TO REVIEW THE SITUATION. THEY TOOK NO DECISIONS ON NEXT STEPS.

5. THE UN ORDERED DUTCHBAT TO BLOCK THE PROGRESS OF BOSNIAN SERB TANKS ABOUT 1.5

3-35

KILOMETERS SOUTH OF THE CITY, ACCORDING TO VOORHOEVE. THE APC'S PLACED THERE HAVE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, BUT CANNOT WITHSTAND AN ATTACK, [redacted]

[redacted]

ATTEMPTS TO KNOCK OUT ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES HIDDEN IN VILLAGES COULD CAUSE GREAT CIVILIAN

CONFIDENTIAL

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 THE HA 03682 01 OF 02 101410Z
CASUALTIES. FURTHERMORE, THE USE OF AIR POWER WOULD PUT THE 427 DUTCH BLUE HELMETS, INCLUDING 30 NOW BEING HELD BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS, IN EVEN GREATER DANGER.

6. VOORHOEVE SAID IT HAS UNCLEAR WHAT THE BOSNIAN SERB OBJECTIVES WERE. [redacted]

[redacted]

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

7. BOSNIAN FM SACIRBEY WAS IN THE HAGUE JULY 10 FOR A LONG-PLANNED VISIT. VOORHOEVE AND FM VAN MIERLO HAD A JOINT MEETING WITH HIM TO EXPRESS THEIR ANGER OVER THE KILLING OF A DUTCH SOLDIER BY GOVERNMENT FORCES ON SATURDAY WHEN HIS UNIT WAS RETURNING TO SREBRENICA FROM AN OBSERVATION POST. [redacted]

[redacted]

1.4(B)
1.4(D)
B1

CONFIDENTIAL

3-36

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

CZN 1114 4/4

United Nations Peace Forces - Headquarters
Forces de Paix des Nations Unies - Quartier Général

Cc: JH JA files

Zagreb, 10 July 1995

Lieutenant General Bernard JANVIER
Force Commander UN Peace Forces

General,

I was deeply shocked to learn of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Army hostile action against an UNPROFOR armored personnel carrier on 8 July in the afternoon, and I have to express my deepest indignation with regard to the murder of a Dutch soldier in the area of Srebrenica.

At 1445B on 8 July 95, as the Dutch troops withdrew from the OP-F, after it was captured by the BSA, they were confronted in the vicinity by BiH soldiers who tried deliberately to prevent them from leaving the area.

Later on, the Dutch APC encountered a BiH barricade across the road and while driving over the obstruction, it was fired on and hit by a BiH grenade. One Dutch soldier was seriously injured and he was evacuated to Potocari but died of his wounds at 1625B.

There is no question that the fire came from your soldiers. I am unable to admit such flagrant and totally unnecessary action against my soldiers, and of course so are the Nations whose Troops contribute to UNPROFOR and came here to help the process of peace. I wish you to know that, in accordance with my mandate, I fully intend to react in an appropriate manner and with all possible means available to me, should such a situation be repeated.

I continue to stress my impartiality in all work carried out by UNPROFOR soldiers under my command and continued efforts to find a peaceful solution to the current problems within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Looking forward to meet you on a near occasion, I hope that the best cooperation between UNPROFOR and your forces will resume as completely as possible, as needed for the impartial mission I have to implement.

Yours sincerely,

General Rasim DELIC
CINC ARBIH
SARAJEVO

R0015471

English Translation *ET 0415-1005-0415-1005*

10 July 1995 20:10:00 909 The UNPROFOR forces Commander for former Yugoslavia, General Bernand JANVIER, in conversation with the VRS Head of Security, General Zdravko TOLIMIR, at 20:10 hours requested that the VRS members immediately cease the attacks on the UN forces south of Srebrenica and to withdraw to the positions they held in the evening of 9 July 1995. General JANVIER has been informed that the VRS members were attacking the UN members with two tanks. General TOLIMIR promised that he would contact the Commander of the Serbian formation located south of Srebrenica and issue an order to cease attacks.

English Translation *ET 0415-1006-0415-1006*

10 July 1995 21:05:00 909 In a conversation between the same participants at 2105 hours, General TOLIMIR explained that he had received information about fire being opened from a UN checkpoint towards Serbian units, following orders that were being issued through the Muslim radio network. General JANVIER repeated his demands: members of the VRS were to immediately halt fire, to withdraw to their positions of 09 July 1995 and that General TOLIMIR was to meet with General Herve GOBILLIARD (commander of UNPROFOR in Sector Sarajevo). JANVIER claimed that the commander of the Serbian battalion had contacted the commander of UN forces at the checkpoint and demanded that they abandon their positions, lay down their weapons and withdraw towards the town. He also demanded that members of all foreign organisations leave the enclave and gather at the yellow bridge. He also claimed that according to the latest reports he had, the Serbian army was advancing towards the town instead of halting their fire and returning to their positions from yesterday. General JANVIER asked that his demands be immediately met so the use of NATO air forces could be avoided.

3-38

IT-02-54-T
Milošević

Exhibit # 722
Date Admitted: 28-JUL-04
Reference #

R0081672

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
CD6 TOR
'95 JUL 10 21:35

CZN-1115
CZG-906
CZK-024
OSN-1687

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -2140Z

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA -2143Z
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO -2146Z

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
'95 JUL 10 21:46
FTOT

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB for - Lauvier FC

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 1128

DATE: 10 JULY 1995

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN SREBRINICA

1. The purpose of this message is to keep you informed of developments in Srebrinica as they happen. The message is meant to complement other communications on this subject to your office on the same subject, such as my "Daily Reporting" message of today, and the telecon between Mr. Annan and Mr. Almstrom from my office.

2. Of primary concern is the shelling of the town of Srebrinica, and the resultant civilian casualties. Although the situation at present prevents any accurate casualty counts or even estimates, UNHCR reported that six civilians were killed and 23 wounded in Srebrinica town as at 13:00 (all times local) today. This figure is likely to rise, as heavy shelling continued intermittently throughout the day, and as there was a stream of refugees fleeing outlying villages into the town. UNHCR reported that about two thousand people had gathered in the vicinity of the hospital, looking for some protection because of the special status of a hospital. UNMO reports however claim that at least two heavy rounds, presumed 155 mm, impacted near the hospital, shattering its windows. Subsequently, an unknown but large number of people started to flee Srebrinica town to the north, in the direction of Potocari, where another UNPROFOR (Dutchbat) base is located. As of 18:00 there were reports of BSA infantry attacking the southern perimeter of Srebrinica town in the general vicinity of the Dutchbat blocking position. The Dutch soldiers manning the position fired back over the heads of the advancing BSA. Later, as the advance continued, the Dutch engaged in direct fire fights with the BSA, using personal weapons and .50 calibre machine guns. Two BSA tanks have been heard

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; DFC; COS; HCA; HAAU; ICFY; DOA

CZN 1115 2/3

R0081677

operating behind the BSA infantry lines, and there is concern that these tanks may advance to engage the blocking position. During the evening hours, we received reports that the Bosnian army has set up defensive positions near to the Dutch blocking position, presumably in an effort to stop the BSA advance. Reports now (23:00) state that the BSA advance has indeed stopped. Other reports state that the Dutchbat OP on the western boundary of the pocket is surrounded by the BSA, and may have been directly targeted. The only UN casualty report so far is the Dutch soldier who died on 8 July.

3. The Dutchbat Commanding Officer and the BSA Commanding Officer met in the south of the enclave, at which meeting the BSA officer offered a cease-fire to allow: 1) the withdrawal of NGO workers from Srebrinica, who should gather tomorrow a.m. south of the town; 2) the withdrawal of Dutchbat forces without their weapons or equipment, as of tomorrow; 3) the departure from Srebrinica within 48 hours of all those Muslims who wished to leave for Tuzla. This offer is considered unacceptable by UNPF.

4. Serious consideration was given to the possible use of close air support in Srebrinica. The Force Commander made the decision not to use CAS under the present circumstances because the fighting was by infantry, thus making means other than air power preferable in UNPROFOR's efforts to stop the BSA advance. However, the use of CAS is still possible at any time if the BSA uses its tanks or artillery against UNPROFOR troops in the enclave. As of 06:00 tomorrow NATO aircraft will be airborne and ready to conduct a CAS mission at shorter notice, and against infantry if necessary, if called upon to do so.

5. The SRSG was in Dubrovnik today at the long-standing invitation of the Croatian government. He was alerted to the deterioration in the situation, and made the decision to return immediately. An aircraft was sent to pick him up, and he is expected in Zagreb at approximately 23:30. The Force Commander has kept the SRSG apprised of developments.

6. The Force Commander spoke to General Tolimir (close advisor to General Mladic) this evening. Tolimir stated that he had given orders to his troops to stop firing and not to attack UN troops, but that it would take some time for the orders to reach the troops on the ground. Tolimir also claimed he was unaware of the terms of any offer made by a local BSA commander to the Dutchbat CO.

7. I have instructed my representative in Belgrade, D-SRSG Iouri Miakotnykh, to contact President Milosevic's office urgently, to inform him of events on the ground, and to solicit his assistance in preventing a further deterioration. Miakotnykh has an appointment at this time with Milosevic's Chef de Cabinet.

8. There are varying assessments as to why the BSA has embarked on this military operation. One is that a renegade commander is responsible, a possibility which I consider unlikely. Another is that the BSA wants to shrink the Srebrinica pocket, as opposed to overrun it, in order to decrease the resources required to defend its lines. A third is that the BSA wish to overrun the pocket in order to completely do away with it, free up substantial military resources, expand Serb control of eastern Bosnia, and by doing so render unusable the Contact Group map as a basis for future negotiations. Yet

C2-N 1115 3/3

R0008167

another possibility is that the BSA wish to demonstrate to UNPF/UNPROFOR, and to the TCNs, that the RRF is not a panacea for our difficulties, and does not free us from the continuing dilemma over the use of force by UNPROFOR.

9. I will keep you closely informed of the situation as it develops.

ENDALL../

3-41 CZB-38 (2)

CZN-1117
CZG 907
CZK 028
CZB 037 VIA MAC
SSN 1691

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UN COMM... NS
CDN
'95 JUL 11 12:40

1/2

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK "ONLY"

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK "ONLY"
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA "ONLY"
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO
MIAKOTNYKH, UNPF, BELGRADE "ONLY"

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB Y. Akashi

DATE: 11 JULY 1995

NUMBER: Z - 1130

SUBJECT: Situation in Srebrenica

'95 JUL 11 12:52 CDN UN COMM...

Further to our Z-1128 of yesterday, the Serbs did not advance past the Netherlands blocking force. Throughout the evening and most of this morning, the situation in Srebrenica was quiet and the town was not shelled.

At approximately 1130 hours this morning, I was advised that the Netherlands battalion commander reported a Serb force positioning itself for a possible attack. The Netherlands compound in Srebrenica was also shelled and observation posts on the northern perimeter of the enclave were under fire by mortars and machine guns. A Serb force was also detected moving outside the northern perimeter. I was also advised that the Netherlands battalion has limited ammunition.

At 1220 hours today I authorized a request for close air support against any Serb targets that may attack the Netherlands blocking position south of Srebrenica, as well as any heavy weapons identified to be shelling UN positions in the village of Srebrenica or attacking observation posts along the perimeter of the enclave. Close air support is now on station, but will be employed only if UNPROFOR personnel come under actual attack. There will be no pre-emptive use of NATO aircraft. The NATO air "package" includes "suppression of enemy air defence" (SEAD) aircraft the will react in self-defence if required.

We are not entirely certain of the fate of the approximately 30 Netherlands soldiers in Serb-held areas around the enclave. There are unconfirmed reports that they may have been released and are attempting to return to their battalion within the pocket. If this is true, we hope that they will be able to return before close air support, if necessary, is employed. The protection of Netherlands soldiers in observation posts, Srebrenica, and the blocking position must, however, take priority.

President Milosevic has contacted my be telephone. He clearly understands that it may be necessary for us to employ

R0015473

close air support. Milosevic stated that he would contact General Mladic immediately. He also stated that he doubted that Mladic would understand the difference between close air support and air strikes, and that Mladic might react strongly.

I was subsequently contacted by the Netherlands defence minister, who stated that he is concerned that the battalion may come under concentrated Serb attack. He has requested that we review our evacuation plans.

SE/UNHCR advises that there are no UNHCR convoys moving through Serb-held areas. UNHCR personnel in Serb areas are limited to the normal office staff in Banja Luka and Pale.

The deputy civil affairs coordinator of UNPROFOR has now departed for Pale for discussions with Professor Koljevic.

3-43

CZB-35 (6)

CZN 1123
CZG 912
SSN 1698

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPF COMMAND ZAGREB '95 JUL 11 1/2 16:42

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 11 JULY 1995 Z - 1136

SUBJECT: Situation in Srebrenica

UNPF COMMAND ZAGREB '95 JUL 11 16:53

This message updates the highlights of the situation in Srebrenica since our Z-1130 of earlier today.

In summary, the situation in Srebrenica is highly fluid.

At 1440 hours, NATO aircraft attacked two Serb tanks threatening the Netherlands blocking position south of Srebrenica. It is not clear if the bombs struck the target. A second pass was cancelled due to obscuration over the target area. Departing aircraft reported Bosnian Serb tanks moving south away from the blocking position.

President Milosevic contacted the SRSG again at about 1500 hours and was briefed on the situation. At that time, Milosevic stated that the Netherlands soldiers in Serb-held areas retained their weapons and equipment, and were free to move about.

At about 1630 hours, UNMOs reported that the Bosnian Serbs have overrun the village of Srebrenica including the Netherlands company camp. The blocking position has withdrawn toward Srebrenica. Remaining Netherlands forces are in isolated OPs, and the main camp at Potocari is exposed to artillery fire. Large numbers (possibly thousands) of refugees are now moving toward Potacari where the Netherlands battalion reports that there are insufficient resources for their sustenance. Local Serb commanders have threatened to kill Netherlands personnel and shell various villages in the pocket if there are further air attacks. The attitude and defensive capabilities of local Bosnian authorities are not yet clear.

Admiral Smith has agreed to our request, proposed by the Netherlands minister of defence to the SRSG, to suspend air presence and close air support missions over Srebrenica. It is our view that they would endanger the civilian population and our own personnel who are now inter-mixed with Serb forces. NATO aircraft are in high readiness elsewhere.

We are now gathering more detailed information on the situation on the ground in order to determine the needs of the civilian population. We are also examining the issues related

SRSG

C2B-35 (7)

to the security and possible evacuation of the Netherlands battalion as discussed with the Netherlands defence minister. The Netherlands minister advises that he has been presented by his staff with three options: withdrawal conducted by UNPROFOR with RRF, withdrawal conducted by NATO, and withdrawal conducted by an ad hoc coalition to which France, the UK, and the US have agreed.

The preliminary assessment of the Force Commander is that any withdrawal of the Netherlands battalion must be carried out through negotiation as its members are in some areas already interspersed with Serb forces, its stocks are limited, and the area of Srebrenica is beyond the immediate operational reach of UN or other military forces. General Gobillard has accordingly been instructed to establish an immediate local ceasefire with all parties. He is attempting to contact General Tolimir now. The UNPROFOR deputy civil affairs coordinator has also reached the UNHCR office in Pale, where he will remain as a liaison officer to Pale Serb authorities.

More detailed information on the situation and our intentions will follow as soon as possible.

CZN-1125
33W-1700
CZG-914

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPF HQ COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE
95 JUL 11 20:08

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 11 JULY 1995

NUMBER: Z-1138

SUBJECT: Situation in Srebrenica

P 1/2

7

UNPF HQ COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE
95 JUL 11 20:14

In addition to my two earlier cables, this message contains further details regarding today's developments, and the latest information provided to us by NATO and the UNMOs in Srebrenica.

Early this afternoon the BSA continued to shell the towns of Srebrenica and Potocari. At 1300 hours HQ UNPROFOR in Srebrenica went to state orange. Fifteen minutes later the BSA intensified its shelling of the two towns. At 1330 hours a TACP was wounded in the fighting west of Srebrenica. At 1440 hours, NATO aircraft attacked two Serb tanks. It appears that two passes were made. The first involved F-16 fighters carrying non-precision munitions. We believe the bombs missed their targets. The second attack, also involving a pair of F-16s, was aborted due to the poor visibility caused by the smoke, which obscured the pilots' view of the targets. The first aircraft in this pair of aircraft was engaged by a SAM missile.

At around 1600 hours, a third aerial attack was initiated by a pair of A-10s and was directed at, at least, one tank and some infantry (bearing small arms) attacking a TACP position. But no ordnance was dropped.

Between 1300 hours and 1500 hours the BSA bypassed the Dutchbat blocking position from the west. The Dutch B-Company subsequently withdrew to Potocari. As this was occurring, the Serbs succeeded in detaining the B-Company commander, thus raising the total number of Dutchmen detained by the BSA to 31. At 1620 hours, the town of Srebrenica itself was overrun by the Serbs. At 1800 hours, Dutchbat D-Company reached Potocari and deployed in defensive positions around the Dutchbat camp.

The UNMOs have reported that the number of severely wounded civilians in Potocari camp is between 50-70 persons. There are approximately 1500 displaced persons also in the camp, and this number is expected to grow as more displaced continue to make their way toward the camp. Earlier on, the

Serbs harassed the column of Bosnians leaving Srebrenica for Potocari. Between 1340 and 1500 hours the BSA fired 22 rockets from Dugo Polje (grid 644922) toward Budak (grid 623912) and Gradac (CP625989), i.e. in proximity to the Srebrenica-Potocari road. The sound of the exploding shells was so close to the column of displaced, it caused heightened panic.

First reports from Potocari suggested that there was only enough food and water for 24 hours. However, the UNMOs reported at 1711 hours that Dutchbat was attempting to rectify the situation. Its troops have opened their rations and were trying to make soup out of them. By doing this, the Dutch hope the food will last for a further 48 hours. After that, there will be no food for either UNPROFOR personnel or the displaced.

The shelling of the Srebrenica town itself stopped at 1700 hours and the BSA issued an ultimatum that the displaced and UNPROFOR leave the enclave through a protected corridor.

There have been reports of only one UNPROFOR soldier having been injured during the fighting. Nine Dutchbat OPs are still operational: A (CP633900), C (CP638850) M (New Location 570919), N (CP6139401), P (CP645918), Q (CP659893), R (CP659833). These OPs are now described as "very passive".

Dutchbat and the UNMO team are trying to meet the BSA commanders at 1930 hours. The battalion's intention is to propose a very small safe area (perhaps the general area of the compound) to protect the displaced.

The HCR Special Envoy will attempt to go to Tuzla tomorrow to meet with the Bosnian Minister of Refugees, in order to identify the humanitarian requirements. UNHCR assess that over 75% of the population of the enclave are displaced persons who may wish to leave, perhaps to Tuzla. The position of the Bosnian Government on this delicate issue will also be explored by UNHCR.

3-47

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
FOR
'95 JUL 11 21:47

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CZB=38 (10)

CZN-1126
CZG-915
CZK-030
SSN-1701

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -21537-

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA -21562-
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO -22002-

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
'95 JUL 11 22:04

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 1139

DATE: 11 JULY 1995

SUBJECT: UNPF POLICY, AND INFORMATION FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. The purpose of this message is to inform you of plans I am making to deal with the situation in Srebrenica, and to provide you with our preferred line for your approaches to the Council. I have just concluded a meeting with my senior military and political advisors, and with the UNHCR Special Envoy, at which a general consensus was reached on the policy that UNPF, UNPROFOR and UNHCR will pursue with regard to Srebrenica in the coming one to seven days, depending on the evolution of events on the ground, the stance taken by the parties, and the attitude of the people living in Srebrenica. I should note that the situation on the ground in Srebrenica, notably the BSA presence in the town of Srebrenica and substantial parts of the enclave, necessitates that our actions in Srebrenica in the coming days be conducted with the consent of the Bosnian Serbs.

Policy Intentions

2. UNPF/UNPROFOR

a) Dutch troops in Srebrenica will be ordered, to the extent possible, to further consolidate their units, abandoning all remaining OPs, and concentrating in and around Potocari. Efforts to do so may be thwarted by Bosnian army forces, which have resisted such efforts in the past 72 hours, by the BSA, which may try to detain more UN soldiers,

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; DFC; COS; HCA; HAAU; DOA; ICFY; NATO LO; UNHCR SE

R0015481

as well as by people living in villages near where the remaining OPs are located. The Dutch troops in Potocari will be instructed, to the extent possible, to defend their base from being overrun and to provide shelter, food, medical care and a degree of security through co-location with the people and tens of thousands of refugees in Potocari. Indeed the Dutch have already begun to do this in Potocari, but advise that they will run out of food stocks for the refugees in a maximum of 48 hours, and are desperately short of medical supplies and shelter. UNMOs will join the Dutch in Potocari.

b) UNHCR reports that 80% to 90% of the population of Srebrenica (total pop is 40,000) are displaced persons who fled fighting earlier in the war, thus they do not have long-standing ties to homes and property in the enclave, and will probably be interested in leaving for Tuzla. A UNHCR local staff member in Srebrenica reported today that virtually everyone in the enclave wishes to leave. The UNHCR SE will discuss this issue, as well as immediate humanitarian requirements, in a meeting tomorrow in Tuzla with the Bosnian Minister for Refugees, Mr. Cero. Following consultations with the Bosnian government, and in order to avoid a continuing humanitarian catastrophe, agreement will be solicited from the Bosnian Serbs to allow all residents of Srebrenica, including all men, to leave for Tuzla if they so wish. The Dutch will be instructed to remain in the Srebrenica enclave at least until arrangements have been negotiated and finalized with Bosnian Serb authorities for the departure from the enclave of those people. Ideally, UNPROFOR will maintain an armed and substantial presence in the enclave at least until the departure from the enclave of all those wishing to leave has been completed. This preference will need to be balanced against the Dutch government's desire to evacuate its forces from Srebrenica with the shortest delay. UNPROFOR with the support of UNHCR will also endeavor to reach agreement with the Bosnian Serbs to escort any convoy of refugees from Srebrenica to Tuzla. It is likely that the BSA will resist this. In such a case, we would maintain a presence with the refugees prior to their departure from the enclave; UNHCR would place international staff members with each of the departing convoys. The convoys would transit approximately 60 kilometers of Bosnian Serb controlled territory en route to Tuzla.

c) While satisfactory arrangements for the departure of refugees are sought, UNPROFOR will negotiate for the departure of the Dutch troops from Srebrenica. Ideally the first destination would be Tuzla, and the route would be the same as that used for the refugees. However, resistance to this route is expected from the BSA. Alternative plans would be to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY authorities a departure from the enclave for the FRY, travelling only a short distance on BSA controlled territory. While we understand that there may be some criticism in the press if this second option is selected, we may have no other acceptable alternative. All efforts will be made to obtain BSA agreement to allow the Dutch to depart with their weapons and equipment; however we expect resistance on this matter from Mladic.

d) We cannot rule out the possibility that recent events in Srebrenica will be repeated in Zepa and/or Gorazde. I have asked the Force Commander to study on an urgent basis various options for future deployments in the Safe Areas, without ruling out the possibility of a total withdrawal in the worst case scenario. His thoughts will be communicated to you.

e) UNPROFOR contingents in other enclaves, particularly Zepa and Gorazde, will in the meanwhile be instructed to further consolidate any outlying posts, concentrating forces in the safest location, presumably the local UNPROFOR HQ. Any eventual withdrawal of Dutch forces from Srebrenica will have serious implications for UNPROFOR troops in

Zepa and Gorazde: i) the governments contributing those forces may wish them to be withdrawn as well; ii) the viability of their continued presence will be cast into doubt in the event of a Dutch withdrawal, in the eyes of the warring parties, as well as the population of the enclaves; iii) a Serb attack on one or both of Zepa and Gorazde would obviously place at grave risk the safety of the UN forces there, a possibility of which the Force Commander and I are acutely aware. Indeed there are already signs, as well as internal UNPF analysis, that suggest that the Serbs will shortly attack Zepa in a similar manner as it attacked Srebrenica. While such an attack is by no means inevitable, we are making the appropriate contingency plans, including the evacuation of UNPROFOR troops from Zepa and Gorazde simultaneous with or subsequent to the withdrawal of the Dutch from Srebrenica.

3. UNHCR

a) UNHCR will immediately begin negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs for: i) the provision of emergency food and medical supplies for the people in Srebrenica, particularly the wounded and the approximately 25,000 displaced by the fighting; ii) the safe, rapid and orderly departure from Srebrenica of all those people, including men of military age, for Tuzla, beginning with the evacuation of the wounded on an emergency basis. This will be a massive logistics operation, beginning potentially as early as 13 July. Although modalities for determining the free will of people for the departure are yet to be decided, they will in any case be rough and approximate, perhaps as simple as anyone coming to a bus and stating they want to leave. The UNHCR Chief of Mission for Bosnia is in Banja Luka and will try to travel to Pale tomorrow, depending on the security situation and on authorization from the Bosnian Serbs. We can however expect resistance from the BSA to a rapid and safe departure of all those wishing to leave. Particularly, the BSA may try to link the departure of Muslims from Srebrenica to the departure of Serbs from Sarajevo or Tuzla. The BSA is also likely to separate the military age men (16 to 60 years old) from the rest of the population, an eventuality about which UNPROFOR troops will be able to do very little. The fact that the BSA will have practical difficulties controlling 40,000 people may mitigate against its desire to prolong or exacerbate the plight of the Srebrenica population. As a side note, UNHCR advises that it would face substantial practical difficulties caring for 40,000 people in the conditions that now exist in Srebrenica, and is of the opinion that the population would prefer to leave for Tuzla, and would be much better cared for there.

<u>Action from the Security Council</u>

4. Our efforts to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs, and to ameliorate the situation on the ground, would potentially be greatly facilitated if the Council were to make several points on an urgent basis, preferably in the form of a Resolution, but alternatively in the form of a Presidential Statement.

a) All hostile actions against all safe areas must stop immediately.

b) The safety and dignity of the civilian population, and of all men who have placed down their arms, must be respected.

c) The efforts of the SRSG to resolve the situation are supported by the Council, and

the parties must cooperate with those efforts/negotiations.

d) The efforts of UNHCR to look after the humanitarian needs of the population of Srebrenica must be supported by the parties.

e) All those wishing to leave Srebrenica for Tuzla must be allowed to do so under UNHCR care.

f) Consultations between the UN and NATO on possible future assistance should urgently begin, and NATO should be asked to take any preliminary and precautionary measures appropriate for the circumstances. This is necessary because, while we intend to proceed as above, our policy is dependent on cooperation by the Bosnian Serbs, and our actions will be contingent upon their consent. Absent that cooperation and consent, our only viable alternative might then be to withdraw the UNPROFOR mission from Bosnia-Herzegovina, a possibility for which the United Nations must be practically prepared.

g) The Council may also wish to express appreciation for the rapid and professional response of NATO to the request for close air support made to it.

h) The courageous efforts of the Dutch battalion, and its continued dedication to the welfare of the civilians, should also be recognized.

5. The Council will presumably be intensely interested in UNPF's future intentions regarding the safe areas. You may wish to again ask the Council to reconsider the United Nations' commitment to the safe areas in Bosnia for all the obvious reasons. Maintenance of the commitment on paper, with all the inherent complexities and contradictions, but without the means to uphold that commitment, has placed the Organization in the tragic situation in which we now find ourselves. The limitations on what UNPROFOR can do in the safe areas, and the vulnerability of its forces, have again been demonstrated in Srebrenica. In response to the Serb advance, the Dutch battalion has concentrated as much defensive capacity as possible while maintaining surveillance around the remaining perimeter. Air power has been used to support our forces in attempting to blunt a Serb attack based primarily on infantry advancing in close country. Finally, the battalion's resources, already severely limited due to Serb restriction on logistic routes, have been expended. Skill, willingness to accept great risks, and the heroic efforts of the soldiers on the ground have not sufficed to overcome the inherent problems and increasing dangers in the safe area concept set out in two reports of the Secretary-General, as well as in the personal presentation to the Security Council by General Janvier. At the same time, we recognize that UNPROFOR cannot abandon the safe areas, where special responsibilities have been assigned by the Security Council. We would therefore seek the support of the Security Council in adjusting the extent and scope of our deployment, particularly in isolated safe areas, to enable us to reduce risks and emphasize those tasks in which we can succeed.

6. I will keep you closely informed both of developments on the ground, as well as the evolution of our thoughts and our policies both here and in Sarajevo.

ENDALL../

3-51

12-JUL-1995 01:47 U.N. NYK HQS 2129633715 P.09

CNZ 580 CYZ 601 P1/2

SSN-882

ONLY

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG & FC ONLY

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ONLY

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 11 JULY 1995

NUMBER: 2280

SUBJECT: **Situation in Srebrenica**

1. Thank you for the excellent reporting you have given us, by cable and on the phone, on the events in Srebrenica. It is an extraordinarily difficult situation for the mission and we here have nothing but praise for the competence and courage of the UNPROFOR personnel involved in it, as well as for the calm leadership you have provided them.

2. The policy approaches outlined in your Z-1139 are well understood here, though (as a separate cable explains) the Security Council is pursuing a somewhat different line in its draft resolution. The situation does, however, raise some serious questions of general significance for the Force. How was it that UNPROFOR was taken unawares again, as with Gorazde and Bihac last year, by the true extent of Serb intentions? What intelligence resources do you have and what information, if any, was provided to UNPROFOR by those troop contributing countries with intelligence-gathering assets in the area? I intend to meet with the Permanent Representatives of Contact Group Governments here on Wednesday to pose the same question. I find it difficult to accept that no "early warning" was possible when the evidence suggests that a major build-up of troops and heavy weapons by the BSA occurred prior to the offensive.

SRSG
FC

IT-02-54-T
Milošević

Exhibit # 715
Date Admitted: 28-JUL-04
Reference #

R0012268

3. This raises the further question of whether, in your best judgement, the Serbs have deliberately embarked on a new phase in their military strategy. Is there a discernible pattern to their current conduct that might lead to the conclusion that Zepa and/or Gorazde will be next?

4. Please accept our best wishes in your efforts to negotiate an acceptable outcome in Srebrenica. We are conscious, from your Z-1138, of how crucial the next 48-to-72 hours will be. Despite the gulf between your repeated underscoring of the unviability of the safe areas and the "robust" signals that Governments wish to send in the Security Council, we are aware of the extremely limited resources and options at your disposal. You may be assured of our full support in the difficult decisions you may be obliged to make in the days ahead.

U.N. PROTECTOR COMMUNICATIONS
'95 JUL 12 -2 :02

(9)

HQ UNPROFOR SARAJEVO T. 028

PAGE 1 OF 1

MOST IMMEDIATE UN RESTRICTED

OUTGOING FAX NO: 1291/95	DTG: 111827B July 1995
TO: SECTOR NE INFO: CO DUTCHBAT	FROM: HQ UNPROFOR ACTING COMMANDER MGEN H M GOBILLIARD SIGNATURE:
FAX NO:	FAX NO: 7234/7239
ATTN: COMMANDER, COS, G3 CO	FILE NO: 3206 DRAFTER: LT COL HATTON
INTERNAL INFO: COMMANDER, COS, G3	
REF:	
SUBJECT: ORDERS FOR DEFENCE OF DUTCHBAT AND PROTECTION OF REFUGEES IN SREBRENICA	

MESSAGE

In view of new situation in Srebrenica the following are the orders of Acting Commander UNPROFOR for the defence of Dutchbat and the protection of refugees in Srebrenica.

a. Enter into local negotiations with BSA forces for immediate ceasefire. Giving up any weapons and military equipment is not authorised and is not a point of discussion.

b. Concentrate your forces into the Portacari Camp, including withdrawal of your OPs. Take all reasonable measures to protect refugees and civilians in your care.

c. Provide medical assistance and assist local medical authorities.

d. Continue with all possible means to defend your forces and installation from attack. This is to include the use of close air support if necessary.

e. Be prepared to receive and coordinate delivery of medical and other relief supplies to refugees.

MHHE. 059

MHDU. 002

3-54

IT-02-54-T Milošević

Exhibit # 716
Date Admitted: 28-JUL-04
Reference #

p1/2

CODE RESTRICTED

CZN=1134
CZG=922

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

SSN=1718

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK "ONLY"

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA "ONLY"

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 12 JULY 1995

NUMBER: Z -1147

SUBJECT: Military Information

MOST IMMEDIATE

This message is in reply to your MSC-2280 of 11 July 1995.

Our ability to monitor Bosnian Serb military activities beyond visual sight from confrontation lines is generally limited to what can be seen by convoys or helicopters which pass on designated routes through Serb-controlled areas. Additional information, although less reliable, can be deduced from open sources or by correlating the reports of neighbouring UNPROFOR units.

In order to deal with a threat from mechanized forces, armies deployed in defensive positions are provided with information out to a range of as much as 100 kilometres from its forward positions. This provides early warning in order to assess the intentions of an approaching force, and sufficient reaction time to engage it with long-range weapons including aircraft. Strategic intelligence also provides information on decisions of key political and military leaders. Much of this information is provided by satellites, airborne photography, and electronic interception--all of which are under national control.

The sharing of national intelligence between nations is governed by strict bilateral agreements to which the United Nations is not a party. Occasionally, local embassies or national contingents provide us with additional information. This did not take place during the Bosnian Serb advance into Srebrenica, and we have not received any additional information about the situation around Zepa or Gorazde. It would not be appropriate for us to attempt, at our level, to improve access to national intelligence.

We assess that the Serb attack on Srebrenica may signal future events. In light of the ease with which the Bosnian Serbs were able to move into the pocket, their planners may be considering the prospects of a similar success in Zepa--which is also lightly defended. Gorazde would be a more difficult objective. Events around Zepa are now following a similar pattern as those around Srebrenica, with an increase in artillery and small arms attacks. We do not, however, have

SRSC

R0013497

the surveillance capacity to determine the full extent of Serb build-up or intentions for the reasons already explained.

There are a number of possible explanations for the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica, all of which are somewhat speculative. First, the Serbs may have selected Srebrenica as a vulnerable target against which to demonstrate their continued military capabilities, as well as to retaliate for the Croatian capture of Sector West and the long series of Bosnian government offensives that began last March. Secondly, the Serbs may be attempting to secure their rear areas against a growing threat from BiH raids against villages, and possibly roads or economic targets such as the bauxite mine near Srebrenica. Thirdly, the Serbs may be attempting to reduce the extent of the area they must contain in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby freeing scarce troops. Fourthly, they may be demonstrating to the international community their ability and willingness to prosecute military operations in their own interests despite the injunctions and pressures of the international community. Finally, the Serbs may be attempting to re-arrange military and demographic facts on the ground, and to heighten the crisis, in order to increase pressure for changes to the peace process.

Commanding Officer
1(NL)UN Inftbn (Dutchbat)
Compound POTOCARI
SREBRENICA
Bosnia-Herzegovina

To: - Forcecommander
Lgen Janvier
ZAGREB

- Commander
Bosnia-Herzogovina Command
HQ UNPROFOR
SARAJEVO

- Commander
Sector North East
TUZLA

- Minister van Defensie
den HAAG

- C-KL Crisisstaf / CLS
den HAAG

12 July 1995

Nr: TK95114

Subject: Meetings with Gen Mladic on 11 and 12 July 1995

1. Due to time limitations I am not able to make a full report of the two meetings I have had last night with Gen Mladic of Bosnian-Serb Army. Details of the current situation in and around the compound of POTOCARI are known to you. These were explained to you by telephone. Today I witnissed a catastrophic sequence of events.

2. I have been ordered by HQ UNPROFOR SARAJEVO to enter into local negotiations with BSA forces for immediate ceasefire (see appendix). I had two meetings with Gen Mladic.

3. During the first one I have been accused of everything, what happened today, as beeing CO-Dutchbat. Again he demanded that there will not be any airstrikes or CAS longer. If airstrikes or CAS should occur or be continued, compound POTOCARI with Dutchbat and about 2.500 refugees in it and about 15.000 refugees in the direct vicinity of it will suffer shelling. He emphasized in most threatening way that he will use all his assets to outgun the compound.

4. He demanded a second meeting at 2230 hrs. In that meeting a representative of all refugees should present. I found one, although he is not an official representative. They are in the field. I was able to suggest my requests concerning the huma-

mitarian aid and first needs on behalf of the refugees. He made note of all of them. He stated: There will be a ceasefire till 12 July 1000 hrs. Then he started his talk to the representative of those refugees. He demanded:

a. All ABIH troops within the former enclave were forced to handover their weapons and free retreat.

b. Next meeting on 12 July 1000 hrs with a representation of the refugees and the former civil and military authorities.

Gen Mladic is willing to receive and treat all wounded persons however first to accept and execute his demands. If not, then he threatened again with very specific measures: shelling.

5. There are more than 15.000 people within one sqkm including the batallion in an extreme vulnerable position: the sitting duck position, not able to defend these people at all. In direct line and above the compound he deployd two guns, two tanks, three MLRS and one AAgun, all in direct sight. At this moment I am responsible for these people.

6. I am not able:

a. to defend these people;
b. to defend my own batallion;
c. to find suitable representatives among the civilians because the official authorities are for certain reasons not available;
d. to find representatives among the military authorities because they are trying to fight for a corridor to the TUZLA-area, and will not show up anyway because of purely personal reasons;
e. manage to force ABIH troops to handover their weapons.

7. This situation is deteriorating in such way that additional measures are to be taken for both refugees and soldiers. In my opinion there is one way out: negotiations today at the highest level: UNSG, highest national authorities and both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government.

CO-1(NL)UN Infbn
Dutchbat

[illegible] Th.J.P.
[illegible] Colonel

3-58

//0208-9224 – EDT Draft translation//

16/01/90 00:28 250 Pera
SRNA - Serb News Agency – No: 17 816 – 06 – Date: 11 July 1995 – Pale

Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army
No: 06/17 – 455
Date: 10 July 1995

To: The UNPROFOR Command – Sarajevo
Personally to: General Rupert Smith

General, Sir

I received your letter from 9 July 1995. Srebrenica enclave was not demilitarized in the spirit of the agreement from 19 April and 8 May 1993. Muslims did not surrender their weapons, mines and explosives and combat means to UNPROFOR. Muslims took advantage of their special zone status and the presence of your forces for preparation and execution of terrorist and other combat activities against Serb population and the territory of Republika Srpska.

Allow me to remind you that from then until now Muslim forces killed 100 and wounded over 200 Serb civilians in the attacks and with infiltrated sabotage terrorist groups. They burned many Serb villages along the zone and committed heinous crimes against civilians. In the last couple of days they started wide military operation in order to link up with the enclave in the area of the Žepa village and they burnt down the villages of Višnjíca and Banja Lučica and killed the residents. In implementation of their vile intentions even the UNPROFOR members were not spared. Although your forces protected them they also became their victims.

Crimes committed against innocent civilians provoked /illegible/ in order to neutralize Muslim terrorists. Our activities are not directed against civilians and the UNPROFOR members who are deployed in this enclave. A certain number of UNPROFOR members who fled to our territory after their soldier was killed by Muslims saw that for themselves. They were properly accepted, accommodated, and made safe.

I assure you that, as far as we are concerned, UNPROFOR members can be completely calm and safe just as they used to be until now.

I am convinced that your patience and better understanding of entire situation shall be useful to the peace in this area.

COMMANDER
Lieutenant General
Ratko Mladić

/signed stamped/

(4)

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

United Nations Peace Forces - Headquarters
Forces de Paix des Nations Unies - Quartier Général

Lieutenant General Bernard JANVIER
Force Commander UN Peace Forces

Zagreb, 11 July 1995

General,

With respect to the action that your forces are undertaking in Srebrenica area, I wish to express my deepest concern with regard to the fate of the twenty Dutch soldiers in Bratunac and the ten others in the area of Nazda, who are under your control. My main concern is related to their safety and I request for them, total freedom of movement so that they can go back to their headquarters when they decide so.

On 8 July afternoon, OP F manned by Dutch soldiers was directly targeted by a tank belonging to your forces. Fortunately, there were no casualties. On 9 and 10 July attacks were also conducted against UN positions leading to a total of 7 OP's left for safety reasons due to deliberate targeting. I must stress that hostile actions threatening the life of my soldiers cannot be accepted and have to stop. In accordance with my mandate, I intend to react with all possible means available, should the life or the mission of my soldiers be threatened.

I request then, complete freedom of action and movement for my troops and therefore I cannot see the continuation of this situation which affects UN troops defending a Safe Area in accordance with Security Council Resolution 819

Once again, I strongly emphasize the imperative necessity for the forces under your command to cease all firing against UNPROFOR, to withdraw to the perimeter of the enclave immediately and to stop all direct or indirect targeting against civilian population.

Your violation of the Safe Area cannot be tolerated by the international community. You have to desist by withdrawing and ending all actions against it. I rely on your authority to ensure compliance with this request. Otherwise, an extremely dangerous situation may be created.

Yours sincerely.


Potocari
Bosnia and Herzegovina
12 Jul 95
~ 1400 hours
People
Trucks

3-60


Overview
Potocari, Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 Jul 95
Energoinvest
Factory "11 of March"
Zinc Factory
Express Bus
Compound
"Feros" Building
Blue Factory
Electrical
Station
"White House"
UN Base

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
Buses and Trucks Lined Up
Potocari, Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 Jul 95
~1400 Hours
Express Bus Compound
Shed
Shed
House
Grown Cornfield
Vehicle
Out of Order Busses
People
UN APC
Trucks
Buses
Water Tank
"Blue Building"
"Blue Factory"
Bus
"White House"

3-62

PTQ7890

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7890

PAGE 01 SARAJE 00324 111714Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00
	SRPP-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IMMC-01	SSA-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-08	L-01	ADS-00	M-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	SSD-01	PMB-00
	DRL-09	G-00	/045W				

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O 111811Z JUL 95
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0377
INFO AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000324

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, SR, BK
SUBJECT: PM SILAJDZIC: SREBRENICA DOOMED,
- "BETRAYAL COMPLETE"

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC, DRAINED AND DOWNCAST, CALLED ME IN TWICE JULY 11 TO INFORM ME OF THE

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SARAJE 00324 111714Z
SPIRALING CRISIS IN SREBRENICA AND TO CRITICIZE U.S. POLICY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK H PEREZ
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2007 200603744

ON LIFT. END SUMMARY.

3. PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC CALLED ME IN ON AN URGENT BASIS AT 1400 JULY 11 TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN SREBRENICA. HE SAID HE HAD SPOKEN WITH THE MAYOR OF SREBRENICA BY RADIO 0600 THIS MORNING. THE MAYOR ASKED, "IS MY CITY UNDER A DEATH SENTENCE?" THE MAYOR HAD RADIOED IN AGAIN AT 1330 AND SIGNED OFF, "THIS IS MY LAST CALL, THIS IS THE END."

4. THE PM, LOOKING EXHAUSTED AND DESPONDENT, SAID THE ENCLAVE WAS FALLING TO THE BSA. PANIC HAD BROKEN OUT IN THE STREETS. "THE BETRAYAL IS COMPLETE." WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, HE WENT ON, HAD WARNED THAT A LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO WOULD SPELL THE END OF THE ENCLAVES. THE EMBARGO WAS STILL IN EFFECT, AND YET SREBRENICA WAS NOW DOOMED. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN PARTICULAR WOULD HAVE A HARD TIME IN EXPLAINING ITS POLICY NOW, IN DEVISING A NEW "EXCUSE." (COMMENT: THE PM GAVE A LOCAL RADIO INTERVIEW AFTER OUR MEETING TO ANNOUNCE HE HAD CALLED ME IN TO CRITICIZE U.S. POLICY. END COMMENT.)

"TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE"

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5. THE DISCUSSION TURNED TO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE ENCLAVE. I INFORMED THE PM THAT NATO AIR ACTION WAS EITHER IMMINENT OR ONGOING. HE DISMISSED IT, SAYING THE IT WOULD NOT DETER THE SERBS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

6. THE PM CALLED ME IN AGAIN AT 1645 TO GET AN UPDATE ON THE NATO MISSION OVER SREBRENICA. I INFORMED HIM THE MISSION WAS STILL ONGOING. HE AGAIN WAS DISMISSIVE OF THE ACTION, LABELING IT "TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE." [redacted] B1 [redacted] HE ADDED THAT THE BSA HAD SLICED THE TOWN OF SREBRENICA INTO THREE PARTS AND SAID THE UNIMAGINABLE WAS NOW TAKING PLACE.

7. EARLIER IN THE DAY (1145), OSMAN TOPCAGIC, THE MFA

GENERAL SECRETARY, CALLED ME IN TO PASS ON INTELLIGENCE THAT THE BSA WAS PLANNING AN ARTILLERY ASSAULT ON THE DUTCH DEMARCATION LINE SOUTH OF SREBRENICA AT 1240, TO BE FOLLOWED BY AN INFANTRY ATTACK AT 1250. I PASSED THE INFORMATION TO THE UNPROFOR'S CINCSOUTH LIAISON, WHO NOTED THAT THE DUTCH, FEARING SUCH AN ATTACK, HAD ALREADY REQUESTED AIR SUPPORT.

ALL CLEAR
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8. TWO MORTAR SHELLS LANDED ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND UNPROFOR AROUND 1615. EMBASSY EMPLOYEES RETIRED TO THE BASEMENT SHELTER UNTIL THE ALL-CLEAR SIGNAL. NO ONE WAS WOUNDED. UNPROFOR WENT TO ITS HIGHEST ALERT STAGE. UNPROFOR CONTACTS TOLD US THEY ASSUMED THE TARGETING WAS DELIBERATE AND THE SHELLS WERE IN RETALIATION FOR THE NATO MISSION.

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CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT
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9. NO CONSENSUS HAS FORMED AMONG GOVERNMENT AND DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS HERE AS TO THE ULTIMATE SERB MILITARY STRATEGY, BUT MOST THINK IT IS INTERACTIVE -- THAT IS, THE BSA PROBES RESISTANCE AND PUSHES UNTIL IT LOCATES OPPORTUNITY. GOBH OFFICIALS NOW FEAR THE SERB AIM IN SREBRENICA IS TO "EXPEL AND OCCUPY," THE FORMER BEING PURSUED WITH BRUTALITY. THE DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN SARAJEVO, THE CROATIAN AMBASSADOR, REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THE BSA STRUCK THE ENCLAVE PREEMPTIVELY BEFORE THE RRF WAS OPERATIONAL. [redacted] HE SAID, THE RRF HAD BEEN SO HAMSTRUNG IN POSSIBLE MISSIONS THAT THE SERBS HAD NOTHING TO FEAR. ANOTHER CONTACT SUMMED UP THE SERBS' OBJECTIVE: "THEY WANT IT ALL."
BURTON

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CZN=1141
CZK=44
CZG=928

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

SSN=1730

'95 JUL 13 13:42 BUZ

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 13 JULY 1995

NUMBER: Z=1154

SUBJECT: Situation in Srebrenica

CODE RESTRICTED
MOST IMMEDIATE

1. Continuing with our reports on the situation in Srebrenica, this message contains the latest information concerning the joint efforts being made to resolve the current humanitarian crisis, together further details regarding yesterday's developments on the ground.

2. The main areas of concern identified by the HCR Special Envoy, Mr. Anne Willem Bijleveld, who has just returned from Tuzla, are:

-- General Mladic's refusal to allow all access, whether it be to personnel or convoys, to Srebrenica

-- the insistence of the Bosnian Government that the international community, and not Sarajevo, deal with the fate of the displaced who are now assembling at the Tuzla airbase.

-- As of 1130 hours today there were an estimated 5500 displaced at the airbase and this number is expected to rise very quickly. There are an estimated 6000 people in Kladanj who will soon proceed to Tuzla and there are many others to follow them (approximately 25000). We believe there are about 4000 males of draft age still in Bratunac awaiting "screening" by the BSA. Their fate is of obvious concern to everyone here.

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UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS

3. Other points mentioned by the Special Envoy are:

-- The airbase at Tuzla cannot accommodate Srebrenica's displaced persons for long, and it is the Special Envoy's belief that the Bosnian Government will remain obstinate in its refusal to help the displaced, until Tuzla airbase is overflowing with people, and Sarajevo succeeds in embarrassing both the UN and the international community. Mr. Bijeleveld said there is accommodation for 11000 persons in the Tuzla area. Should the displaced be relocated to Tuzla proper (i.e. from the airport), this could of course put strains on the

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Federation, by upsetting the population balance in the area. Nevertheless, given the looming humanitarian difficulties it appears to be the only viable alternative in the short-term.

-- At the airbase, there are enough tents for about 9600. Unless the Government assists us forthwith, the humanitarian situation at the airbase could reach critical proportions. HCR's convoys in central Bosnia, which could be of obvious benefit in this regard, are also being hindered by BiH road restrictions. Mr. Bijleveld noted that Minister Muratovic was dismissive over the obvious fact that the displaced are Bosnians who are now on Bosnian soil and must therefore be cared for by the Bosnian Government with the assistance of the UN agencies.

4. Our two main objectives are to ensure the welfare of the population in the Srebrenica area, and to support UNHCR in convincing the Bosnian Government that it cannot simply abrogate its responsibilities vis-a-vis the safety and security of its own people: that it must take the lead and HCR, UNPROFOR and UNPF will assist. General Smith is due to meet Prime Minister Silajdzic and Minister Muratovic this afternoon and he will endeavour to make this point to the Bosnians. We will also insist that the Bosnian Serbs allow us access to Potocari and Bratunac, so that we ourselves may support Dutchbat and the UNMOs in ascertaining the situation there.

5. To continue with yesterday's developments, the following is a summary of the decisions taken in UNPF-HQ and a recounting of the developments on the ground.

6. Late yesterday afternoon, HCA Mousalli chaired a meeting of the joint crisis management team, which brought together the civilian and military components of UNPF and representatives of UNHCR (see separate report of meeting from HCA Moussalli). The meeting's primary objective was to find agreement on how the plight of the displaced can be alleviated, to address the question of who should lead the efforts on the ground, and how this should be coordinated with supporting agencies. UNHCR will take charge of all the humanitarian aspects with UNPROFOR providing all necessary and available support. Press and Information Officers have been sent to Tuzla. The task of establishing the modalities for the implementation of the plan is currently being worked on in this HQ.

7. Meanwhile, yesterday in Potocari, at around 1200 hours, Bosnian Serb troops marched through the town and took up positions around the Dutchbat camp. They also sent a detachment to a prefab factory some 200 metres away from the main camp where a large number of displaced had congregated. On hearing of reports that soldiers from this detachment were pointing their weapons at the civilians in a threatening manner, the UNMOs were asked to investigate. On arriving at the factory, the UNMOs discovered the allegation to be quite false and witnessed, instead, some of soldiers distributing sweets and cigarettes to some of the displaced.

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8. As was reported in my Z-1152, the Commanding Officer of Ducthbat then held another meeting with General Mladic. The results of the meeting have already being communicated to you, and there are no further details regarding the precise nature of the Dutchbat Commander's opposition to Mladic's evacuation order. Meanwhile, the high temperatures, lack of sanitation and the overcrowding in Potocari, combine to create a very difficult situation in that area. There continues to be no reports of the BSA mistreating any of the Bosnian civilians.

9. At 1512 hours yesterday, the Bosnian Serbs provided 30 buses and trucks and began to move the displaced (with the exception of men of draft-age) to Bratunac. The vehicles were under the constant observation of Dutchbat soldiers, who escorted the convoy. By 1645 hours, the UNMOS estimated that 3000 people were subsequently being taken from Bratunac to Kladanj, again under Dutchbat escort. The civilians were dropped off by the Serbs close the confrontation line, from where they walked to BiH lines and were subsequently transported by BiH buses to Tuzla airbase. Contrary to press reports, at no time were UNPROFOR or UNHCR drivers or vehicles used in the movement of the civilians. At 2245 hours the BSA's operation to relocate the displaced was suspended until 0700 hours this morning.

10. MSF reported that those who had arrived at Kladanj transfer point were very hungry and had very little warm clothing.

11. In the Srebrenica area, there are 38 Dutch soldiers who are still detained by the BSA in Bratunac. They were taken from OP-N, OP-S, OP-U, OP-G, OP-R, and OP-Q. Ten other soldiers (from OP-K) were taken by the Serbs to a mining area located at grid CP5582. OPs Alpha and Papa are still manned by Dutchbat (with 10 soldiers at each OP) but are surrounded by the BSA and are thus inoperable. Six Dutch soldiers are still in OP-C without their weapons, and are blocked by the BiH.

12. Finally, we have received initial reports that Mladic intends to have the Dutchbat depart, with its personal weapons only, as soon as the transfer of civilians has been completed. We are now assessing this potentially alarming development.

Regards.

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Lieutenant General R A Smith DSO, OBE, QGM
Commander, United Nations Protection Force
Sarajevo
Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina

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See Distribution

13 July 1995

AFTERMATH OF FALL OF SREBRENICA

1. In the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica we face amongst other issues, two immediate matters; the reception and care of the refugees, and the recovery of DUTCHBAT complete with all its weapons and equipment. The solutions that we find to these problems will likely become the policy for handling the anticipated fall of other enclaves and should colour the advice we give as to the policy for the remaining enclaves.

2. What follows is based on the perception that:

a. The Bosnian Serbs are intent on moving fast to present a 'fait accompli'. They wish to remove the Enclaves, inter alia, to free their rear area, to provide troops for a decisive blow and possibly to counter the RRF. We must expect Zepa and possibly Gorazde and Bihac to be attacked. (See attached for the latest report on Zepa and our relations with the BSA).

b. The Bosnians want to involve the UN, so as to make it responsible for solving the refugee problem in all respects and for the defence of the enclaves. They want the UN to say if it cannot or will not discharge there responsibilities, so as to reinforce their efforts to have the Arms Embargo lifted and the impediment of the UN removed.

3. The Bosnian Serbs are "cleansing" Sebrenica. DUTCHBAT are doing what they can to monitor the situation but reports of abductions and murder, unconfirmed as yet, are beginning to be heard. Men of military age are being separated from the refugees. The Serbs are moving the problem rapidly from Srebrenica to Central Bosnia. The Bosnians want all refugees to go to the Tuzla Air Base and the airfield to be opened in order to supply them. (See the Government statement faxed to you this afternoon). I have said that the Government and UNHCR must cooperate and I was sure that a large number of refugees on an open site such as the Air Base would be a mistake. HQ Sector NE is the lead HQ, but there is an urgent need for UNHCR and CA people of appropriate stature and capabilities to grip this matter and deal with the Bosnian Government both in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. In addition UNHCR and CA need reinforcing at Sector level.

4. The recovery of DUTCHBAT with their weapons and equipment is an important objective. If we fail to achieve it we will set the base line for subsequent similar events at a unfortunately low level. CO DUTCHBAT must not be left to deal on his own account: he is talking from the jail. The Serbs are refusing to deal with HQ UNPROFOR and it seems HQ UNPF. Pressure must be bought to bare to support the CO by higher authorities, perhaps Mr Bildt and his team or Governments. Meanwhile CO DUTCHBAT has been given instructions to sit out demands to do anything but depart with his people, weapons and equipment. The BSA may well seek to hold DUTCHBAT as hostage to cover subsequent attacks into other enclaves.

5. These two matters are of immediate concern but effect a slightly longer term objective: the security of UNPROFOR and the refugees in other enclaves. I think we have the following broad options open to us:

a. To lie back. In this event our solutions to the foregoing issues are critical.

b. To leave the vicinity: either

(1) Leaving a small UNPROFOR presence. This would involve negotiations, time, and the recognition that we were to a degree abandoning a Safe Area. In place we would probably have to promise Air Strikes which would complicate the negotiations and on the evidence to date be ineffective, particularly if UNPROFOR remains in range of BSA Artillery.

or (2) Withdrawing both UN and refugees. We would be playing into the Serbs hands.

c. Resist. On the grounds that we do not want to repeat the failed approach in Srebrenica, we can either:

(1) Bomb - This has not worked because we have not been prepared to escalate and the bombing does not stop the attacks on this terrain. Proposals to use armed helicopters and or raid with the RRF fall into the same category as the air raids. Ground cannot be held; there is difficulty in finding suitable targets; air supremacy has to be achieved; the raid is not part of a coherent All Arms battle; elements of UNPROFOR remain potential hostages to capture and attack; casualties must be expected.

(2) Reinforce to defend. This would involve the air insertion of a sizable force of All Arms which would have to be maintained by air and supported by air. An even larger force could fight its way into the enclave but it too would need air support and probably maintenance.

6. As to which to choose: I suggest if the BSA continues to move at their current speed and particularly if they hold DUTCHBAT as hostages para 5a will be chosen for us. If we have more time then we must decide whether or not we wish to fight a war. If we do it should be for a greater aim than the defence of an enclave. Furthermore, appropriate forces must be deployed and we must remove the white and vulnerable elements of UNPROFOR or we will continue to have hostages to fortune. If we are not prepared to fight and escalate to achieve the desired end

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then we must face the harsh and unforgiving truth that short of a peace settlement we must settle for either options 5a or b.

7. In the immediate future the need for UNHCR/CA reinforcements to grip the refugee crisis and an high level advocate for DUTCHBAT are critical.

RA SMITH
Lt Gen
Comd UNPROFOR

Distribution:

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HQ UNPF for SRSG, FC, DFC, COS

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Internal:

COS

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CONFIDENTIAL 508214

From: Capt E L Bliss
LO/Interpreter
VSAT 7201

9/20

To: See Distribution

Date: 13 Jul 95

MEETING GEN SMITH / PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC : 13 JUL 95

SUMMARY

1. Gen Smith met Prime Minister Silajdzic at the Presidency at 1420 hrs on 13 Jul 95. They discussed the current situation in Srebrenica, the refugee crisis and unconfirmed reports of atrocities. Silajdzic was very keen to raise the issue of Zepa and requested that UNPROFOR immediately reinforce its troops in the enclave in order to avoid the same fate as Srebrenica.

2. Dr Muratovic was also present at the meeting and, in addition, discussed the accommodation arrangements offered for the Multi-national Bde (MNB).

MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED

3. Silajdzic immediately raised the issue of Zepa and requested swift reinforcement of the UN contingent to protect the enclave from the expected BSA attack. He asked Gen Smith whether he could reinforce the UN forces in Zepa. Gen Smith replied that he has neither the capabability nor the orders to reinforce Zepa at this time. Gen Smith emphasised that currently his most important task was to clarify the policy on the enclaves and identify the stance of the participating member states as whatever action was taken in Srebrenica would become the model for the other enclaves.

4. Silajdzic informed Gen Smith that the Government had held an Extraordinary Session of Parliament today and were about to release a press statement with a list of demands. This would include a request for the UN to reinforce in the Zepa enclave. He stated that, firstly, Zepa was the immediate priority as it had become apparent that it would certainly be the next target and that Belgrade was actively involved and no longer bothered to conceal this fact. Secondly he requested that Tuzla airport be opened immediately to ease the refugee crisis. Thirdly he requested the UN to provide medical and food aid and shelter to the refugees at Tuzla airport.

5. Gen Smith responded that the capacity at Tuzla airport was realistically limited to approx 2500 people and that it was necessary to create a cohesive, high-powered UNHCR / ICRC / UNPROFOR team to coordinate the resources on the ground. He explained that he has sent DCOS HQ UNPROFOR, Col Coiffet to aid this. Gen Smith expressed his readiness

to use helicopters in the relief operation and foresaw no problems with their use to and from Tuzla although he doubted whether the BSA would agree to allow them access to Srebrenica.

6. Both the Prime Minister and Minister Muratovic raised their concerns about the as yet unconfirmed reports of atrocities in the Srebrenica area, in particular the rape of young women in Vlasenica and the murder of a bus-load of refugees. The Bosnian government wishes all the refugees to have the same status as the UN hostages as they are en route from one UN safe haven to another. They are also worried about reports of refugees being segregated into groups and men between the ages of 16 and 60 being sent to different locations. They asked for all convoys to be escorted by UNPROFOR and that passenger lists be compiled on all buses.

7. Gen Smith updated the Prime Minister on the details he had. Namely that there were still large numbers of people outside Potocari camp and others still in town with approx 4,000 refugees enroute to Tuzla: that there were 48 Dutch soldiers held hostage in total in two different locations and two OPs unaccounted for to the west of Srebrenica where the fighting was continuing; that there had been various figures of 10,000 to 15,000 refugees in Potocari.

8. Muratovic raised the issue of Tuzla airport again and stated that they wanted to put a large number of refugees there because there was plenty of space and UNHCR would be unable to hide the problem from the world. He requested a camp be created with accommodation suitable for the coming winter months. Gen Smith said that he would rely on the expert advice of UNHCR in this matter and doubted the feasibility of housing 30,000 to 40,000 refugees in the airport area. He stressed the need to cooperate with the UNHCR.

9. Gen Smith raised the issue of the move of elements of the MNB up-country from Tomislavgrad to the Kresevo / Tarcin area. Muratovic stated that he had identified a good location at Pazaric and that his assistant would be happy to take someone from HQ UNPROFOR to recce it over the next two days. He stated that the RRF move had been agreed with President Zubak in Mostar recently and foresaw no problems with the proposal. Two buildings had also been found for Civil Affairs and his office would also organise recces of these buildings when required. He agreed to investigate the problems of resupplying the two CanBat OPs in the Visoko area and said he had been unaware of any problem there, thinking that they were unoccupied.

E L BLISS

E L BLISS
Capt
LO/Interpreter

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~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to the Fall of Srebrenica

Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. Chris, Bill Perry, Shali and I have also been in continuing contact in shaping a U.S. strategy.

Everyone agrees on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military aggressiveness that has marked the past month. Failure to reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. It will also accelerate passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

Deputies agreed on the following immediate actions:

- To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to prevent the fall of Zepa).
- To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them to remain unsupported behind Serb lines.
- To use our public statements and our consultations with allies to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

- To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority, in light of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun.

Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission:

- At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue maintaining peace where it exists.
- To this end, we will support robust use of the existing elements of the RRF to secure overland access to Sarajevo using the Mt. Igman route, and possibly to restore control over Sarajevo airport.
- Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning all of the eastern enclaves, and the fact that NATO credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if protection of Zepa proves unfeasible.

Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on unilateral lift. The current Dole language, while not requiring immediate lifting of the embargo, would require unilateral U.S. action in violation of binding UN resolutions within 12 weeks of a request by the Bosnian Government for UNPROFOR withdrawal. Failure to demonstrate that UNPROFOR retains a viable mission after the fall of Srebrenica will virtually guarantee passage of the bill and encourage the Bosnian government to pull the trigger.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac
Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 13, 1995, 3:22-3:58 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? I will speak in French. I'm very worried about Bosnia and there are things we want you to know. *(Switching to French)* First of all, my congratulations on the strong statement you issued that if we cannot restore the UN mission, then the days of UNPROFOR are numbered and that that causes you concern. Our analysis is the same. The fall of Srebrenica, the probable fall of Zepa tomorrow and the real threat to Gorazde represent a major failure of the UN, NATO and all the democracies. You see what we are seeing on TV, how the Serbs are separating men from women, sending women to be raped and killing men who are old enough to bear arms. In my opinion, we can no longer just stand by and watch this. [redacted] 1.4(b) [redacted] Therefore we must restore the situation to the way it was guaranteed by the UN. That means restoring the situation in the eastern enclaves. yes

Therefore, firm and limited military action is called for. France is ready to put all of its forces behind the mission. I don't yet know what the British want to do. They are directly concerned since they are in Gorazde, next door to Srebrenica. I wonder whether or not their intention is to pick up and leave Gorazde just as the Dutch left Srebrenica. I don't want France to be an accomplice to such a situation. Either we agree to carry out a joint military intervention to protect the three enclaves -- to recapture Srebrenica and guarantee the integrity of Gorazde and Zepa, which account for 100,000 Muslims (today 20,000 to 40,000 Muslims are fleeing Srebrenica) and we use military intervention to impose the will of the UN, which can

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only come from the U.S., France, the UK and Germany -- and France is prepared to throw all of its forces into the effort to restore the situation in Srebrenica -- or we do nothing. But if the option is to do nothing, then that is exactly the situation we were in in 1939, and France will withdraw -- of course, by agreement with our British friends and the rest of UNPROFOR. So the issue is whether the U.S. is prepared to cooperate in combating ethnic cleansing, or do we sit back and let these people fight each other and we go home. We cannot allow ourselves to be accomplices! ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me first say that we appreciate the strong stance you have taken and your determination to do something. Obviously, we have been thinking about this a lot. I will take up your specific proposals with my military commanders, but I wanted to speak with you first. I would like you to think about a few things. Gorazde is much more important than Zepa and Srebrenica in terms of its size and psychological impact. The Bosnian Government has 9000 troops in Gorazde, who are apparently are willing to fight. In Srebrenica there were about 3000 Bosnian troops but, as you know, they left under pressure of shelling. They left without putting up a fight, although I think they could have done so. The British have 300 troops in Gorazde, so I think they will be more inclined to take a stand there. We all know that if something happens to Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb army will feel they have a free hand to move on to Sarajevo. Our military advisers say there are significant hazards in attempting to land a force with helicopters in Srebrenica and that UNPROFOR might be better off securing Gorazde first and then move back eastward due to the inherent difficulty of defending the area there. ~~(C)~~

The other issue I would like to raise with you -- which we discussed in Halifax and here during your visit, and which has become more pressing -- is the necessity of knowing what the rules of engagement are going to be if you take the initiative in Srebrenica, Zepa or Gorazde. You cannot be in a position to fight in Zepa and then ask for NATO support without clear rules of engagement. If there is going to be fighting, it has to be different than in the past. Before we provide air power, we have to know that it would be used and that we could inflict real pain on the Serbs in other areas. Before UNPROFOR gets into a military campaign, we must have a clear sense of what the next move is and what the acceptable military options are under UNPROFOR and NATO. Now that you have told me what you want to do, I will talk to our military advisers, but they are very skeptical about bringing in forces with helicopters, especially if the Bosnians won't fight. I think we should first secure Gorazde and then Sarajevo. I will have conversations with them and get back in touch with you. ~~(C)~~

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I would like to make two more points. First, I think your stated intentions to reopen Mount Igman road is very important -- a critical point. Second, we need General Shalikashvili to speak with Admiral Lanxade or have Secretary Christopher speak with your foreign minister to talk in detail about what you have in mind for the enclaves. We need to consider whether the Muslims will return to the enclaves, how we will protect them if they come back, and whether it would be under the old UN rules of engagement. Will the Bosnian Serb Army just end their advances? Therefore, I believe we should focus on Gorazde and press for ministerial and military talks. You have given me many things to think about. I would like to have a follow up between the generals and foreign ministers on the details. (C)

1.4(b)

The President: We cannot defend democratic values in the abstract. My military advisers tell me the Muslims could have made a hell of a fight in Srebrenica and raised the price of the Serbs' occupation, but they wouldn't do it. We can't fight just because the UN says they are "safe areas". We can't send the Muslims back and commit ourselves to stay forever if they won't

defend themselves. That's the problem with the strategy you suggest. Yesterday we saw the effects of the imbalance in arms. Have you had any second thoughts about lifting the arms embargo? (C)



1.4(b)

The President: If we intervene to regain the enclaves on their behalf and they won't fight, how do we keep them open? UNPROFOR's mission would be completely changed and you would have entered into combat on the side of the Bosnian Government when they don't fight for themselves. I agree the Serbs have made a mockery of the UN. They took Srebrenica and got it for free. We didn't even bomb them. We should raise the price, and even hit Pale. I have argued that we should allow NATO to take tougher action, but that was not to be. If we enter the war to defend the Bosnians, they have to be ready to defend themselves. That's what worries me. (C)

President Chirac: When does the Congress vote on lifting the embargo? (C)

The President: Next week. I'm trying to defeat it. I agree with you: I am vehemently opposed to unilateral lift. If they pass it, I will veto it, and they would be obliged to override my veto. (C)

President Chirac: Can Congress override the veto? (C)

The President: Yes, with a two-thirds vote, but I don't think they'll have two thirds. I'm not worried about it. I would like

to confer with my military advisers and get back in touch on this matter. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: OK, I quite agree. I will ask Admiral Lanxade to contact General Shalikashvili as soon as possible. Thank you very much. ~~(C)~~

The President: OK. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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