In our statistical risk assessments, Chad currently ranks among the 30 countries worldwide at greatest risk of an onset of state-led mass killing. At the same time, our pool of experts has set Chad’s risk at 8 percent, low compared to several other countries in that Top 30. For example, our experts’ current forecasts for Iraq and Pakistan, both in the Top 30, are 22 and 23 percent, respectively, and for Myanmar, 38 percent. Considering the relative instability of Chad’s neighbors and Chad’s history of coups and ethnic conflict, why do our experts see such a low chance of a mass killing episode, and what might change their predictions?
First, let’s consider how our forecast works. We draw from several models that attempt to predict the likelihood of a mass killing episode based on a wide range of variables. One model considers factors such as political instability, infant mortality rates, and regime type (among others). Another model considers factors such as coup activity and the risk of a civil war onset, theorizing that these events would be threatening to the regime and could trigger a mass killing episode in an effort to quell resistance. Because our model uses all of these variables to forecast the risk of a mass killing, countries with similar risks of coup or civil war, like Mali and Sudan, are ranked differently because Sudan has previously experienced a state-led mass killing, a factor strongly correlated with future risk of mass killings.
Second, let’s consider the opinion pool’s reasoning. Our experts might be considering Chad’s neighborhood, where Nigeria, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Libya are all suffering various degrees of instability or violent conflict. One commenter in our opinion pool cited a recent UN report, which suggests that the conflict across the border in CAR could spark a religious war within Chad. One theory on the causes of mass killing emphasizes the insecurity political leaders feel in the face of insurgencies or coup attempts as an impetus to commit mass atrocities in an attempt to stamp out the apparent threat to their power.
I asked two Chad analysts for their thoughts on Chad’s autocratic president, Idriss Deby, and how he might respond to these developments. One analyst said that any threat of a coup—Chad has had several—would come from within Deby’s inner circle, decreasing the risk of Deby seeing another ethnic group as a threat and attempting to eliminate them. To this end, Deby has muted the threat of a “palace coup” by placing members of his family and tribe in key positions within his regime. Deby has also reduced the threat that regional instability might pose in two ways. First, he has formed advantageous alliances with Sudan to the east, repairing previously tense relations not only with Khartoum but also with Janjaweed militia along the border. This strategy led to a formal agreement with Khartoum, providing for extensive patrolling of the border and allowing Chad to pursue hostile combatants into Sudan as necessary. Second, while Chad is deeply concerned about terrorism across its borders, it has used this threat and its response to it to boost its own credibility, further strengthening the Deby regime.
All of which to say what could increase the risk of a mass killing episode in Chad, and which is most likely? For example, an increase in minority repression or rhetoric in favor of elite superiority could impact the model, yet both analysts I spoke to saw this as unlikely even in the context of the influx of refugees across several borders. The one potential issue is to the East where Khartoum has recently been contending with protests in its capital. Should Bashir be overthrown, tribal balances in the region could be upset, with Deby facing increased instability around his own power. So regional instability on the whole might not affect Chad, but disruptions to carefully formed alliances might. Considering Sudan’s own record, and current risk, of state-led mass killing, this alliance structure will be key to watch.