MuseumDESCRIPTION:
ENOUGH! Co-Chair John Prendergast returns to the program to provide an update on the situation in Darfur.
TRANSCRIPT:
JERRY FOWLER: My guest today is John Prendergast, the Co-Chair of the ENOUGH Project and formerly Senior Advisor to the International Crisis Group, and of course, a previous guest on Voices on Genocide Prevention. John, welcome to the program.
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Thank you, Jerry.
JERRY FOWLER: Well, John, we wanted to get an update on Darfur. And I know many times when you talk about Darfur and other similar situations, you focus in on what you call the three “P’s;” peace, protection and punishment. So let’s start with peace. Recently, there were peace talks that were convened in Sirte, Libya. And they didn’t go very well, did they?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Well, they sure intended to have a great, grand, sort of, collection of all of the people who matter to bring peace to Darfur in one room. And I think that the objective was, simply, a bridge too far at this juncture. The rebels are-- there’s too many divisions within the rebellion to have believed that all of them would show up at once in the same place, particularly in a place where many of them have great suspicion about, which is Gaddafi’s Libya. And so unfortunately, only a few of the rebels showed up, and so they’ve had to postpone the real beginning of the peace process, of the peace talks, and continue to go around and undertake efforts to try to unite some of the groups and prepare them, I guess, for actual negotiations.
JERRY FOWLER: Now, when you talk about continuing the effort to unite the groups, expand on that a little bit. Who, exactly, is doing that and what’s their strategy for making it happen?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Yeah, I think, there was a, kind of, superficial effort for a while by the United Nations and the African Union that hoped that if they just said, “Well, can you guys-- isn’t it in your interest to get it together? For you all to unite, even, at least, on paper, with respect to the positions you would hold at the negotiating table, and come on the basis of that?” And that just didn’t work. So now, the government of Southern Sudan – which is the regional government created by the peace deal between the North and South of Sudan in 2005; there’s a regionally autonomous government in Southern Sudan – they have brokered some substantial talks between a number of the factions of Darfur. And they’ve come forth with some, I think, the beginnings of some progress on harmony on the issues. Not all the groups are there. There’s still a number of holdouts. But I think this represents a bloc of rebels that is significant enough to be encouraged about. So there’s really, at this juncture, about four main rebel blocks. And I think that one of the largest now is the one that’s in Juba negotiating about the future of the peace talks. So it takes awhile. I mean, this is a point of fragmentation within Darfur that is at its height. And you see this in civil wars in places all over the world, where the rebellion becomes so fragmented for a while that there can be no coherent negotiations. But there’s always a bottoming out and then, a bouncing up. So I think we’ve seen the bottom. We’ve hit the bottom, with respect to the divisions within the rebels. And it got all of them nowhere. You know, hang together or we’ll all hang separately is the maxim that has held true over the centuries throughout the world. And I think that as each of them, individually, began hanging in their own little fiefdoms, they realized that they needed to have some measure of cooperation and coordination and consolidation. So we’re starting to see the beginnings of that. And I think the process that’s taking place in Juba is really helpful for that.
JERRY FOWLER: I’ve asked this question of various guests from time to time. But you know, you and me and a lot of us have, generally, identified the problem in Darfur as being the government of Sudan, based in Khartoum and its allies. But when you see this fragmentation of rebels, a natural question is: doesn’t that mean that they’re the problem?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Yeah, they’re part of the problem. You know, there’s-- I mean, you’re talking about the underlying, kind of, foundation of the problem is that we’re talking about a dictatorship. We’re talking about authoritarian governance, in which a government that hoards power and doesn’t share it, that takes all the wealth of the country and puts it in their own bank accounts and buys arms with it. So that’s the real problem. Then, there are manifestations. There are symptoms. And one of the symptoms is this conflict in Darfur, as the non-Arab Darfurians took up arms against the government. Then, the government chose to conduct a genocide as a way to destroy the rebellion. So you have to address the after-effects of the genocide, which is partly a division within Darfurian society that has never been seen before. And the division within the rebellion is symptomatic of a division within Darfur as a result of the divide and destroy policy of the government. So it’s a question of a continuum of causes that begins with authoritarian non-participatory governance and is exacerbated by war tactics on the part of the government in Sudan that ends up dividing people. And so when the rebels are on the receiving end of all this divide and they’ve become, in many ways, at the local level, one of the main instigators of violence or instability or criminality. Then, yes, they have joined the ranks, officially, as part of the problem. But it’s important to understand the causality and that, in fact, at the end of the day, what have we got to change? What has to be addressed in order for this ship to be righted? We’re going to have to get to the bottom line, which is that the way that the country of Sudan is governed has to change.
JERRY FOWLER: And do you think that the way it’s governed can be changed without, basically, changing the government, I mean, getting rid of this regime?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Well, you know, when people take up arms in the south, then, in the east and the west in Darfur, their objective is to change the government. They haven’t succeeded. They haven’t come close to succeeding, because this government is very, very strong. And the international community doesn’t have the will to try to undertake some kind of regime change strategy, so that’s out. So what we’re left with is the strategy that focuses on two things. One is the agreements that can be reached with the various rebel groups, the peace agreements that can be reached, which would increase the representation of those that have previously been outside of the system, putting them into the inner circles of power and wealth in the country. So you have a more representative government over time, as a result of the peace deals. And the second strategy, of course, is through democratic processes, democratic elections, democratic institutions that ultimately will allow the people of Sudan to choose their leaders. And we have an election scheduled for Sudan in 2009, for national elections. So we’ll see if the government allows a free and fair election to occur. One assumes that they won’t, but with international pressure you can get more space given to the political parties and others. So those are the two ways that in the absence of a viable military strategy to change the government, the long-term is to build for a peaceful transition to a more stable country, through elections and through peace processes.
JERRY FOWLER: So before we leave this first “P,” what should we look for in the coming months as signs of progress or, contrariwise, signs of deterioration?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: I think we have to see a more visible African Union and United Nations mediation effort. And left to their own devices, I don’t think the U.N. and the African Union will be able to pull this off. It is imperative that the United States with its new special envoy, the Chinese with their special envoy, the European Union with their equities and interests, and the African Union together, these guys all together, start working in unison towards pressing the parties to the table and to start to work towards a peace deal. You know, we have a successful model for Sudan peace processes. And the model is Sudan. Because, you know, just a few years ago in southern Sudan, and a far deadlier war than Darfur was ended, because the United States and the Brits and the other European countries joined hands with the Africans. In putting together a very credible peace process with lots of leverage behind it that brought the parties to the table, North and South, and got a deal. It took a while, but it worked. And that was because of external involvement. And so I think we need to see the same thing, a few different parties, now. We have France and China and the U.S. and others that have the most leverage. And they ought to be the ones that step up now and take the reins and really work towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Darfur.
JERRY FOWLER: One of the elements of the negotiation between the North and the South that seem to me to be important was a strong mediator – in that case, the Kenyans and a Kenyan general, in particular. First, how important was a strong mediator, and secondly, who’s going to serve that function in the Darfur context?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Well, you have two co-mediators now from the United Nations and the African Union, Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim. Together, I mean, certainly have the same, if not more, credibility than the Kenyan special envoy did for the North/South deal, Lazaro Sembeywo. But they don’t have any backing. You know, I do believe that there really is a question of to what extent the African Union and the U.N. itself can move the parties. And the answer is not much. They need the leverage provided by those outside countries that actually have influence. And there are no other countries than China and the United States that have more leverage than those two. So we need the Chinese and the U.S. to start working together on the question of this peace process in Sudan, to bring that leverage. And they ought to work with some of the key countries, like Saudi Arabia and the British and the French, and some of the regional actors, the immediate neighbors that have some influence, as well. And that’s the way peace processes are brought to successful conclusions, is when you have full time presence, which the United States doesn’t have right now, working assiduously to get all of the pieces of the puzzle placed in the right places on the board. And we don’t really have anybody doing that right now. And the United Nations and African Union haven’t succeeded in doing that themselves, again, with the lack of leverage and strategic vision that the United States usually brings to the table. So people are looking – whether they say it or not – they’re looking for U.S. leadership. And you can lead from behind. You don’t have to be issuing press releases every day. You don’t have to sit in the gavel or the throne. You know, we can lead in many different ways. And I think the U.S. has to step up and take that leadership role, because it’s floundering right now without us.
JERRY FOWLER: And we should say in terms of the U.S. role that just this week, the U.S. swore in a new special envoy. Ambassador Richard Williamson, who has close connections to the White House, has represented the United States at the United Nations before and in other venues. Is that a good step forward?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: I think it’s a great step forward. I think Ambassador Williamson is a very focused, very dedicated human being who wants to make a difference, who knows that he has, you know, 12 months to do something here, before the administration concludes its work. And he’s going to spend, I think, every day of those next 12 months working to the best of his abilities to do so. What he needs, and what I think all of us activists and people care about Sudan, need to help get him as a full time staff, is a group of people, diplomats, in the field who will be working these issues full time. Because the United States can’t do this part time. We can’t do it on the cheap. We’ve talked about the U.S. conducting drive-by diplomacy, where we don’t really spend the kind of time on the ground. And everybody senses that now, and nobody takes this that seriously, because they know we’ll be gone the next day. We need to be there, and we need to stay there. And Ambassador Williamson needs the kind of support that full time diplomats can give him on the ground.
JERRY FOWLER: Okay. Let’s turn to the second “P” that you always talk about, which is protection. And along those lines, the African Union Mission in Sudan, called AMIS, was supposed to transition at the beginning of the year to a new so-called hybrid U.N. African Mission, which goes by the somewhat strange acronym of UNAMID. What happened with that?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Yeah, well, the date came, and the authority was transferred from the African Union to the United Nations. But the requisite massive increase in troops and logistical support and equipment and back up, all that stuff is not coming, has not been forthcoming, yet. We still have some very critical obstacles to circumvent and overcome, before this force can really get off the ground in a way that will distinguish it from its predecessor. First and foremost, the government of Sudan continues to place obstacles on the deployment in a number of different ways. Says yes, verbally, and then, as the many governments have noted, it says no in its actions. And so there’s that, which was just a question of political will that there has to be a cost, you know, associated with obstruction. And we haven’t imposed that cost, yet. So that’s one I think is remediable, but it has to be-- it will only be remedied if the Security Council, in particular, takes action against anyone obstructing the mission. But the rebels, of course, also are a problem. They’re making things difficult and unstable in certain areas. And then, finally, the donor nations themselves having supported rhetorically this deployment of the United Nations and African Union troops; they have not come through with the requisite logistical support. Particularly, everyone knows now the air support has been lacking. And in a place like the Sahara Desert, you need to have air mobility. And without those helicopters, and 24 to be exact, then, it’s just putting more men, which doesn’t incrementally add anything to the mission. So in the meantime, until there’s more troops on the ground, we’re not going to have much of a difference. And until we have air support, no difference, either.
JERRY FOWLER: Now, let me focus in on that in particular, the air support. And you used the number 24 helicopters. How hard is it to find 24 helicopters in the world?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Yeah, well, you know, I think it has to do with some things that people don’t talk about. I think, for a lot of countries, they don’t want to risk the personnel. Helicopters get shot down. You’ve got to explain to your families why this happened, why their kids were killed in the middle of the desert. And a lot of people just-- a lot of governments aren’t willing to do that right now. And secondly, it’s expensive. And the United Nations covers only a certain amount of the deployment costs for helicopters that are provided to these missions. And so the big problem for some countries that don’t have the means is can we afford to lend these helicopters to the mission and then, have to pay all these maintenance costs and stuff, which can be millions of dollars. So I think those are the two main reasons I think people aren’t-- or the governments are not being forthcoming until they’re addressed. I mean, you really can’t address the first one. But certainly, the cost issue can be addressed until that happens. And I think we’re going to be at a crossroads, at a standstill here.
JERRY FOWLER: And what role should the U.S. be playing, with regard to, both, the helicopters in particular and the issue of donors coming through more generally?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Well, I think, on the helicopters, you know, I think that the U.S. and the Europeans can go to the countries that they provide helicopters to and work out deals with them, where we could help pay the cost of deploying those helicopters. And the Europeans could do so for their business partners for these things and their recipients of these, and do it that way. I mean, there are many ways to skin a cat. We don’t necessarily-- the U.S. doesn’t necessarily have to provide helicopters themselves. Many people worry that that would be a lightning rod for terrorist groups to come to-- or extremist groups to use the U.S. direct involvement as an organizing tool or as a means to take a shot at the mission. So I think there would be a desire not to have that element in it, the U.S. in it. But I think the U.S. can help pay for it and get countries that we have military relationships with to provide the helicopters, if we help fund it.
JERRY FOWLER: So we’re running short of time. Let’s just jump to the final “P” that you talk about, punishment. Is there anything to report in that area?
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Well, I think that key one gives traction and leverage to the first two, to peace and protection. Unless there is a consequence for obstructing UNAMID deployment, unless there’s a cost for undermining peace efforts, then, it would be irrational for the Khartoum government or the rebels to not continue to be difficult. And so I think that the time has come. There’s no question in my mind that the time has come for the Security Council to take a stand, finally, and say-- and to impose, specific sanctions, targeted sanctions, against anyone who obstructs the deployment of the U.N. force and anyone who undermines the peace efforts at this point. And, you know, we’re talking about asset freezes and travel bans. We’re not talking about, you know, massive military invasion. It will be hard sledding, hard to negotiate that in the Security Council. Of course, the Chinese and Russians will be against it. But I don’t think they’ll veto. I think that they will ultimately stand down and, you know, we’ll get a strong resolution against certain officials who have been most conspicuously obstructing this process of getting troops to help the people. So I think that third “P,” the punishment, creating a penalty for obstructing peace and protection, is really the key right now to progress.
JERRY FOWLER: John Prendergast is the co-chair of the ENOUGH Project, and formerly Senior Advisor to the International Crisis Group. John, as always, it’s good to talk to you.
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Thank you so much, Jerry.
JERRY FOWLER: Thank you
JOHN PRENDERGAST: Take care.
NARRATOR: You have been listening to Voices on Genocide Prevention, from United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. To learn more about preventing genocide, join us online at www.ushmm.org/conscience. There you’ll also find the Voices on Genocide Prevention weblog.
