JERRY FOWLER: The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., is our nation’s memorial to the victims of the Holocaust, and we seek to honor the memory of those who suffered in the Holocaust by acting against genocide and threats of genocide today. Hi. I’m Jerry Fowler from the Holocaust Museum’s Committee on Conscience. For over two years we at the Committee on Conscience have been confronting the crisis in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Yet hundreds of thousands of civilians have perished, millions have been driven from their homes, and as I speak to you today, lives are hanging in the balance. We need to do more. When we teach about the Holocaust, one thing that we emphasize is that just because something happened doesn’t mean that it was inevitable. The Holocaust was not inevitable. It was the product of choices made by many people, including bystanders. Likewise, what will happen in Darfur after today is not inevitable. It will be the product of choices that are still being made. Choices that are being made on the ground in Darfur itself and in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum, but also choices that are being made here in Washington, D.C., and in capitals around the world. And those choices are influenced in turn by choices that we as citizens make of whether to speak out or to remain silent. Many citizens will be gathering here in Washington on April 30 on the National Mall, in San Francisco at the Golden Gate Bridge, and in cities around the nation to raise their voices on Darfur. To help inform your choice, the Holocaust Museum is pleased to present today’s discussion, “What will it take to end the genocide in Darfur?”

JAMES ROSEN: Good evening and welcome to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., and to this special live Internet event. I’m James Rosen, Washington correspondent for Fox News, and your moderator this evening, but you too have a role to play. You can offer your own questions about the crisis in Darfur by visiting www.ushmm.org/stop-genocide. Now some 20 months have passed since then Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the Sudanese government and its Arab militia allies known as the Janjaweed were engaged in an active program of genocide against non-Arab populations in that region. In the past two years some 300,000 people have been killed, another 2 million displaced, yet the crisis continues and by most accounts has actually worsened in recent months. So, what will it take to end the atrocities in Darfur? For insight and answers tonight we’re joined by a distinguished panel. [3:33] Ambassador Michael Ranneberger is senior representative for Sudan at the State Department. He has been instrumental in crafting and executing day-to-day policy on Sudan at the State Department for the past two years. Dr. Mudawi Ibrahim Adam is a Sudanese human rights activist and the head of SUDO, the Sudan Development Organization, which operates a peace building and reconciliation project in Darfur. He has also been jailed numerous times by the Sudanese authorities, and on the brighter side recently enjoyed an audience with President Bush. Jon Sawyer is an award-winning journalist who directs the Pulitzer Center for Crisis Reporting. He recently traveled through Darfur with the African Union Monitoring Force, and has produced a documentary chronicling his trip. At various points in our program we will screen portions of that documentary. And last but not least we have Samantha Power, who has been to Darfur and reported extensively on the conflict. Her book, A Problem from Hell: America in an Age of Genocide, was the winner of the 2002 Pulitzer Prize. She is a lecturer at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and presently serves as Foreign Policy Fellow in the Office of Senator Barack Obama, Democrat of Illinois. First, for an overview of the situation in Darfur and a look at the roots of the crisis, we turn to an excerpt from Jon Sawyer’s documentary: “Look closely and you notice something eerie and sad. That in village after village there are no people. Many of these remote hamlets have been burned, or abandoned. Mute testament to a willful bloodletting that has taken the lives of over 200,000 Sudanese, and driven 10 times that number from their homes. In 2003, when the long marginalized region of Darfur erupted in rebellion, it appeared at first as merely a sideshow. Negotiations were then nearing completion on a settlement to end the equally brutal war that the country’s Arab-Muslim rulers had waged for two decades on non-Muslim African tribes in Southern Sudan. American and UN officials gambled that pressing ahead with the North-South accord would resolve the Darfur issue too. They were wrong. Khartoum responded to the Darfur rebellion by unleashing a paramilitary force of Arab tribes known as Janjaweed. Their mandate: to burn the villages of the region’s African tribes, also Muslim. To kill the men, rape the women, steal the cattle, abduct the children. Some say Janjaweed attacks are closely coordinated with Khartoum, others that Khartoum has long since lost control. Either way, the result is the same. Disaster for the people of Darfur.” The latest wire reports today reflect the spread of this crisis across the border into neighboring Chad, with threats by that country’s government to forcibly expel the estimated 200,000 Sudanese refugees who have fled there. That raises the question of responsibility that nations besides Sudan, neighbors or otherwise, bear in this situation, and it’s natural enough that people around the world might look to the United States, the world’s only remaining superpower, for action. I wonder, however, at the outset here, if there’s anybody on this panel who would quarrel with the proposition that it is not the United States or any other large power that’s observing the situation, whether from near or afar, that has chief culpability for these atrocities and crimes, but actually the perpetrators on the ground. Is there anyone who would quarrel with that proposition. Samantha or anybody? Okay. So now that we have defined that the United States does not bear chief responsibility for these crimes, Ambassador Ranneberger, if I could start with you first, in a word, and by a word I mean yes or no, is it the policy of the United States government that genocide is still occurring in Darfur as we speak?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Yes, it is.

JAMES ROSEN: Alright. What should the role of a superpower, of this superpower, be in such a crisis, and what grade, honestly, would you give the Bush administration right now?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well, you know, the Genocide Convention, which was passed after the Holocaust, as you know, does call member states to take action in the UN Security Council. And what I would say about the United States’ response is that as soon as this became evident as a major crisis we took the lead in mobilizing international effort to exert pressure on Khartoum, to get African Union forces into Darfur to try to stop the violence with responsibility to help protect civilians, and to get a viable peace process started to resolve the conflict politically as well.

JAMES ROSEN: And we have a peace agreement that’s been in place since January of 2005 between the North and the South, but that has not necessarily stopped the killings. Samantha Power, you’ve written a book about America’s responses or failure to respond to genocides over the course of the twentieth century. How would you rate the United States’ response so far to this genocide?

SAMANTHA POWER: Well I think American citizens, students, church groups, Islamic groups, human rights organizations, have learned a really important lesson from the twentieth century which is that you’ve got to put sustained political pressure on the U.S. government in order to get the focus to remain on a genocidal state. Sudan really has suffered I think, or Darfur has suffered, from lately a sense that it is a chronic problem rather than that it’s a rapidly deteriorating situation. There’s the sense of, well, they burned all those villages, like Jon showed in his film, but that was a while ago and now there are a couple million people in camps, and aren’t we feeding them. So I think part of the thing that’s really challenging for the U.S. government is (a) it’s not going to be the country that’s putting its troops on the ground, nor should it be, I think jihadis would likely follow an American troop presence (b) it’s obviously very distracted with Iraq and other things at present and (c) it’s been able I think to sort of tell itself that by basically doing diplomacy, by sending Deputy Secretary Zellick to the region

JAMES ROSEN: A number of times

SAMANTHA POWER: and frankly by comparing its performance to that of any other country on the earth, it’s doing pretty well. But it’s not doing well in terms of actually talking about what civilians need and that’s where we really need to ratchet up the sense of urgency within the administration.

JAMES ROSEN: Mudawi, very quickly, you of course have had your life on the line in this situation. You’ve been sent to jail three times I think in just a space of a year or so. Do you think the United States should be doing more than it is?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I think it should be doing more than it is doing, in the right direction, because I think we have to learn from the experience of the CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement], that you have been pressurizing the Sudanese government and the rebels to get to an agreement, and this agreement have not been owned by the people in, neither in the North nor the South. I think the U.S., or any international community, they need to have the involvement of nationals who exactly know what the need is. And you need to involve people at the grassroots level. I don’t think the international community by themselves they can bring any solution for the country’s problems.

JAMES ROSEN: What about Arab countries, what about the Europeans? Are they doing enough? Should they be doing more? Are they more negligent than the United States has been?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I don’t think the Arab countries are doing anything, because the Arab countries are siding with the Khartoum government and they are always taking this official line. But for me neither the Arabs nor the Africans can do anything more than implore the Sudanese people to get in ... to own the process of making peace or bringing peace to the country.

JAMES ROSEN: Let’s take this moment to move to another subject. [Jon Sawyer’s documentary]: “In 2004, a decade after the genocide in Rwanda, the international community vowed that it would not happen again. Five thousand African Union soldiers were dispatched to Darfur, plus another two thousand police and observers. The force proved too small, too poorly trained and equipped, with too weak a mandate to enforce a ceasefire between Sudan’s government and fractious rebel forces. A ceasefire all sides had flagrantly violated.” That was more from Jon Sawyer’s film about his experiences covering the African Union monitoring force, 7,000 strong, that has by all accounts manifestly failed to keep the peace. Jon, in your observations of that force up close, what exactly was it that prevented them from succeeding?

JON SAWYER: [12:14] I think they have succeeded, James, in some areas, where they are, I think in some of the camps where they have a presence, in Nyala, in south Darfur, where we watched and observed, went out on firewood protection patrol, where hundreds of women were able to go out and gather firewood without being attacked and incidence of attacks decreased substantially over the three or four months that they’ve been there. The problem is that there are not enough of them and they’re not well enough equipped, there’s no ... the places that we were the African Union officers were relying on their own cell phones to communicate, the helicopters had contract pilots, the people flying them, they didn’t work on weekends so that if there were incidents you couldn’t respond to them. And my sense is that they succeeded where they had sufficient force in place and what I would like to see is to have more support go in immediately to take advantage -- not to say that they’re a failure but to use them, because they are there, that’s it, they’re limited, but they’re all we have right now and they’re on the ground.

JAMES ROSEN: Michael Ranneberger, is it the view of the U.S. government that whatever other international forces might be sent into the region, and we’ll get to that in some depth later in this program, that the African Union force should stay or that it should be relieved of its duties?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well, we’ve said that there needs to be a transition to a UN peacekeeping force. But the first thing I would say is that the African -- I’ve been to Darfur about eight times and I’ve visited many of these camps -- the African Union force has had a major impact in stopping what I would call the large-scale organized violence. By which I mean the systematic burning of villages, and it’s not because as some say all the villages have been burned. I’ve flown over Darfur, there are thousands of villages. It’s because their presence has had a deterrent impact. Now, has it been perfect? Absolutely not. There’s still a tremendous amount of violence occurring. But that violence is more complex.

JAMES ROSEN: How so?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well you’ve got groups of Janjaweed militias clearly, but you also have a lot of rebel activity, more than there was frankly previously. You’ve also got bandit groups, you’ve got sort of undisciplined government militaries. So it’s a very complex situation, and frankly, the African Union assets are stretched in trying to deal with that, so one of our objectives is in fact to intensify support for the African Union mission, try and strengthen it so it can deal with the situation until the UN can get on the ground.

JAMES ROSEN: Has the United States supplied money or logistics to the African Union peacekeeping force?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: [14:36] We’ve so far supplied about 220 million dollars in assistance, we’ve got another 123 million dollar request on the Hill in a supplemental that’s pending.

JAMES ROSEN: And what country is next behind the United States in terms of support and funding for that AU force?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: The European Union has provided about as much funding as we have to it, so together we are the principal supporters.

JAMES ROSEN: [14:57] Alright, let’s take a question from our Internet audience right now. This question is from Holly and she wants to know “to what extent has U.S. involvement in Iraq interfered with U.S. policy regarding Darfur and how can the U.S. balance its commitment to Iraq with working to stop genocide in Darfur?” She says “I think that the United States and the rest of the world have a responsibility to do something.” Samantha Power, do you think Iraq is -- you mentioned this a little bit before -- how much is Iraq crowding out our ability to act decisively in Darfur?

SAMANTHA POWER: I think it’s had a profound impact on our foreign policy everywhere around the world. When there was an opportunity about a month ago it looked like for the African Union to hand off to the UN peacekeeping force, the Sudanese government basically went door to door with a number of countries and said, almost like a PR agent, you know, if you like Iraq, you’ll love Darfur. I mean in essence this is the quagmire that awaits you and so it’s raised the specter, I mean countries don’t generally want to go and offer protection in the face of genocide, it’s not something states like doing, and it’s not something their citizens reward them for doing, so when you can create yet another disincentive I think that really hurts, and also people have around the world I think quite unfairly actually, have heard the U.S. government’s claims about genocide in Sudan as just part of an anti-Islamic, you know, larger agenda about..

JAMES ROSEN: A crusade, if you will,

SAMANTHA POWER: a crusade about sort of whacking Arab governments or Islamic governments and so its diplomacy I think has been greeted with a certain skepticism and its claim to moral legitimacy and you know to be upholding international laws is obviously greatly weakened by the decisions it made in the run up to the war to Iraq. So it’s been a real problem, but again if there were a community of countries other than the United States who were really concerned you would probably see some of that melting away and the kind of domestic movement we have in this country pressuring the U.S. government to do more, which I think has paid dividends, isn’t actually evident in the rest of the world.

JAMES ROSEN: Alright. Time for us to turn once again to another subject. With the government in Khartoum directly implicated in genocide its delivery of basic services naturally leaves much to be desired. This makes the role played by the United Nations, aid workers, and humanitarian organizations, all the more critical. The U.S. and other countries have pushed for a blue helmet U.N. peacekeeping force as we’ve been discussing to replace the beleaguered African Union force. Sudan is balking at that. Once again let’s take a look at Jon Sawyer’s documentary chronicling his recent visit to the scene [17:30]: “Now the United States is pressing for the United Nations to take over the AU mission with more troops and a stronger mandate to protect the civilian victims of Darfur. Sudan’s government is balking, stoking public fears of an Iraq-style foreign intervention. Calls for further UN sanctions against Sudan, meanwhile, are stymied by the opposition of countries like China, the major purchaser of Sudan’s newfound oil.” Mudawi, when we see scenes like that, is that just a reflection of the power of the government in Khartoum to stage-manage public opinion and make it look like the public is up in arms against any UN force coming in? Or is there a real opposition in Sudan to the presence of white foreigners essentially?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: One thing we have to understand about the Sudanese people: we don’t have anti-foreign sentiments. These are rallies which have been mobilized by the government. Sudanese people, in the history, we are the only nation which paid a farewell party to our colonizers. We have been colonized by 462 British. We don’t have anti-foreign sentiments. You have all these people coming from western Africa, living in Sudan, coming from Ethiopia, coming from Eritrea, you have the Coptics for example, we don’t have any, you know, this kind of anti-foreign sentiment.

JON SAWYER: But Mudawi when the British were there in the nineteenth century, and the Mahdi rose out of Darfur and he came to power and threw out the British, there may not have been an anti-foreign sentiment but when there was an army perceived as an army of occupation, people rose up, and I certainly agree that the government has done everything it could to create these demonstrations and they’re trying to stoke anti-foreign sentiment, but if there is an army that is perceived as a western, particularly if it’s an American army that came in, I think you’d see something similar to what you saw in Iraq. When I was in Iraq just before the war there was a sense that we would be perceived as the Vice President said as liberators, and we were for a few weeks, and then it quickly changed, and that would happen anywhere that you had a large-scale foreign presence on the ground.

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I think the Mahdists had a revolt against an Islamic country. It was against the Turkish. It wasn’t against the British. The British came afterwards. But I think for me the problem is not troops, you don’t need troops in Sudan, you need people to be engaged in a dialogue If you have the African Union force with only 7,000 -- when they came and they stabilized the situation there were very few, there were less than 3,000 people, they came and they stabilized the situation where there was a negotiated, you know, ceasefire. There was a hope that there is a solution.

JAMES ROSEN: Now Mudawi has talked, Michael, about troops being able to accomplish only so much and what you need is people on the grassroots level if you will or on the ground. You, however, or the Bush administration I should say, are pushing for a UN peacekeeping force here that would be 12,000-20,000 men strong. What do we imagine that a UN force could accomplish by way of stopping the violence that’s taking place, whether it’s complex or organized or disorganized or what have you, it’s there and it’s happening. What do we imagine that a UN force could accomplish that the African Union couldn’t?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well as I indicated earlier the African Union has in effect sort of reached the limit of its capabilities in dealing with this very complex situation. If you get a UN peacekeeping force in there it will have more technical capabilities, it’ll be a larger force, it’ll be a better equipped force. Now the African Union forces however would form the nucleus of that force, there would also be additional troop contributing countries. The way I would put it is this. You need an international peacekeeping force, now the African Union, soon to be the United Nations peacekeeping operation, to stabilize the situation and stop the killing. The long-term solution to this, the only real viable solution, is a political settlement, and that’s why we’ve been a very strong supporter of the Abuja peace talks. And it has been the United States in fact -- and I’ve been watching this issue, I’ve been dealing with Sudan now for four years -- that has mobilized really a very broad international coalition, including the European Union and virtually every state on the African continent, to press Khartoum and to support these international peacekeeping forces.

JAMES ROSEN: Alright, let’s go to our Internet audience once again with a question from Laura who asks, “Realistically, how long will it take for the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force?” and she also asks about NATO. We’re going to come back to NATO. Michael once again do you have any, very quickly, any ideas on how long it’ll be before we actually see one, obviously the Sudanese government has something to say about this.

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Right. Again, there are two parts here. One is to strengthen the existing African Union force and that can be done immediately, we’re already taking some steps to do that. In terms of deployment of a UN force [22:46] realistically, these things do take time. If a UN Security Council resolution was approved tomorrow, it would most likely be six to nine months before a UN force was on the ground.

JON SAWYER: The other point there, James, worth noting, is that the United Nations is already in Southern Sudan, there’s a UN mission in Sudan, it’s already been approved, there isn’t any of this dispute that we have on the mission in Darfur.

JAMES ROSEN: And how’s it doing?

JON SAWYER: Well it’s only about , Ambassador Ranneberger knows the number better than I, but it’s only about seventy percent there

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Right

JON SAWYER: and it’s taken much longer to get it up to speed and they’re not really doing all that they could even though there’s not the dispute about what role they should play. So you have to keep that in mind, that if you put all of your hopes on the United Nations coming in then you may be not only kicking the ball down the road, but not having what you’d like to get at the end as opposed to what you can do right now.

JAMES ROSEN: Now there is another element to this and President Bush has talked about the need for NATO involvement, what he calls “stewardship” of any prospective UN peacekeeping mission. On March 29 of this year Mr. Bush welcomed President Obasanjo of Nigeria to the White House and in a session with reporters in the Oval Office offered his broad prescription for this crisis. [Oval Office video] President Bush: “President and I talked about Darfur and the Sudan, and I made it very clear to him that we’re deeply concerned about the humiliation, the rape, and murder that’s taking place against the citizens of Darfur. He agrees, and I want to thank you for your compassion. We talked and strategized about how to move forward, how to make it clear to the Sudanese government that there will be an international response, and working toward a peace. We talked about a dual track, that the rebels must come together and negotiate with the government, and at the same time we talked about bolstering the AU peacekeeping force, with a blue helmeted force, and I explained to him my desire to have a NATO overlay to make sure that force is robust.” Jon Sawyer, you’ve been to this region extensively, you’ve just heard the President’s comments. Does this strike you as NATO in a post-Cold War era foraging for something to do or do you think that NATO could play a real viable role here?

JON SAWYER: [25:06] I would love to see NATO do something here. A couple of years ago I spent a month in Afghanistan and at that time we were waiting for NATO to come into Afghanistan, and it took NATO about I think a year and a half longer than anybody thought when it was first discussed they would come in and help with the effort in Afghanistan -- this gets back to what Samantha was talking about earlier,that other countries have been, whatever you say about the United States’ response, other countries have been much more loathe to commit people and resources. I remember in Afghanistan you couldn’t get the Dutch to commit even half a a dozen helicopters. They just couldn’t come up with the money for it, and so then I fear that if we put our hopes on NATO, as with the United Nations, that we may be disappointed. And that ultimately, if we want to do something, you see this wonderful concern all across this country and the civic involvement in this issue, you really have to put your focus on Washington, on this administration that the Ambassador represents, and on Congress to act in Darfur and I think it’s possible to do it in ways without committing ourselves militarily but making resources available and getting them on the ground.

JAMES ROSEN: Michael, I imagine you have something you want to say in response to that.

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Yes, what I was going to say, I think it’s important [26:21] to understand how we see the NATO role being played. What we’ve said is, the objective here is obviously to strengthen the AU forces on the ground, and then to facilitate a smooth transition. Where we see the role of NATO is a very limited engagement to provide technical, logistical, and advisory support. So, limited footprint on the ground, but something that could help expedite the strengthening of AMIS [African Union Monitoring Mission in Sudan] and then facilitate this transition to a UN force.

JAMES ROSEN: Mudawi?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I don’t think troops are going to solve the problem.

JAMES ROSEN: What do we need?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: We need people to engage on, because [26:56] if you put the people to be part of the solution, then they will be committed to have solution.

JAMES ROSEN: So you’re talking about the peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. Correct?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: No

JAMES ROSEN: Where should that dialogue take place then?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: In Darfur, between the people who are part of the conflict.

JAMES ROSEN: Realistically can we get people to talk and engage in dialogue when there’s this kind of killing going on?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Yes, they have to, because you have to stop the killing [27:21]. You don’t need that kind of forces in Sudan, that’s this country where you have 70 people who have been keeping peace in the Nuba Mountains since 2002, without guns. You have the monitoring CPMT, this Civilian Monitoring and Protection Team which have been monitoring the cessation of hostilities in the South. They are 26.

SAMANTHA POWER: But Mudawi, it also took how many decades to get to that kind of balance of power on the ground where there was a level of exhaustion, a level of...?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: You need to pressurize the Sudanese government.

SAMANTHA POWER: Right.

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Because the Sudanese government is the one who’s brokering the fighting there.

JAMES ROSEN: Samantha, let me ask you something, because we’re taping this at the Holocaust Museum. one of the great debates that still rages about the Holocaust itself was should the Allies, should the United States, have bombed the rail lines leading into Auschwitz? And that leads in subsequent discussions of subsequent genocides to some -- perhaps it’s a misconception, I want you to tell me if it is -- that the United States doesn’t really need to rely on NATO or the United Nations, but the United States personally itself can take action, direct military action, to negate what the government in Khartoum is doing, and what the Janjaweed are doing. Is that true, or is that a complete misconception that for example by aerial power that we could intervene to make a real difference?

SAMANTHA POWER: [28:53] No, I mean that, I think that one has to be very careful. Every intervention, when one is talking about military intervention, is a cost-benefit analysis, and it’s the cost and benefits to the people whose lives that you’re contemplating trying to save, it’s cost-benefit in terms of American lives, it’s cost-benefit to international law, to regional stability, to the rest of Sudan, to the North-South agreement, I mean there are so many elements and sadly this cost-benefit analysis wasn’t done adequately on enough axes with regard to the war in Iraq. Had you done that kind of analysis with regard to Rwanda I think you probably, you would have cut very much in favor of acting, given the risks, given the kind of international consensus you might have been able to muster. But Rwanda happened of course very very quickly. What I find very disturbing in a way about our kind of hum-de-dum discussion and even the President’s very welcome remarks, is the idea that now, we’re suddenly, we’re talking about a bridging force, and we’re talking about a very disciplined short-term engagement, you know, in order to support the African Union, in order to hand off to the United Nations, and we’ve been having this kind of conversation now for going on three years. People are still dying. The conflict has now spread over into Chad. Fine that the engagement has to be limited, but who is going to staff this United Nations protection force? We want to export the hazard, we the United States, we as a sort of group of public intellectuals, you know, yammering on on a Monday night about what should be going on in Darfur, but who is actually going to comprise that force? Ambassador Ranneberger talked about going to the usual suspects, you know, making the African Union the backbone of that force. Well those usual suspects -- the Nepalese, the Bangladeshis, the Indians, the Pakistanis, the Ghanaians, the South Africans, the Senegalese -- these are the kinds of countries we’re talking about asking to come and do this kind of work. Well they’re active already in peacekeeping around the world. There are 75,000 of them doing this kind of humanitarian work. When are the Europeans actually going to step up and stop simply you know taking our security umbrella, not spending any money on policing or on kind of ramping up their own services so they could actually perform these kinds of roles? And Mudawi, while I agree with you totally that we need to create a space for these communities to come back together and that that’s the only long-term solution for this place, if you go into those camps and you talk to those people about what they want, they would love to talk to the Arabs who are attacking eventually, but only when they feel that they’re not going to be attacked when those talks occur, and there is a desperation for outside, for an outside presence, and even sadly for a non-African presence, on a logic that while the Africans can do what they have done, there is a need for, you know, much more mobility and much better training and much greater numbers.

JAMES ROSEN: But aside from logistics and military, you actually think that white men with blue helmets can actually serve as a positive influence here, that they won’t be resentedpurely by virtue of the fact that they’re Europeans?

SAMANTHA POWER: You’ve got to get the diplomacy right, I mean part of what the United States has to be doing in addition denouncing and talking about the need for other countries to go and put their troops in harm’s way, is peeling away Sudan’s allies, and this gets to Mudawi’s point, peeling away the support they’ve been getting from the Chinese, and even from some African governments, peeling away members of the Arab League. You know launching a joint fact finding mission when you bring the Egyptian foreign minister with the Jordanian foreign minister together with Secretary Rice, into the conflict to try to enlist support for a much larger force. I mean all those countries are saying they want peace in Darfur, so using their own words against them, and saying, look, we all have an interest in having a thicker, much more robust force, creating the conditions by which these communities can actually interact, both in Abuja and at a grassroots level.

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I think the presence, the presence in, only in the presence of the humanitarian workers in the camps is enough, is there protection

SAMANTHA POWER: Why are they still being attacked?

JAMES ROSEN: Are the workers protected?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: If you can force the Sudanese government not to

SAMANTHA POWER: not to keep killing, right, and how do you do that, what is the...

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: That is the pressure you have to do

JON SAWYER: Mudawi, I was in a camp, in Dali, in north Darfur near Tawila, and 18,000 people were there in September and it was completely abandoned. The aid workers had left, because it had been attacked, and in that case it was attacked -- sometimes there are attacks by rebel groups -- but in this case they’d been attacked by Janjaweed and by government of Sudan police, and the African Union that was nearby had no arms, they were unable to protect, and so the people all left. The aid workers left as well, that’s happening all across the region.

JAMES ROSEN: Michael... Let’s let the Ambassador speak please.

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: But it’s important to keep in mind that the [33:41] actions that have been taken, and I think at this discussion it conveys the perception that somehow the situation is every bit exactly as bad as it was. The situation has changed. In 2004, there were 100 humanitarian workers on the ground; there are now 14,000. Malnutrition rates have been cut in half. The mortality rate, according to the latest World Health Organization study, is less than international crisis levels. That’s not to say the situation is not horrendous. It is horrendous.

SAMANTHA POWER: You said a genocide is still occurring

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: It is horrendous

SAMANTHA POWER: Is a genocide occurring?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: It is occurring

SAMANTHA POWER: So we should be speaking about

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Here’s what is occurring: killing is going on, rapes are continuing, 3.5 million people are affected by the conflict, and these African tribes are being targeted. Yes it is still genocide. What I’m saying is that the actions that have been taken have not been totally impotent, things have happened, have we just discovered the UN? No. We’ve been talking about this for quite some time. In terms of isolating Khartoum, I think we’ve done a fairly good job of it. Remember, President Bashir was deprived of the African Union presidency, and believe me, that was largely our

JAMES ROSEN: Michael, how much help is Sudan giving the United States in the war on terror and is that playing a role in our policies?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: [34:47] I will tell you the cooperation has been good, but it has

JAMES ROSEN: How so, what are they doing for us?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well, I’m not going to get into details here but

JAMES ROSEN: They’re helping us on the trail of Al Qaeda?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: There’s been, let me just say that there’s been cooperation, but here’s the point of that, I want to tell you I’ve been in some very high level discussions at the very highest levels. There has never been a discussion of a trade-off. In other words, what we have said consistently is, look, we’re going to try to have this cooperation because it’s in our national interest; are we going to lessen pressure, or lessen our efforts on the other issues, on Darfur in particular, absolutely not, even if it were to jeopardize the counterterrorism cooperation. The Sudanese maintain that in their own self interest.

JAMES ROSEN: It’s perhaps worth noting if only for the benefit of the audience here that Osama bin Laden spent about five years in Sudan in the early 1990s. Let’s take another Internet question from our audience on the Web. Kristin asks “Short of the United States being involved militarily in Darfur, are there specific alternative interventions we can do?” She lists cutting off aid to the countries that are supporting the oppressors. “Is there a way to show the world that it is beneficial to them to stop the genocide?” Mudawi? What would you do? You talked about pressure on Khartoum just now; can we work through other governments to pressure Khartoum and how would you recommend we do that?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I think... I might have different views on these issues you know, because for me, pressure for Khartoum government means pressure for Khartoum government. You have to differentiate between pressure on the country making, you know...

JAMES ROSEN: Deals of trades

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Deals of trades, and, or pressures on the individuals. For me, which is working is the individuals. The sanctions on the country has only led the way for countries like China to come in, support, invest, and then allow Khartoum to do whatever.

JAMES ROSEN: So sanctions don’t work, you’re saying.

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: It doesn’t work on the country level; it works on individuals

JAMES ROSEN: It punishes people, not regimes

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: It punishes people, it doesn’t punish the regime, and at the same time it opened the way for countries like China to come in and then support the Sudanese government

JAMES ROSEN: So how should we be putting the pressure on Khartoum that you just mentioned? What’s something practical we can do? How can Mr. Ranneberger pick up the phone ...

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Enforcing a no-fly zone, enforcing a no-fly zone, you can do that, this is one of the resolutions of the, of the

JAMES ROSEN: A no-fly zone like we used to have in Iraq, you’re talking about

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Yes, you can do this. If Khartoum can be you know forced not to fly by military helicopters or by military planes to Darfur, that is, that is

JON SAWYER: But that requires a military presence in Chad or somewhere to do that which would be, since Chad is in the process of falling apart, quite complicated, but there are other things that we can do. You mentioned China, and Hu Jintao, the leader of China, is coming to this city, I believe it’s on Thursday, he’s meeting with the President. I know that we have said we would like China’s help, but the President has an opportunity quite visibly when the two of them are together -- when they have the standard joint press conference -- the President can turn to Hu Jintao and say, now your major supplier of foreign oil is from Sudan, you have been obstructing efforts to put international pressure on the government of Sudan for five years now.

JAMES ROSEN: But Jon, you know very well that Sudan unfortunately is not the only pressing situation in world affairs right now and aren’t we dependent on the Chinese in some cases, for example our diplomacy trying to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon? Aren’t we limited in the extent to which we can say to a single other nation that is as powerful and important a member of the Security Council like China to press them so hard on an issue when you need their help on another one?

JON SAWYER: Yes you have to consider the full array of issues that are before us but I think that if you just engage the world community, if you sort of put it out there in the open, and you’re talking, the two of them together, you’re saying, we have a serious disagreement on Sudan and that you are in effect enabling, you are facilitating the Sudanese government to continue on a path that is highly dangerous to millions of people in part of the country.

JAMES ROSEN: And if he did that, if President Bush did that when the President of China visits, what kind of cooperation could we expect from China at the UN Security Council on an issue of great importance, like Iran?

JON SAWYER: Well I think that in that case too they have to look at their own self interest, as they will in this case, but I think the Chinese are sensitive to not only world opinion but to the opinion of their own country. The people in China itself. Part of it is you’re seizing that opportunity in a non-military way to bring the issue before the broad world public.

JAMES ROSEN: Ambassador Ranneberger, let me ask you one question here. Is there, are there initiatives that the United States could have undertaken either diplomatically or otherwise, that you personally wanted to see us undertake, and that we did not.

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: I tell you, I’m sure I could think of one if you gave me enough time, but we have... I first became involved with this issue in August of 2002, after Jack Danforth had been appointed special envoy. And I’d been working this issue very hard and I tell you it has been a full court press, and we talked about conflicting foreign policy priorities, I will tell you Sudan is one of the top several issues that the administration has been pursuing. And I think one reason, and on the China point it’s an absolutely important point, we have had a very intense discussion with the Chinese and we will with the president when he arrives, on Sudan, and I think one of the reasons we’ve seen the Chinese be somewhat responsive, somewhat responsive -- we’re not there yet -- is because we’ve done such an effective job at mobilizing this multilateral pressure on the Sudanese government.

JAMES ROSEN: Why aren’t they more responsive? You’ve just said they’ve been somewhat responsive, what’s your analysis of why the Chinese aren’t more responsive?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well we haven’t fully tested the proposition; I think when we go to the Security Council for a UN Security Council resolution to endorse peacekeeping, that will probably be the most significant test.

JAMES ROSEN: [40:48] Do you think the Chinese are acting out of economic self interest here?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well I think they’re acting out of economic self interest in terms of their relationship with Khartoum. They do have oil interests there and of course there are natural resource questions, but I think that by the same token, cooperation to end the violence in Darfur is something that’s in their national interest. They want to be seen as a responsible global partner, and we’ve made this a significant issue in the senior level dialogue with the Deputy Secretary

JAMES ROSEN: Very quickly...

JON SAWYER: The Ambassador’s mentioned Jack Danforth’s role, and that’s how I got first involved in Sudan as well, because he represented Missouri and I was working for the St. Louis Post Dispatch at the time. And that’s one thing we’re not doing quite the same way now. I think one reason I was able to go back to Sudan and get in with the African Union was because both sides -- the Sudan government as well as the southerners who came into the Government of National Unity -- they had so much respect for Jack Danforth and Danforth spent two or three years essentially knocking heads there, and just working at it, very pragmatic, and I think we’ve kind of gone off in a different direction since we’re putting pressure on the United Nations, and we’re talking about NATO, we’re talking about things on the outside, and we don’t have somebody of Danforth’s stature who is out there day in and day out.

JAMES ROSEN: We have a powerful forum right here, is there anybody whose name you’d like to place into nomination to replace him?

JON SAWYER: Danforth himself, he could come back. People have talked about Colin Powell. I’m not so sure, it has to be someone who has a lot of visibility.

JAMES ROSEN: Who are some of the names that have been mentioned besides Powell? Anybody else that comes to mind?

SAMANTHA POWER: Clinton

JAMES ROSEN: Bill Clinton

SAMANTHA POWER: I mean, he, to this day, there’s not a single member of his administration that he apparently interacts with without saying, “How did we allow the Rwanda genocide? How did it, I still don’t get it, how did we let that happen? Just doesn’t make any sense.” He can’t wrap his mind around it. But instead of having that conversation, obviously it would be politically very difficult for President Bush to enlist him, but Kofi Annan in his final term could potentially enlist him as a UN envoy, as he did for the tsunami relief. I mean he is somebody who has got a vested self interest and a true capacity to make people see commonality that they didn’t see.

JON SAWYER: Well it goes to Mudawi’s point also about the need for dialogue. You need somebody there, but not... I spent a day with a tribal reconciliation conference south of Nyala and this was a grassroots effort, great family organization, and that particular one didn’t succeed, but there is a great desire to find that space, and I think that we need to have somebody who is over there, and I think Clinton’s a wonderful idea, someone who had international stature

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: You need an envoy to give protection for the process itself, somebody who can stand in front of the Sudanese government, to allow this kind of grassroots effort [43:31]

JAMES ROSEN: But wouldn’t the Sudanese government paint any U.S. envoy as a representative of imperialism, as someone who is, you know, here’s the U.S. here in the person of Bill Clinton or whomever, and try and paint that person as they are going to try for regime change and so forth?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: If he is appointed by the UN, then you can cut this short, a UN envoy is an American but he is a UN envoy.

JAMES ROSEN: Of course it also bears saying that the appointment of Bill Clinton as a prospective envoy to Sudan would not be without its own domestic political consequences here in the United States, especially as we head into a mid-term election year. I want to move on at this point folks. We mentioned earlier that the Sudanese government has so far refused to allow the deployment of a UN blue helmet force, which would be larger and in theory could do more to pacify the situation than the African Union force that has been there for some time. This raises the question of what can be done to change the behavior of the regime in Khartoum, we’ve already been discussing this a little bit, or whether the greatest need is for a change of the actual regime there. Michael Ranneberger, you probably have heard about this from the inside. Has anyone talked at all about regime change in Khartoum? In the Bush administration.

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well the whole point of the policy of course is transformation in Khartoum. I mean,

JAMES ROSEN: Transformation, I’m talking about change of the regime, not behavioral change by the regime

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well transformation is in effect a change of the regime, and here’s why I say that. We’ve said this very clearly, Jack Danforth has said it, we’ve all said it, that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement puts in motion a democratic process that if it works will in effect lead to a democratic system in Khartoum. That means you will not have an Islamic fundamentalist government in Khartoum. Now, that’s not something that happens tomorrow. They have a right to compete in an electoral process. So that is under way, and what we did as Darfur became an issue, we linked Darfur to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, so the two things had to move forward together in order to maintain, to improve relations with us. I did want to add one quick point, on the envoy issue, I don’t want to leave the conversation without making very clear that we do have in effect an envoy in Deputy Secretary Robert Zellick, I mean he spends an enormous amount of his time on this, he has traveled to the region repeatedly, and has the most, has very constructive conversations with President Bashir and Vice President Taha, Salva Kiir, all the players.

JAMES ROSEN: And it’s true that he has visited sites in the Darfur area beyond the sort of normally trafficked sites that VIPs visit.

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: [46:04] Absolutely. I’ve been up with in the Jebal Marra mountains, I mean, yes...

JAMES ROSEN: Samantha Power, I want to go over to you. Should we be trying to effect actual regime change in Khartoum? From your remarks about Iraq earlier it sounds as though perhaps you would think that Khartoum might have been a worthier target for regime change efforts than Baghdad?

SAMANTHA POWER: I mean I’m a great believer in Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn” rule that if you break it you own it. And if we don’t have an appetite right now to staff up in South Sudan, you know, we the world, that is, not we the United States, to actually shore up that peace agreement where there’s actually a peace, and we have barely an appetite to equip 5,000 African Union troops and a couple thousand monitors, the idea that we’re prepared to dislodge the regime and own Mr. Mudawi’s country seems to me very far fetched. So rather than raising expectations and so on I think really thinking about where are the travel bans on Sudanese government officials, where are the asset freezes? For all of the allegedly constructive conversations with Sudanese officials, they’re not that constructive. We’re still seeing people dying and now again there’s major spillover into Chad. I agree totally that Deputy Secretary Zellick has really made his presence felt, but it is spasmodic, I mean by definition he’s got a huge portfolio, namely the globe, to tend to. So there is I think a difference when you have somebody of his stature, which is enormous, and I have to say no other in the entire twentieth century, you never saw somebody at the deputy secretary of state level deployed to do this kind of diplomacy, so I really do credit him, but I think ultimately the peace process, we all have to be very honest, is going no place fast and right now the African Union again for all of the allegedly constructive conversations we’ve had with African governments, have hinged the handover to the UN on the securing of a peace settlement in Abuja, so the linkage now between politics and protection, politics and the settlement, is something we now have to actually break so as to ensure we can actually enhance the protection, ramp it up, and that in turn will then have a constructive effect on the peace process hopefully.

JAMES ROSEN: Very quickly.

JON SAWYER: We also need to recognize how fragile the North-South agreement is, this Comprehensive Peace Agreement that the Ambassador is talking about, that yes it would transform the government if all of its terms came to pass but if you talk to just about anybody in Khartoum or in turn in the South the expectation in the South is that in 2011 when under the CPA the, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, they can vote on secession, they anticipate that they will secede. So we’re looking at the separation of the country, not transformation in the North unless we somehow invigorate that process and that gets back to Mudawi’s point about dialogue and sort of our being involved on the ground bringing all factions together.

JAMES ROSEN: Alright, we have to leave it there, we’re going to move on to another subject. Sixteen months ago the Sudanese government signed this comprehensive peace treaty with southern rebels to end the 21-year-old civil war out of which the Darfur crisis grew. Ongoing peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, have stalled over issues related to the disarmament of the various factions, oil wealth and so forth. Are all the people at that table who need to be at the table in Abuja, Mudawi?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: [49:17] Unfortunately not.

JAMES ROSEN: Who belongs there that isn’t?

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: You know, in the history, the Sudanese government has always been fighting by proxy, using local conflicts. These are grave conflicts, and those people who are fighting are not fighting because of the Sudanese government giving them weapons. They are fighting because they have their own conflicts with the local community and the Sudanese government’s just granting them immunity not to be taken to court. So without bringing these people to the negotiations, you cannot actually do peace. The same thing...

JAMES ROSEN: Is it your view that the talks in Abuja, however successful they might be, will never necessarily have an impact on what’s happening in the western region in Darfur.

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I think it’s going... If you sign a piece of paper in Abuja, a piece of paper ... the level of violence is going to increase.

JAMES ROSEN: Samantha Power, your view of the Abuja talks so far?

SAMANTHA POWER: I mean very very tricky process, because you have rebel groups splintering by the day as Mr. Mudawi said, that you know, we’re not actually including in the process the Janjaweed, we’re assuming that the Sudanese can rein them in, which I think is probably wishful thinking in that, I mean I think that Sudan can have a profound effect on their behavior, but whether they could, you know, sort of call the Janjaweed to heel at this point, given how long, how much time has passed, I think is wishful thinking. I think that until you get a stable security situation, a relatively stable, a more stable security situation, people are necessarily going to gravitate towards those they feel can protect them, and if it’s not going to be African Union or a UN force, or European countries joining an African force, then it’s going to be rebel groups and Arab militia. So to think that we can do politics and do Abuja, without getting this protection piece right and this security piece right, I think is truly wishful thinking.

JAMES ROSEN: We’re closing in on the end of our program Michael Ranneberger, question I wanted to ask you, we really haven’t focused enough in this discussion on the role of the Janjaweed, which are the armed militias backed by the Sudanese government that are carrying out the majority of the atrocities here. Where are they getting their ammunition, their weapons from, their money, their financing? If you tell me it’s from the Sudanese government, where are they getting their weaponry from, their hardware?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well, first of all, let me address that then I want to make one other comment. [51:49] They’re getting support directly from the Sudanese government, there’s no question about it, they also capture weaponry and all of that. Now the Sudanese government has fairly large oil revenues coming in to it and until at least the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed they had free rein to use all of those oil revenues, so weapons purchases, their defense budget...

JAMES ROSEN: Who are they buying their weapons from?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: They buy it from the Chinese, the Russians, and other countries, so it’s a combination. Now there is a UN arms embargo on Darfur that we ourselves helped to achieve through a UN Security Council resolution, so that has somewhat limited the impact. But one point, I think this is a crucial point, on the Darfur peace talks, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is moving ahead too slowly, it does create a context for a peace agreement in Darfur. That process is slow, Mudawi’s absolutely right, it does have to have a component of dialogue within Darfur, but the level of U.S. engagement here is what makes this viable, 1.3 billion dollars a year of U.S. aid going into Sudan to support that Comprehensive Peace Agreement and humanitarian relief. That is one of the largest aid programs of the United States in the world, bar none. So, tremendous level of engagement, that’s what gives us a chance to move ahead.

JAMES ROSEN: Alright, we’re at a point in the program where unfortunately we have to give each of our guests a final chance to summarize their final thoughts and we will begin and proceed in order of the arrangement here on the stage, with Ambassador Ranneberger. You will each have about a minute. What can you tell us that you haven’t had a chance to say already?

MICHAEL RANNEBERGER: Well I think, in watching this process, look, I went out to Darfur in January of 2004. We heard reports of what was happening in Darfur in 2003, the rebels launched these attacks, the government launched the Janjaweed. I flew over Darfur. It was the worst thing I’d ever seen in my life. it was like a scene out of Armageddon. Villages burning as far as the eye could see. As a result of that, and that sort of ground truth reality, I was very pleased that the administration moved so quickly. Within weeks, we had sought a resolution in the UN Security Council, ended up being a presidential statement, President Bush was the first to speak out, we’ve passed four UN Security Council resolutions to maintain pressure, we have put billions of dollars into support for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, humanitarian relief, 85 percent of humanitarian relief is being provided by the U.S. So the one thought I will leave you with, the level of U.S. engagement is tremendous, and again I repeat what I said earlier, it is what lays the basis for stopping the violence completely in Darfur and to achieve a political accord.

JAMES ROSEN: Jon Sawyer, journalist who has been to Darfur many times, produced a documentary about his experiences there. Your final thoughts?

JON SAWYER: I agree the level of engagement is tremendous, as we’ve said before it’s more than any other country, but it is not enough and my sense is, I feel that a year or two ago we somehow went off track. I think the process was a very good process and the idea of building up the African Union, using the African Union troops as a force to deal not just with Sudan but with many other conflicts that have arisen across Africa that we’re not really equipped in Europe and the United States to go in and do ourselves, it’s far better to use Africans, to have Africans staff up and have the ability to do that, I think we were on the way to having that happen. I think we didn’t quite commit enough resources, we were not quite successful enough in persuading the Europeans and the Japanese to write checks as well, so that that money ... so the African Union could have been a bigger force. I think it’s still possible to do that and I’d rather see us seize that opportunity than spend a lot of spinning wheels in effect trying to get a resolution, or in the United Nations, or doing something with NATO, I’d like to see us build on what’s there and increase the presence on the ground, and make the space possible for the kind of dialogue that we talked about here.

JAMES ROSEN: Are you headed back to that country any time soon?

JON SAWYER: Hope to go but I’m not sure when.

JAMES ROSEN: Okay Jon Sawyer, thank you. Dr. Ibrahim Mudawi Adam, please, you’re headed back to that country sometime soon, you’ve been in jail three times over there, do you fear for your life when you get back there? And your final thoughts please as well.

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: The risk is always there.

JAMES ROSEN: The risk is always there you say.

MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Yes, and you know, one thing I’ve always said, troops never solve those problems, an international community cannot solve all problems of the Sudanese. We need the international community to assist the Sudanese who are working for this without protection, to protect them to negotiate a peace deal. And peace is always negotiated while war is going on. You cannot speak about security and peace. You speak about security and insecurity then. So you have to negotiate people who are fighting the wars come and negotiate. You cannot disarm anybody without his will. You have to get him to this negotiating table, he has to be part of it, he has to feel he is part of the solution. The international community can make the environment by pressurizing the Sudanese government to allow this to happen, by putting more effort, by assisting, by protecting Sudanese to involve in the process. I hope we don’t make it wrong again. That the CPA have been negotiated under pressure. And now it’s not going anywhere.

JAMES ROSEN: Dr Mudawi Ibrahim Adam, we’re all impressed by your courage genuinely we wish you well when you go back to Sudan. Finally, author and Pulitzer Prize winner Samantha Power, your final thoughts?

SAMANTHA POWER: When the U.S. government began talking about a NATO bridging force I went to see a very senior French official thinking that since the French had a lot of action going on in Africa that they’d be a good place to start to get a rundown as to who in NATO actually might be interested in supplying advisors or equipment or troops. And as I went through each of the countries that comprise NATO I got one answer after another was, “no, I don’t think, no, not them.” When I got to the Canadians this senior French official said “Oh no no no, definitely not, after Rwanda, I don’t think so.” And so one of the things that’s so amazing is all these students who are out there in America who have put such sustained pressure on the Congress which in turn has put such sustained pressure on the Executive Branch of the Bush administration, legitimating the efforts of people within the State Department who are trying to get this to move up within the ranks of the bureaucracy. All of that effort is so significant and it has to be sustained, but we have got to figure out a way for governments to learn the lesson of Rwanda, and not just domestic political constituencies, and we haven’t yet found out how.

JAMES ROSEN: Samantha Power, thank you very much. Thanks to all of our panel members for this enlightening discussion on the crisis in Darfur. The verdict of history will take many years to render on whether the United States, the Bush administration, the world international community, has done enough to end this crisis. One thing we do know is the crisis continues. For more information on this subject feel free to visit the Web site of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, that’s www.ushmm.org. For all of us tonight, I am James Rosen of Fox News, your moderator, thank you for joining us.