MuseumDESCRIPTION:
Return guest, Mudawi Ibrahim Adam, Chair of the Khartoum-based Sudan Social Development Organization discusses a recent meeting with President Bush, his views on the transition from an African Union force to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, the progress of peace talks in Abuja, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Southern Sudan.
TRANSCRIPT:
NARRATOR: Welcome to Voices on Genocide Prevention, a podcasting service of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Your host is Jerry Fowler, Director of the Museum’s Committee on Conscience.
JERRY FOWLER: Today we are joined by Dr. Mudawi Ibrahim Adam who is the Chair of the Sudan Social Development Organization, known by its acronym SUDO. SUDO is a Khartoum-based organization dedicated to the promotion and protection of human rights, peace building, and development, and has been monitoring human rights abuses in Darfur. Dr. Mudawi, welcome.
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Thank you.
JERRY FOWLER: Dr. Mudawi, you are back in the United States; you were actually our first guest on Voices on Genocide Prevention, and you are also our first return guest, so it is especially nice to have you here. On this trip, you met with the President, President Bush. What did you tell him?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I told him about the need for a political process in Darfur to bring people together who are part of the conflict, and the need for protection for this political process and for the civilians to go together, and that there is need to apply more pressure on the Sudanese government to accept these deals.
JERRY FOWLER: I want to deal with those three things in turn—political process, protection and pressure. You could say, “The three P’s”—political process, protection and pressure. But first let me ask you how did the President receive it? What was his attitude?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I think he received it very positively and he is replying very positively—he is with a political process; he is with a solution to the conflict; and he is with the protection of the civilians.
JERRY FOWLER: Let us talk first about a political process. There is a political process that is ongoing in the Nigerian capitol of Abuja which is basically negotiations between rebel leaders and the Sudanese government. Is that political process going to work?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: This political process is not inclusive because not all of the artists of the conflict are involved in the talks. If this Abuja process in this composition now resulted in any kind of agreement it would be an incomplete agreement. It will be between the rebels and the government. It will not involve militias who are fighting on the ground, tribes who are fighting with the rebels on the ground. You need a kind of complete and inclusive process to take place in Darfur.
JERRY FOWLER: So basically if I understand you correctly, you are saying that there are not enough people at the table in Abuja? Not all of the interests in the conflict are represented?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Actually what is happening on the ground that the government is not fighting directly with the rebels; they are fighting by proxy; they are using local conflicts which is conflicts between the tribes on issues—land, other resources like water, or grazing land—and they are using these militias to fight on their behalf. These are the real parties to the conflict on the ground. Then you have people that have been displaced. There is an assumption that the rebels representing those people who are displaced and this is not true. These people—this is a very big majority in Darfur—are not brought to the negotiating table, so whatever comes out of Abuja will be between the rebels and the government of Sudan. It will not be between all Darfuris; they will not be accepting it because they have not negotiated it and they will not feel as if it is representing them.
JERRY FOWLER: One of the tactics as you have alluded to that the Sudanese government is using in Darfur and has used elsewhere—for example in the South for many years—is inflaming local conflicts, inflaming ethnic tensions. Do they even have an interest in bringing about peace in Darfur?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: No, I do not think they are in a position to accept any kind of a peace deal in Darfur because if you look at the CPA, the CPA—
JERRY FOWLER: The CPA is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government and the Southern rebels.
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: It is saying that the North is having something like seventy percent of the share of the power. Out of this is fifty-two percent going to the NCPA, which is the ruling party, the National Congress Party. Fourteen percent will be going to the other Northern position parties. If you are going to get any share for the Darfuris from the power sharing—if they are saying Darfur is going to get a share of twenty percent from the total—they are going to take it from the fifty-two percent of the National Congress, and the National Congress is not going to accept because the National Congress will be a minority in the government; they will lose power. They are maintaining power through this fifty-two percent. They are not really going to go into a real peace process which ground the different people or the different regions that are sharing power.
JERRY FOWLER: Let me ask you this then: if the government really does not have an interest in reaching an agreement is this process that you envision one that includes the government or is it Darfurians without the government even being present?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: It should be Darfurian without the government being present. You might have government agents, but the government itself, if it is present, it will undermine the whole process because they have a history of corrupting people, and using this money, and dividing them—the same thing they are doing on the ground.
JERRY FOWLER: But how could you set up a process that excludes the government? I am trying to understand how practically that would work. Where would it take place?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: If there is an international will, it will happen. It can happen even inside Darfur, but they need international will, that the international community wants to happen. They can force the Sudanese government to comply.
JERRY FOWLER: I guess that raises the third “P.” We have skipped over—at least for the moment—the second “P” of protection, but the third “P” of pressure on the Sudanese government—do you think the Sudanese government is feeling pressure now from the international community?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: No, they are not. I think the pressure has loosened a little bit because of this war against terror that the United States is saying that they are getting information from the Sudanese government. They have escorted the Security Minister from Khartoum to Washington in a United States plane. The pressure is slackening on this.
JERRY FOWLER: What would be necessary to increase the pressure? What kinds of steps could be taken that would make the Khartoum government feel pressure?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I think one of the things for implementing the resolutions of the Security Council on Darfur is the International Criminal Court, enforcing the no-fly zone, targeting certain individuals by sanctions because of their actions in Darfur—all these kinds of things can be done.
JERRY FOWLER: Do you think that the government is amenable to pressure? Might it just be the case that if a lot of pressure is put on them, they will just say, “Okay, we are just not going to participate at all.”?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: If they feel as individuals, they are certain, then things are going to change, but if it is collective, if it is on Sudan—sanctions or pressures on Sudan as Sudan—they do not care. But if it is targeting individuals, then that makes the difference.
JERRY FOWLER: Do you think that the top officials in the government think that sanctions may be imposed? They were authorized a year ago now, and recently, apparently, the sanctions committee identified top individuals who have been obstructing the peace process, or have been obstructing peace, or have been contributing to instability in Darfur. Is there a sense in Khartoum that sanctions will actually be imposed?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Yes, I think there are feelings that sanctions will be imposed. I think, also, it can be pushed by human rights groups in their countries; they must make sure that these sanctions are imposed. For example, not giving them visas, freezing their assets, all these kinds of things can happen due to pressure of the human rights organizations in the countries that are concerned.
JERRY FOWLER: Why do you think it is that the international community has not followed through on, for example, a no-fly zone or these targeted sanctions?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I think because of the different interests—this war against terror—I think this is affecting the whole thing.
JERRY FOWLER: The war against terror; but there are a lot of countries, other than the United States, that is certainly a big interest to the United States, but other countries that are not necessarily as engaged in that...
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: There are other countries like China, for example, that have an interest. They are defending the Sudanese government, and they have interests in the oil. They are really using it. You have Russia; they are selling these weapons and antinovs to the Sudanese government. Those people have interests and they will never apply these sanctions, or apply this no-fly zone. The others also have their own interests that are not allowing them to help. Some of the people and countries are saying that they do not want to undermine the peace process where the CPA has been signed by the government and that they want them to implement it, and do not want to undermine that, but I think this is not realistic because the peace had been signed under pressure. If they want it to be implemented, they have to implement it under pressure.
JERRY FOWLER: They have to keep up the pressure. Pressure led to the signing and it will be pressure to lead to implementation if it happens at all. What about the African Union? Do you think that they are disposed to put pressure on Khartoum?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: No, Khartoum is more influential than the African Union then the other countries, many countries. They are the ones who have put pressure on the African Union, not the African Union putting pressure on them.
JERRY FOWLER: Obviously, a focus of discussions most recently has been transitioning the African Union mission in Sudan into a United Nations mission, and the Sudanese government has launched a real publicity campaign against international involvement, especially deployment of any non-African troops in Darfur. They have organized a few demonstrations. What is the public sense in Khartoum? Is there public concern about having non-African troops in Darfur?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I think the public are really laughing at the campaign because the campaign is saying that we do not want international groups; we do not want foreign troops in Sudan. On one hand, we have 10,000 foreign troops, according to the CPA, under the Mission of the United Nations in the South and in the headquarters in Khartoum. Then, these are foreign troops, and also the Africans themselves are foreign troops; they are not coming from Darfur; they are coming from outside Darfur. The campaign is really not genuine; people are laughing at this. It does not make any sense, and even in the newspaper in Khartoum, they are all writing against it, saying that it is not a realistic campaign. You cannot make a campaign against something which you accept on the same country.
JERRY FOWLER: There were reports of demonstrations in Khartoum against greater United Nations involvement. What does it mean in a country like Sudan—not in a country like Sudan, but in Sudan—with a dictatorship when there is a demonstration? How do those come about?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: This is very simple. It is organized by the National Congress. It is organized by the ruling party, and it is not a big demonstration, but if you are in power you can bring people using different means. It is organized and done by the ruling party. They might name it under different names and organizations, but all people know that this is the National Congress Party.
JERRY FOWLER: Continuing on this issue of protection which was one of your “P’s,” if there is a transition to a United Nations force—I believe when we spoke before, you expressed the view that the African Union was not really able to protect civilians sufficiently, that it was not respected on the ground—what kind of force is needed in order to protect civilians? How big would it need to be? What kind of capabilities would it have to have?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: If there is a peace process going on, on the ground, then you do not need a really big force. You need a very small, highly mobile, well trained contingent which can respond to the needs. You do not need a big troop on the ground. If you do not have a peace process, you are not engaging people; whatever the size of the troops you have, it will make no effect because people will not really respect whatever forces are there. But if these people are engaged in the peace process, if they are engaged in dialogue, they will be committed actually to the peace, and you do not need a big force. When you need a force to accompany the peace process, you need a small contingent, not a big one, but it should be highly trained, well mobile, so that it can respond to the need, because if there is any other group, whatever small, they are trying to attack a place or to attack the civilians, they have to be responded to directly.
JERRY FOWLER: What you are describing does not sound like a normal United Nations peacekeeping operation. It sounds more like the involvement of western troops.
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: It is not a United Nations operation, and also I think we should not be looking at the conflicts as similar because each conflict is a unique conflict. It has its own dynamics, and it has to be looked at with this view. For example, now, after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, they have decided to bring 10,000 troops in Sudan. What for? Why do we need them? They signed the peace agreement, and then it took them six months to bring the first contingent, and nothing happened, and now, nothing is happening. In the case of Sudan, do you need so many people to come in as peacekeepers? You do not need this. You need people to sign into the peace agreement; you need people to get engaged with the peace agreement, and that is it. You need very few people to monitor what is going on; you do not need a very big contingent on Darfur.
JERRY FOWLER: Turning to the issue of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it has now been well over a year since the agreement was signed and it has been about nine months since the death of the Southern rebel leader, John Garang, how do you assess implementation at this point?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: I do not think the peace agreement is being implemented according to schedule. It is running far behind what had been scheduled. That is due to many reasons. The first one is that the pressure has been lifted. Second is that there is unwillingness from the National Congress Party to give up power because it is something to give up power. There is unwillingness to give power. Then you have also issues of capacity that neither the National Congress nor the Khartoum government has that capacity to deliver, nor does the SPLM have the capacity to implement the peace agreement. These are problems. The ruling party is very reluctant to give up power, so they will just go on trying to delay implementation of the peace agreement since the SPLM does not have organizational capacity to force them to implement it.
JERRY FOWLER: Does pressure on the government—when I say the government, the National Congress Party—with regard to Darfur, interfere with implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? Or can that pressure be mutually reinforcing?
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: When you are applying pressure on the government, you will have dual effects. You can apply to have Darfur issue be resolved, and you apply the same to see that the peace process is being implemented. I think pressure has to do with giving up power because when you maintain pressure you force people to give up power. Giving up power, resolving the implementation of the peace agreement, means the National Congress Party has to give up power, and resolving the conflict in Darfur also means that the National Congress Party has to lose power, so this pressure has to be applied.
JERRY FOWLER: Dr. Mudawi, I know you have a conference call you have to get on. Thanks so much for joining us again, and I hope we will see you again before too long.
MUDAWI IBRAHIM ADAM: Thank you Jerry.
JERRY FOWLER: Take care. You have been listening to an interview with Dr. Mudawi Ibrahim Adam, the Chair of the Sudan Social Development Organization, and I am Jerry Fowler.
NARRATOR: You have been listening to Voices on Genocide Prevention, a podcasting service of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. To learn more about the Museum’s Committee on Conscience, visit our website at www.committeeonconscience.org.
