MuseumDESCRIPTION:
Jerry Fowler and Sudanese scholar Albaquir Mukhtar discuss the ways in which competing notions of identity contribute to conflict in Sudan. They touch on the ongoing crisis in Darfur, as well as the longstanding conflict in the south and the potential for future violence in eastern Sudan.
TRANSCRIPT:
NARRATOR: Welcome to Voices on Genocide Prevention, a podcasting service of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, hosted by Jerry Fowler, director of the Museum’s Committee on Conscience.
JERRY FOWLER: Our guest today is Dr. Albaquir Mukhtar. He is a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace researching the relationship between identity and conflict in Sudan. He has taught at universities in both Sudan and the United Kingdom and was regional campaign coordinator for the Middle East and Africa at Amnesty International in London. Dr. Mukhtar, welcome to the program.
ALBAQUIR MUKHTAR: Thank you very much. I am very glad to be with you.
JERRY FOWLER: Let me start with quite a broad question. When we talk about identity, who are the Sudanese?
ALBAQUIR MUKHTAR: The Sudanese are a people with many identities. Usually Sudan is described as a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-lingual country. There are hundreds of languages spoken in Sudan. There are tens, if not hundreds, of ethnic groups. But, usually the distinction is made between those who claim to be Arabs and those who do not have this self-proclaimed title, but who are considered as the indigenous people or the African people of Sudan. Sudan’s problem is that it has not—as a state—been built on this multiplicity of identities. It has been built on one identity, this Arab/Islamic identity that has tried to get all of the other identity into it—to assimilate them and to change them into Arab-speaking and Muslim people.
JERRY FOWLER: So, the idea was to take this multiplicity of identities and combine them into one Arab-Islamic identity.
ALBAQUIR MUKHTAR: This is the idea of the state, the institutional position of the ruling class in Sudan.
JERRY FOWLER: When you refer to Arabs, you refer to them as people who claim to be Arabs. What is the source, the origin or Arab identity in Sudan?
ALBAQUIR MUKHTAR: My idea, and my own thoughts are that this part of Sudan, the ruling class, the people who live along the banks of the Nile, from the far north of Sudan to the center of Sudan, and Khartoum and the big cities, these people are originally Nubians. They are the ancestors of the Nubians who produced the great Nubian civilization into history. But over the course of history, they have been influenced by Arab immigration into the country, and in the process, they have been Arabized. The vast majority of the Sudanese in this part of Sudan—in the Nile river valley—they are Arabized Nubians. This is belief versus reality. The general belief is that these people are Arabs. They do not look like Arabs. They are not considered Arabs by the Arabs in Saudi Arabia, in the Gulf, in Syria, in Lebanon, they do not consider them as Arabs, they consider them as black people, or slaves even. They do not look like the Arabs of the Gulf, but they believe that their fathers are Arabs and their mothers are African, and this how they explain their looks, their features, which do not look like Arabs. In the Arabic-Islamic culture, if your father is an Arab, then you are an Arab, no matter how you look. This is how this belief came to be. This is why people like me who started to study these things would claim to be Arabs. I belong to these people, but I do not consider myself Arab. I consider myself as an Arabic-speaking Sudanese, or an Arabized Nubian.
JERRY FOWLER: You mention that the project of this ruling class in Sudan historically has been to assimilate people who do not identify themselves as Arab, into an Arab identity. Where does the project come from? What is the source of it?
ALBAQUIR MUKHTAR: The source of it is in History. We know that during the British Colonial period, the British were confused in the South—their policies were very confused. They made conflicting policies. They decided that the South of the country had nothing to do with the North. They wanted to develop it separately so they issued this ordain, called the Ordain of Closed Areas, and they closed the South in the face of the North. They started to change all the pieces of identity. The British consider as belonging to the Arab identity in the South. They started to stop them. So whenever somebody’s name was Arabic, they changed it into European or a tribal name in the South. They stopped so many things. Very ironically, we have this tradition of female circumcision—genital mutilation—and it has always been practiced in the North. But some southerners, influenced by the connections with the northerners, started to do it. The British, once they stopped it, did not stop it as something that is bad in itself, but they stopped it as a piece of identity that belongs to the North. Then the British opened the South to the machineries. So all the Churches were given areas to operate on in the South. Education was left for the Churches to do. When Independence came, then the British, of course in due course, just before Independence, they changed and reversed their policies. Instead of learning to develop the South separately they decided to link it with the North and unite it with the North. So when Independence came, then the northern elite, the ruling class who inherited power from the British, they distinctly said, “Well the British did this, then let us undo what the British did.” They started to expel the machineries. They started to establish a number of Mosques, Islamic institutes; they changed the English language into Arabic. Arabic became the means of instruction in the schools. Then they imposed Arabic names on the people and they imposed Arabic grace. They just thought that since the British were very clever and wanted to do this, they would do it in reverse. They tried to reverse the British policies. This is one reason.
The other reason is that when there was the rebellion that started in the South in 1955—a rebellion of the southerners against this imposition of northern identity. When this started, the ruling class did a political analysis of the situation. They asked themselves this question, “Why is it that we had a war in the South, but we do not have a war in Darfur—at that time—in the East, or in any other part of the country?” They said, “Because the South is different. Because the South in non-Muslim. Because the South is not speaking Arabic. So how we remove the causes of the war is to Arabize and Islamize the South.” And this is how the idea of Islamization of the South and Arabization of the South came to serve two things. First, as a solution for the conflict. The conflict came as a result of difference, so we have to remove the difference. This is one thing. The other thing is the role of the ruling class that they assign for themselves. They think that they have a role to play on behalf of the Arab countries, on behalf of the Arabic and Islamic culture. That is, to take this culture, to impart into the South, and beyond. When we finish Islamizing the South, we will move onto the rest of Africa. So there is a mission that is assigned to the ruling class in Sudan by the Arabic world. This is why we have in the Arab world; they went to the Arab to world to bring arms or support. The Arab countries have been the main supporters of the Khartoum government’s war in the South. These are the main reasons we have had this conflict in the South.
JERRY FOWLER: You have been talking about the conflict in the South and the separate identity there, and you mention the fact that there was not conflict in the rest of Sudan. But what we see today, especially in Darfur, in the West, is conflict. Somehow that is connected to identity. How did this come about? Why did the relative peace end?
ALBAQUIR MUKHTAR: I think, simply at that time they did not foresee that they had a potential problem that could erupt in Darfur at anytime. Of course, because they have a false analysis—that the problem comes from difference and that we have to remove the difference—this is why they had the wrong analysis, and arrived at the wrong conclusions. The other thing is that the problem of Darfur came as a result of marginalization. Marginaliziation—political and economic marginalization—Darfur is neglected by all the governments. Then also the co-existence between the different ethnic groups within Darfur—and we have Arab tribes in Darfur, and we have indigenous African tribes there—and there was a relative peace and co-existence between them. This is being tested as nature becomes less generous and you had the desertification in the area and we had the drought. The resources become very scarce. This combined with the historical negligence of Darfur caused the tensions. These tensions, historically were between the nomads and the sedentary farmers. They were also historically resolved by traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in Darfur. But then, on the one hand, the problems became acute, and also the mechanisms of conflict resolution became inadequate to address these new realities. The Arab tribes tried also to have a final solution there. The final solution there is to get the land from the indigenous people. Since the indigenous people are sedentary farmers, they live in the most fertile lands, in the oasis’s, and the nomads usually occupy the northern part, which is very arid and harsh. Traditionally they came during the harsh season, the dry season, and would be hosted by the sedentary farmers. There was a mechanism—“When I harvest my crops, then you can put your animal into my farm to eat the hay.” So the farmers and the nomads were able to live together. But now that the situation has become worse, the nomads started to come and attack the crops even before they were harvested. Then, the conflict erupted. And when the conflict erupted, the government sided with the Arabs.
The marginalization itself—there is a question that we have to ask—why was Darfur marginalized? Why was the center of Sudan not marginalized? And here comes the issue of identity. The reason for the killings, and the economic and political marginalization, is identity. The Darfurians—even including the Arab tribes in that part of Sudan—are considered as second-class citizens. They just do not figure in the planning of the ruling class. And all the reasons for the marginalization come from identity.
JERRY FOWLER: The Arabs in Darfur are marginalized as well. How is it that they did not make common cause with the non-Arabs of Darfur against the ruling class from Khartoum?
ALBAQUIR MUKHTAR: Some of them did, but the majority could tolerate the type of marginalization since their way of life is continuing uninterrupted. But at the same time, when they face a problem, they rely on the government. When it comes to either them or the others, they know the government will choose to side with them. It is a type of double standard. The government will marginalize the whole region. Then, when problems come up the government will side with one of them, against the other. But there are some that came from the Arab tribes themselves that understand this. They understand that they have been equally marginalized and used. When the government recruited the Janjaweed from among the groups, they were being used to fight as a proxy. All the bad reputation that they have at the moment is because they have been used by the government. There are some of them that actually joined the rebel groups from the Arab tribes.
JERRY FOWLER: The South was marginalized, and you had war. The West was marginalized, and now you have war, or conflict—we would say genocide because the civilian populations are suffering. My understanding is the East of Sudan is also marginalized and there has been a low-level conflict there. Is that the next catastrophe that is waiting around the corner?
ALBAQUIR MUKHTAR: I think so. I think so. The conflict has always been there, the war has always been there, but because this is a low-intensity war, the international community has unfortunately not been involved or attracted to it. You do not attract their attention unless there is something very, very bad happening. It is going on in the East and I do think it is the next catastrophe, unless the international community takes responsibility now and enforces similar agreements, similar to the CPA, for Darfur and for the East, so that we can avert and avoid such a conflict.
JERRY FOWLER: Dr. Mukhtar, thank you very much for being with us.
ALBAQUIR MUKHTAR: Thank you very much indeed.
NARRATOR: You have been listening to Voices on Genocide Prevention, a podcasting service of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. To learn more about the genocide emergency in Darfur, visit our website at www.committeeonconscience.org.
