On July 14, 2008, International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo asked the court to issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, charging him with several counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for the government's role in orchestrating genocidal violence in Darfur. In announcing the request, Ocampo said that President Bashir had “masterminded and implemented” a strategy aimed at destroying the three primary ethnic groups in Darfur: the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masaalit. The ICC judges may take several months to review the evidence before deciding whether or not to issue the warrant. This request is the first time the ICC prosecutor has brought charges against a sitting head of state. Tensions in Sudan remain high, as government-led reprisals could hamper humanitarian aid efforts, peace negotiations in Darfur, or the beleaguered UN peacekeeping deployment.
The charges against Bashir come amidst continuing conflict in Darfur and a mixed record of implementing the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan’s north and south. In May, government forces attacked and destroyed the disputed border town of Abyei. Some plans, however, are moving forward for the first national elections in more than 20 years.
In the CPA, the final status of Abyei, an oil rich area, was left to international arbitration. The Government of Sudan rejected a mediated decision and tensions had been building around the area for several months. In May, the tensions and sporadic violence culminated in a government attack that resulted in the displacement of 50,000 people and destroyed the town.
In response to the violence, the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) re-deployed to Abyei in June, paving the way for people to return with assistance from the UN. Established by the CPA, the JIU is comprised of an equal number of soldiers from SAF and the SPLA and is responsible for securing the region from other forces.
Although the fighting in Abyei threatened to disrupt immediate political progress, the Sudanese government proceeded in early July under the terms of the 2005 peace deal by passing a new electoral law that allows preparations for a national election next year. A national census, begun in late April as a prerequisite for the 2009 elections, is being conducted and will help determine the distribution of power and oil proceeds throughout Sudan. Complicated by the movement of displaced populations, vocal opposition from Darfur’s rebel groups, and the difficulties of accessing parts of the country due to fighting and landmines, the official count is likely to be problematic.
WINTER 2008 Tensions between Sudan's North and South highlighted concerns about the viability of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). One of the main disputes has been over control of oil rich regions, like that of Abyei. An international boundary commission appointed to resolve these issues and delineate the borders of each region placed Abyei in the South, but the North rejected this decision. The Government of Sudan has also failed to redeploy troops in other contested oil-rich areas. Fighting has occurred in Bahr-al-Ghazal between Misseriya militias and former SPLA rebels in early March, causing an estimated 70 deaths. The same area suffered violence in December as well, resulting in approximately 100 deaths.
Within the South, there are also divisions about the region's future, with some leaders advocating remaining inside Sudan and others pushing for eventual Southern independence. This issue will continue to be debated among Southerners leading up to the planned national election in 2009 and a 2011 national referendum on the South's status, as stipulated in the CPA. A crucial step to prepare for these events is the national census, currently scheduled to take place between April 15 and 30.
WINTER 2007 On October 11, 2007, the former southern rebel movement, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), suspended its participation in the Government of National Unity. The move was triggered by deep dissatisfaction among southerners with implementation of and the ruling National Congress Party's commitment to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in 2005 and ended a two-decade war between the Khartoum-based government and the SPLM. Key points of contention include the demarcation line between the South and North, particularly in the three disputed areas of Abyei, Southern Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains; the removal of northern troops from the South; oil-revenue sharing; and preparations for 2009 national elections, including a census. The government of Southern Sudan also cited censorship and manipulation of the press as core concerns. While both sides have expressed their commitment to the CPA, discussions to bridge the differences have made little progress. Both sides agreed to some troop redeployments by January 9, 2008, the third anniversary of the CPA signing. But talks fell apart during a trip to the United States by Salva Kiir, the president of Southern Sudan and the first vice-president in the Government of National Unity. The National Congress Party leadership has been highly critical of Kiir's attempts to re-engage the international community in overseeing the implementation of the CPA.
2006 - 2007 John Garang, the newly sworn-in First Vice President of Sudan and leader of the southern Sudanese rebels, died on July 31, 2005, when a helicopter he was traveling in crashed near the Ugandan border with Sudan. Garang was the undisputed leader of the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and a pivotal figure in the peace negotiations that culminated on January 9, 2005, with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the decades long rebellion in southern Sudan. His death puts into question the viability of the CPA.
Since Garang's death, the implementation of the CPA has been slow and partial at best. The SPLA has become spread thin in its role as lead party in the new autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and the minority partner in the new Government of National Unity. They have been unsuccessful in challenging the failure to implement provisions of the CPA by the Khartoum based National Congress Party. While oil money has been flowing from the North to the South as dictated by the CPA, many other security issues and integration plans for the Northern and Southern troops have failed to coalesce. Currently one of the most frightening failed aspects of the CPA has been the lack of motion towards organizing the national elections required to occur no later than July 2009. US officials and representatives of the GoSS have voiced concern of severely increased instability in the region if these elections fail to occur.
The conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan is increasing tensions in North South conflicts due to spill-over violence in the region as well as a sense of abandonment by the international community who has diverted all attention on the country to the crisis in Darfur. US Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios stated on February 8th 2007 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that "without international action to energize the implementation of the CPA, the most likely outcome will be two Sudans." In a recent meeting Natsios commented on the disastrous nature of such a split with fears of increased violence throughout the region.
THE PEACE PROCESS
The peace process for southern Sudan, sponsored by the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and mediated by Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, gained momentum with the signing by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM of a framework for peace in July 2002. The parties later agreed to a cessation of hostilities and to unimpeded humanitarian access for international aid. On September 25, 2003, they signed an agreement on security arrangements, a key stumbling block. Other difficult issues involving power-sharing, control over contested regions, and a plan for a referendum on Southern independence to be held in six years time, were agreed to on May 26, 2004. The process culminated on January 9, 2005, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), bringing an end to Africa's longest-running war. Under the terms of the CPA, Garang was sworn in as First Vice-President of a new Government of National Unity on July 9, 2005.
Although conditions have improved for Sudan's vulnerable populations in the South and Nuba Mountains, implementation of the CPA potentially weakened by Garang's death -- requires active monitoring. The government's brutality in the western region of Darfur, which led the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum to declare a Genocide Emergency in July 2004, has raised many questions about the its commitment to peace. Garang's death also dashes hopes that his presence in the new Government of National Unity would speed progress in resolving Darfur.
BACKGROUND
Sudan's racial, ethnic and religious diversity makes it difficult to characterize the conflict in simple terms. It is sometimes described as pitting the Arabic-speaking, Islamic North against the African South, where Christianity and traditional religions predominate. This description contains some truth, but does not entirely capture the complexity of the situation. For example, the Nuba peoples who have suffered so much live in central Sudan, and many of them are Muslims. And one pernicious government strategy - part of its "divide to destroy" efforts - has been to encourage fighting within and among groups in the South, especially the Dinka and Nuer, with devastating effects for civilian members of those groups. In any event, the primary author of the Sudanese catastrophe over the past decade has been the Khartoum-based government of Omar el-Bashir, an army officer who seized power in a 1989 coup. The government strategies against southern groups it fought included:
DIVIDE TO DESTROY
The Sudanese government used a divide-to-destroy strategy to pit ethnic groups against each other, with devastating effects for civilians. Government-sponsored militias torched houses, looted food supplies and other property, and raped and murdered with impunity. The government tolerated the taking of slaves, along with other booty, by Arab tribal militias that raided villages in the south and the Nuba Mountains. It also used religion as a spur to violence, justifying persecution of and attacks against Christians, followers of traditional indigenous religions and Muslims who rejected the government's extreme form of Islam.
President Omar Al-Bashir at Arab Tribal militia.
STARVATION AS A WEAPON OF DESTRUCTION
Systematic human rights abuses were the direct cause of the famine in Bahr El Ghazal [that] affected ... approximately one million people, a majority of them Dinka. — Human Rights Watch
Credit: Eric Bouvet/Liasion Agency
The Sudanese government used starvation as a weapon. It attacked civilian food production and supplies, then obstructed international relief. This strategy decimated the Nuba people of central Sudan. And in 1998, a famine in southern Sudan endangered millions and killed tens of thousands, mostly Dinka. Although the government and its proxies were the primary agents of the famine, the consequences of the government's actions have been worsened by food diversion by the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and some local chiefs.
OIL: MOTIVE, MEANS FOR GENOCIDE
In late 1999, the Sudanese government began earning hundreds of millions of dollars from oil exports, made possible in part by Western oil companies like Talisman Energy. This hard currency gave means and greater motive to accelerate its assault on disfavored groups. Greater means, because the oil revenues financed the purchase of new weapons. As one Sudanese cabinet minister said, "What prevents us from fighting while we possess the oil that supports us in this battle even if it lasts for a century?"
An Interview with Diane deGuzman
Diane deGuzman served as Coordinator of Humanitarian Principles for UNICEF in southern Sudan, traveling extensively through areas affected by oil development. She spoke to Committee on Conscience staff about what she saw herself and heard in interviews with hundreds of displaced Sudanese.
Greater motive, because the government could tap the country's estimated reserves of some 8 billion barrels only if it cleansed ethnic groups like the Dinka and Nuer from the land under which it sits. The need to secure oil fields fueled a vicious scorched earth campaign, laying waste to a broad swath of territory. Amnesty International documented what it called "the human price of oil" in Sudan: "a pattern of extrajudicial and indiscriminate killings, torture and rape -committed against people not taking active part in the hostilities."
Museum
![Systematic human rights abuses were the direct cause of the famine in Bahr El Ghazal [that] affected ... approximately one million people, a majority of them Dinka.](images/burial_child.gif)
